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This chapter is based on the following published, peer reviewed journal articles:
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “SAInt -
A novel quasi-dynamic Model for assessing Security of Supply in coupled
Gas and Electricity Transmission Networks,” in Applied Energy, vol. 203, pp.
829 – 857, 2017.
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “Devel-
opment of a simulation framework for analyzing Security of Supply in
integrated gas and electricity systems,” in Applied Sciences, vol. 7, no. 1,
pp. 47, 2017.
• B. Cakir Erdener, K. A. Pambour, R. B. Lavin, and B. Dengiz, “An integrated
simulation model for analysing electricity and gas systems,” in Interna-
tional Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, vol. 61, no. 0, pp. 410 – 420,
2014.
1.1. Background and Motivation
Energy policies in the EU (European Union) and in many other regions in the world are
aiming at reducing the emission of green house gases (GHG) to combat global warming
and its impact on climate change. Among many if not all economic sectors, that of power
is one of the largest emitters of GHG, with a share of 25% in total global GHG emission
in 2010 [1]. Accordingly, this sector has been identified as one of the key economic sectors
for enforcing low-carbon policies.
In its energy roadmap for 2050 [2], the European Commission set a target to reduce the
emission of GHG in the power sector by 54-68% by 2030 and 93-99% by 2050 compared
to 1990. One of the key measures to fulfilling this ambitious goal is to increase the share
of renewable energy sources (RES), in particular, wind and solar energy in the primary
energy mix for power generation. Germany, for instance, has asserted as part of its “En-
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ergiewende” the goal to increase the share of power generation from RES to 35% by 2020
and 80% by 2050 [3].
The increased share of variable and intermittent RES comes with challenges mainly where
the flexibility, reliability and sustainability of the electric power system are concerned.
The stable operation of an electric power system requires a balance between total power
generation, total power demand and total power losses incurred in lines and other compo-
nents. The integration of RES introduces uncertainties in power generation which have to
be compensated for by other generation units to ensure a stable operation of the electric
power system. This requires the availability of flexible and reliable back-up generation
units that can rapidly respond to reduced generation capacities and contingencies in the
electric power system and the availability of energy storage capacities in case of need to
store excess electric energy generated by RES.
1.1.1. Gas Supply to Power System Networks
The first requirement can be met by natural gas fired power plants (GFPP) which are
known to be reliable and more flexible than conventional thermal power plants such as
coal and nuclear plants. Gas fired generators typically have relatively short start up and
shut down times, low start up and shut down costs and high ramp rates. Furthermore, the
advancements in the gas turbine technology from single towards combined cycle machines
has increased the overall efficiency of gas fired generators. GFPPs are typically connected
to high pressure natural gas transmission networks, which supply the gas fired generators
with the required quantity of gas at the desired pressure, since the storage of large volumes
of gas on-site is not an option due to economic and security concerns. The gas generators
in a GFPP require a specific fuel gas pressure in order to maintain operation [4]. If the
fuel gas pressure goes below this threshold the gas generators have to either curtail the
gas offtake or in the worse case shut down the entire station [5].
Another aspect that makes the use of GFPPs more attractive than other plant types, is
the relatively small amount of GHG emitted when natural gas is combusted compared to
other fossil fuels like coal and oil. Moreover, the improvements in shale gas exploitation and
liquefication technology has increased the attractiveness of natural gas from an economic
point of view [6]. Due to this positive characteristics, natural gas is regarded as the main
backup fuel for RES in case of shortage or loss of generation capacity.
As a result, the importance of natural gas in the global primary energy mix for power
generation has increased in the last decade and is expected to increase further in the
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future as more RES are integrated into the power system1. According to a projection
by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) [7], the global share of natural gas for
power generation is expected to grow by 2.7% per year from 2012 to 2040, which is just
0.2 percent points less than the projected growth rate for RES, which have the highest
growth rate among all primary energy sources for power generation [7]. In 2040 natural
gas is expected to account for almost 30% of total global power generation, which is an
increase of 8 percent points compared to 2012.
1.1.2. Energy Storage through Power-to-Gas
The connection to gas networks can also serve the purpose of storing a surplus of electric
energy generated by RES. Unlike natural gas, electric energy cannot be stored economi-
cally in large quantities in current electric power systems. As a result, excess generation
from RES is curtailed in order to avoid an imbalance between generation and demand.
This energy losses can be avoided by using the capacities in gas pipeline networks as
energy storage. Gas networks typically have large storage capacities available in pipelines
and in underground gas storage facilities, especially in seasons of reduced gas demand,
typically during summer time. The available storage capacities can be utilized by con-
verting electric energy into chemical energy in the form of hydrogen (electric energy is
used in water electrolysis to separate water into hydrogen and oxygen) and/or synthetic
natural gas (SNG, methane is generated through a chemical reaction of hydrogen and
carbon dioxide), which can be injected into the gas system and used for power produc-
tion by GFPPs in periods of peak power demand or reduced generation by RES. This
electro-chemical process, also referred to as Power-to-Gas, has gained great interest in
recent years [8]. The first Power-to-Gas facilities are already in operation and several
additional installations are planned across Europe [9]. The ongoing advancements in the
P2G technology and the increasing number of installations of P2G facilities will increase
the coupling between gas and electric power systems.
1.1.3. Power Supply to Gas Pipeline Networks
Not only is the importance of natural gas for the electric power system increasing, but
also the gas system is increasingly dependent on reliable power supply from the elec-
tricity system. Many facilities in the gas system (e.g. electric drivers in gas compressor
1This is not the case in the EU. In fact between 2010 and 2015 the drop in gas consumption for electrcity
production has resulted in a general drop in gas consumption.
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stations and underground gas storage facilities, liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification
terminals, regulator and metering stations, valve stations etc.) rely on power supply from
the electric system in order to operate. LNG regasification terminals, for instance, need
electirc power to cool down the LNG stored in storage tanks and to operate low and
high pressure pumps required for increasing the pressure of the LNG to pipeline pressure
before the vaporization process. Furthermore, compressor stations may rely on electric
power supply from the electricity network to operate electric motors which drive the
compressors, in order to increase the gas pressure for transportation. The use of electric
drivers in gas compressor stations has increased in recent years [10]. Electric drivers are
particularly attractive in situations where the use of conventional gas engines or turbines
may be limited by emission restrictions or other environmental regulations [5]. Moreover,
electric drivers outperform conventional gas turbines by higher mechanical efficiencies,
lower operating and maintenance costs and a higher flexibility and controllability [11].
1.1.4. Security of Supply in interconnected Gas and Electric Power
Systems
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the operation of gas and electric power
systems is increasingly interdependent. This development is connected with challenges
concerning security of energy supply. Security of energy supply is defined as the uninter-
rupted supply of energy to customers particularly in case of difficult climatic conditions
and in the event of an unexpected disruption [12]. The growing interdependence between
the two systems make the entire energy system more vulnerable to disruptions. A con-
tingency triggered in one system may propagate to the other system or even back to
the system were it originated. Therefore understanding the impacts of the interactions
between the two systems is crucial for governments, system operators, regulators and op-
erational planners, in order to ensure security of supply for the overall energy system.
The interactions between gas and electric systems make it increasingly difficult to separate
security of gas supply from security of electricity supply. The changes in the overall
energy system due to different types of incidents may affect the dynamic behaviour and
vulnerability of the integrated gas/electricity system. The level of vulnerability depends
on some external conditions like the level of power system dependency on GFPPs, power
generation mix of a region, weather conditions, probabilities of natural disaster of a region,
and failure probability of facilities in either of the systems, among other factors.
Generally, large disruptions in gas systems affecting both power and non-power consumers
are not so common. The gas system is well known as reliable and safe. However, there
1.2. Modelling of Gas and Electric Transmission Networks 5
could be incidents resulting in curtailment of gas, which can cause problems in the power
system, such as, unexpected increase in demand, freezing of well heads and disruption
of pipelines among others. In such cases, the delivery pressure needed by the facilities
has to be taken into account. This is particularly important in recently deployed GFPPs
using modern combustion turbines, which need higher gas pressure to operate compared
to conventional combustion turbines. It should be noted that, even if the gas system had
enough capacity to deliver gas to GFPPs at peak demand, the coincidence of peak demand
for GFPPs and for conventional use (household, commercial, industrial) may result in a
significant diminished pressure in pipelines, which eventually may produce interruptions
in the electricity generation because of insufficient pressure.
In case of lack of gas supply in a GFPP, the possible solutions that may help bridge
the gap of gas availability could be dual fuel capabilities or/and a variety of storage
options (linepack and UGS facilities close to consumption areas). However, the costs and
feasibility of storage and fuel switching has to be analysed in detail since sometimes they
cannot be used as a solution in practice. In fact, quite frequently because of the cost of
fuel-oil storage a dual fuel GFPP cannot switch to the alternative fuel due to lack of fuel
stored on-site.
When the consequences and cascading effects of a disruption originating in one system
and propagating to the other system are compared, the gas system is more resilient to
local and short-term disruptions compared to the electricity system. The main reason
for this is that, in addition to the existence of linepack as short-term storage, the ma-
jority of compressor stations are still powered by gas turbines, which keeps the pressure
profile within limits, allowing continued operation. Furthermore, in case electric driven
compressors are installed, a back-up power system (typically diesel) is usually available
to protect the system from power outages. A massive power failure would generally have
no serious effect on the physical pipeline facilities, provided that it does not last too long.
Compressor stations and underground gas facilities that utilize electric drivers would be
the most affected and have to be analysed carefully.
1.2. Modelling of Gas and Electric Transmission
Networks
The growing interactions between gas an electricity systems suggest the need for mathe-
matical models and tools for planning and analysing the operation of the two systems in
an integrated manner to understand better,
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1. the depth and scope of these interdependencies,
2. how they may affect the operation of the two systems and
3. how to proactively approach the bottlenecks and challenges that may emerge.
When modelling integrated gas and electricity systems, there are several aspects to be
addressed mainly due to the differences in the structure and physical behaviour of the two
systems. For instance, the failure response of the power and gas system infrastructures is
significantly different. A technical failure in the power system infrastructure can result in
an immediate loss of service from a generating unit or a transmission line. Under some
extreme conditions, this can propagate and eventually result in loss of service to electric
customers due to cascading effects. On the contrary, most technical failures in gas systems
(e.g. pipeline rupture, failure in compressor station or storage facilities etc.) result in a
locally or regionally reduced network capacity rather than an entire loss of service to gas
consumers [13]. This capacity reduction might result in curtailments of gas delivery to
customers according to their priority level of service.
Another important distinction is the different dynamic behaviour of the two systems.
Electricity travels almost instantaneously and cannot be stored economically in large
quantities in current power systems, with the only exception of hydraulic pumping power
stations, whose availability is very much limited in a significant number of countries. In
case of disruptions, the response time of the power system is quite small and basically the
transmission line flows satisfy the steady-state algebraic equations.
On the contrary, the gas flow in pipelines is a much slower process, with gas velocities
below 15 m/s, resulting in a longer response time in case of disruptions. In particular,
high-pressure transmission pipelines have much slower dynamics due to the large volumes
of gas stored in pipelines. This quantity of gas cannot be neglected when simulating the
dynamics in gas transmission systems; in fact the line pack in the pipeline increases the
flexibility of the gas system to react to short term fluctuations in demand and supply.
This information is important especially in the modelling stage, since different timing of
the systems need to be considered during the simulation process.
1.2.1. Model Requirements
In order to capture appropriately the different characteristics of gas and electric power
system discussed above and to assess the interdependencies between the two systems and
how they may impact security of energy supply the following model requirements are
proposed:
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(i) Dynamic model for describing the operation of gas transport networks (i.e. imbal-
ance between gas supply and gas demand resulting in fluctuations in linepack), in
order to reflect appropriately the changes in pressure and linepack, which cannot
be captured by mass balance or steady state hydraulic models.
(ii) AC model for the electric power system, in order to capture line losses, reactive
power flow, voltage levels etc., which are neglected in DC models.
(iii) Generic sub-models for the most important gas and power system facilities (e.g.
compressor stations, UGS, LNG terminals, generation units, electric substations
etc.) and their technical and contractual constraints (e.g. pressure limits, operating
envelope of compressors, voltage limits, generator capability curves, transmission
line capacity limits etc.), in order to reflect adequately the flexibility and operation
of the two systems in scenarios, where both systems operate close to their limits.
(iv) Consideration of the bidirectional interconnection between the two systems (i.e.
gas offtake for power generation in GFPPs and power supply to EDCS and LNG
terminals), in order to give a full picture of the interdependence between the two
systems.
(v) Simultaneous solution of the physical equations and coupling equations for the in-
terconnected gas and electric power system for each simulation time step, in order
to capture the direct impact of control changes or disruptions originating from one
system and cascading to the other system.
(vi) Possibility to implement conditional control changes, i.e. changing the set points in
one system in respect to the conditions in the other system (e.g. the start up of a
GFPP for power generation depends on the available linepack and pressure in the
gas system), in order to model the coordination between the two systems and how
they may improve the combined operation.
(vii) Estimation of consequences of supply disruptions, in order to quantify how disrup-
tions affect security of supply and to analyse the effectiveness of countermeasures
to mitigate the impact of disruptions.
1.2.2. State of the Art
The research area of modelling the interdependencies between gas and electric power sys-
tems is relatively new. The models addressing this topic can be divided into the following
four groups in terms of the area of application:
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• economic and market analysis
• operation planning and control (e.g., optimization, demand response)
• design and expansion planning
• security analysis
Studies on the medium and long-term economic evaluations aiming at exploring the inter-
actions between the mechanisms of pricing of each carrier are reported in [14–24], where
the influence of technical constraints is often ignored or taken into account in a simpli-
fied way. Additionally in [25], the authors proposed a dynamic model representation of
coupled natural gas and electricity network markets to test the potential interaction with
respect to investments while considering network constraints of both markets. In [26], two
methodologies for coupling interdependent gas and power market models are proposed in
a medium-term scope, where the two systems are formulated separately as optimization
problems and the obtained primal dual information is utilized.
From the operational viewpoint, unit commitment models relating to short term security
constrained operation of combined gas and power systems are developed in [27–29]. In [28],
the authors considered the natural gas network constraints in the optimal solution of
security constrained unit commitment (SCUC). Additionally dual fuel units are modelled
for analyzing different fuel availability scenarios. In [29], the model proposed in [28] is
extended using a quadratic function of pressure for describing the gas flow in pipelines
and also including the gas consumption of the compressors. In [30], an economic dispatch
model (ED) is developed for integrated gas and power systems. The security constraints
for the two systems are integrated in the ED which aims to minimize power system
operating costs.
The optimal power flow (OPF) of the coupled gas and power systems are investigated
in [31–36]. A method for OPF and scheduling of combined electricity and natural gas
systems with a transient model for natural gas flow is investigated in [34] and the solutions
for steady-state and transient models of the gas system are compared. A multi-time period
OPF model was developed for the combined GB electricity and gas networks in [35,36].
The impact of uncertainties on integrated gas and power system operation caused by
variable wind energy is discussed in [37–40]. In [37] the impacts of abrupt changes of
power output from GFPPS, to compensate variable power output from wind farms, on
the Great Britain (GB) gas network is analyzed. In [39], the authors developed partial
differential equation (PDE) model of gas pipelines to analyze the effects of intermittent
wind generation on the fluctuations of pressure in GFPPs and pipelines. The coordination
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between the gas and power systems based on an integrated stochastic model for firming
the variability of wind energy is presented in [40]. Gas transmission system constraints
and the variability of wind energy is considered in the optimal short-term operation of
stochastic power systems with a scenario based approach.
Studies considering the implementation of demand side response in order to mitigate
the pressure of peak demand can be found in [41–44]. An operating strategy for short-
term scheduling of integrated gas and power system is proposed in [43] while considering
demand response and wind uncertainty. In [44], the impact of demand side response on
integrated gas and power supply systems in GB is analysed for the time horizon from
2010 to 2050.
The problem of the design and expansion planning is addressed in [45,46] for the integrated
gas and power systems at the distribution level and the transmission level, respectively.
Recently P2G has gained significant interest. A number of studies [47, 48] have investi-
gated the interdependencies introduced by P2G units on the integrated gas and power
system operation in GB. The application of P2G for seasonal storage in gas networks was
investigated in [49].
The security perspective including the reliability and the adequacy of integrated gas and
power systems has gained significant interest due to increasing dependencies among the
systems. Such studies may include the cascading effects of contingencies where the perfor-
mance of the networks is reduced [15,50–53]. In [15], an integrated simulation model that
aims at reflecting the dynamics of the systems in case of disruptions is proposed. While
developing the integrated model, first gas and power systems are modelled separately and
then linked with an interface.
Co-Simulation versus Combined Simulation
Another distinction between the available models is based on the different solution meth-
ods adopted for the integrated gas and electricity model. The following two methods are
distinguished:
• Co-Simulation: The equations describing the operation of the gas and electricity
network are solved successively in two separate simulation time frames and simu-
lation environments (e.g. two different software applications, simulators or Solvers)
and the two simulation environments communicate and exchange data through an
interface that ensures the interconnections between the two systems are respected.
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• Combined Simulation: The equations describing the operation of the gas and elec-
tricity network and the coupling equations describing the interconnection between
the two networks are solved simultaneously for each simulation time step and in
a single simulation environment (e.g. one software application, simulator, or solver
that solves he combined model in a single simulation time frame). Thus, each com-
puted state of the coupled network fulfils the coupling equations and the physical
equations for the two networks.
The studies presented above are predominantly based on co-simulation methods. In the
following, we give an overview of models in the literature that focus primarily on combined
simulation.
Studies in the literature that use combined simulation to examine the interconnection be-
tween gas and power systems for planning purposes mainly focus on single or multi-time
period operational optimisation methods based on steady state conditions [42, 54–59].
In [55], the authors investigate the short-term optimal operation of the integrated gas
and electricity network with wind power and P2G facilities. The authors use a security-
constraint bi-level ED model with an objective function that minimizes the day ahead
costs of electricity and natural gas consumption, respectively. In [56], a multi-stage co-
planning model is developed to identify the optimal expansion planning of integrated gas
and electricity networks. In [58], a coupled steady state model is proposed to analyse the
mitigation effects of integrated gas and electricity systems using a succession of steady
state approach with time varying power demand and wind generation profiles. The au-
thors use a steady state gas system model to address a dynamic problem. In [57], a unit
commitment and ED model that considers the technical characteristics of power gener-
ation units is proposed. The authors include an energy flow model for the gas system
taking into account pressure constraints.
In [59], the authors propose a probabilistic energy flow framework for investigating the im-
pacts of uncertainties on the operation of the two systems using Monte-Carlo simulations.
The authors use a combined steady state model for describing the gas and electric power
system. Moreover, they consider the bi-directional coupling between the two systems at
gas fired power plants and electric driven compressor statopns taking into account the
voltage and frequency dependency of electric power system loads. Additional stochastic
optimization models are proposed in [21, 40, 43] in order to address the uncertainties of
the integrated gas and electricity networks.
In the above studies, the dynamic behaviour of the gas system is neglected, which, how-
ever, is relevant when studying the combined operation of gas and electric power sys-
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tems [60, 61]. The time evolution of linepack determines the level of flexibility the gas
system can provide to the electric power system. In a steady state gas model the time
derivative of the linepack is inherently zero, since total gas inflow and outflow are at
equilibrium. Thus, the time evolution of the linepack cannot be captured appropriately
by steady state gas models. To account for this aspect, researchers have developed models
for combined optimization of gas and electricity networks considering the dynamics in gas
pipeline systems [35,60–63].
In [35], a multi-time period optimization model is proposed for analysing the coupling
between the gas and power system network in Great Britain. The authors model key gas
system facilities such as compressor stations and UGS facilities and their constraints. The
power system model used in the study is based on a simplified DC-OPF model, where
important power system constraints, such as thermal capacity limits of transmission lines
and reactive power limits of generation units are disregarded. Moreover, the authors
consider the ramping limits of generation units, but neglect their start-up and shut down
time limits, which may restrict the availability and flexibility of these units. Furthermore,
the bi-directional coupling between the gas and electric power system is neglected, since
only the coupling through GFPPs is considered. In [62], the authors present a detailed
optimal control model to capture spatio-temporal interactions between gas and electricity
systems. The proposed model couples a dynamic gas model with an economic dispatch
model for the power grid in order to investigate the economic and flexibility gains resulting
from coordinating the dispatch of the two systems. Similar to [35] the power system model
is based on a simplified DC model, which is connected with the limitations explained
above.
In [61,63], the authors introduce a coupled optimization model for the combined simula-
tion of gas and electric power systems, where the two systems are coupled through gas
fired power plants solely. The model is intended to assist gas and power TSOs in coordi-
nating the scheduling of gas offtakes for power generation in GFPPs. Similar to the other
studies the authors use a DC-OPF approach to model the electric power system.
1.3. Research Questions
The available models for analysing the interactions between gas and electricity systems
do not fully cover the requirements proposed in Section 1.2.1. Most models use either
mass balance or steady state models for describing the operation of the gas system, which
is not suitable for security of supply studies, where a dynamic model for the gas system
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is essential. Moreover, for the electric power system simplified DC models are consid-
ered, which neglect important power system constraints such as voltage limits, thermal
capacities of lines, reactive power limits of generators etc. Furthermore, the majority of
the models consider only a unidirectional coupling between the two systems at gas fired
power plants.
This thesis covers the gaps in the state of the art by developing a mathematical model
that respects the proposed requirements, and by implementing this model into a novel
simulation tool that is designed for gas and power TSOs, researchers, regulatory agencies
and governments to examine the interactions between gas and electric power systems and
to assess the impact of disruption on security of supply in integrated gas and electric
power systems. The developed model can be used to address the main research question
of the thesis, which is:
• How can the consequences of supply disruptions in an interconnected
gas and electric power system be estimated?
The quantification of the impact of disruptions on the operation of the combined energy
system is crucial for assessing how severe a disruption event affects security of supply.
In addition, the estimation of consequences is necessary to analyse the effectiveness of
countermeasures and strategies to mitigate the impact of disruptions on security of supply.
Furthermore, quantifying the consequences of disruptions is essential for performing a risk
assessment of the combined system, which requires the identification of potential harmful
scenarios, the estimation of their consequences and the probability of their occurrence.
In order to answer the main research question, an adequate mathematical representation
of the physical behaviour of the two energy systems and their interconnection is required.
To develop such a model, the following additional sub-research questions need to be
addressed:
• What are the most important facilities in the gas and electricity trans-
mission networks in terms of security of supply?
• How can we develop a mathematical model that reflects appropriately
their physical behaviour and their technical and contractual constraints?
• What are the most crucial interconnection points between the gas and
electric power system?
• How can these interconnections be represented in the mathematical
model?
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To answer these sub-questions the following approach is adopted. Firstly, a general de-
scription of the two energy systems is given, which helps identifying the most important
facilities, their functions and their technical and contractual constraints. After identify-
ing these facilities generic sub models are developed for each individual facility, which
are eventually combined to an integrated network model for each energy system. The
individual energy system models are validated against existing models to confirm their
accuracy. Both energy systems are considered separately in the above approach.
Finally, the most important interconnections between the gas and electricity system are
identified and reflected by mathematical coupling equations, which eventually combine
both previously separated models to an integrated multi-vector energy system model with
bi-directional interdependencies.
After developing the combined electricity and gas network model the following research
sub-questions need to be addressed:
• How do disruptions originating in the gas and/or electric network prop-
agate from one network to the other and even back to the network where
the disruption originated?
• How do disruptions triggered in one systems affect the operation of the
other system?
• Which interconnections have more impact on the combined operation of
the two systems?
Addressing these research sub-questions is needed in order to demonstrate the capability
of the combined electricity and gas network to capture the propagation of disruptions
from one energy system to the other. Moreover, in the process of addressing this ques-
tion a comparison between co-simulation and combined simulation is conducted and the
advantages and disadvantages of both approaches are discussed.
After confirming the capability of the combined model, the model can be used to run
different case studies to examine the impact of disruptions on security of supply. In order
to analyse and compare results from the case studies a number of security of supply
parameters are needed, which essentially address the following research sub-questions:
• How can we quantify and compare the impact of supply disruptions on
different gas customers?
• How can we quantify the grace period for gas and power TSOs to coor-
dinate and react to supply disruptions?
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The capability to quantify the consequences of supply disruption on security of supply
can be used to analyse the following follow-up research questions:
• What countermeasures can be deployed to mitigate the impact of disrup-
tions and how can these countermeasures be integrated into the combined
model?
• How can we evaluate the effectiveness of different countermeasures to
mitigate supply disruptions?
To be able to implement countermeasures the concept of conditional control changes is
utilized, which enables controlled facilities to change their control modes and/or control
set points at a specific simulation time based on predefined conditions in the gas and
electric network at previous simulation time steps.
1.4. Thesis Outline
The thesis follows the following structure.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to the structure of the natural gas transport system
and elaborates the requirements for a transient hydraulic model for gas transmission net-
works, that is suitable for security of supply studies. The requirements are then used
as an orientation to develop mathematical sub-models for the most important facilities
comprising a gas transmission network, such as pipelines, compressor stations and un-
derground gas storages. The models for the individual facilities are then combined to an
integrated model for the entire gas transmission network. The developed model is then
benchmarked against results from the scientific literature and a commercial gas simula-
tion software. Finally, the model is applied to simulate the operation of a realistic gas
transmission network of an European region in a disruption scenario.
Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, the gas network model developed in Chapter 2 is extended by an algorithm
for processing control changes and constraints at controlled facilities in the course of the
dynamic gas network simulation. The developed model and algorithm is then implemented
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into a simulation software SAInt, which includes a graphical user interface for interacting
with the user. The developed software application is used to perform a case study on a
realistic gas transmission network of an European region.
Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, a framework for analysing security of supply in integrated gas and electric-
ity networks is developed. The framework is based on a co-simulation platform between
the developed gas simulation software SAIntand the Matlab-based power system simu-
lation library MATPOWER, where the equations for the gas and electric power system
are solved successively and in different simulation time frames considering the coupling
equations at interconnection points.
Firstly, an introduction to the physical equations describing the operation of the electric
power system is given, followed by the identification of the most relevant interconnec-
tions between the two systems and their corresponding coupling equations. Next, the
co-simulation platform is developed, which is subdivided into a transient gas simulation
model (SAInt), a multi time period steady state AC- power flow model (MATPOWER)
and an interface that ensures the data exchange and communication between the two
models. Finally, the platform is applied to perform a case study on a realistic intercon-
nected gas and power system network of an European region.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 is dedicated to combined simulation of interconnected gas and electricity net-
works, where the equations for the gas system, the electric power system and the coupling
equations describing the interconnections between the two systems are solved simultane-
ously for each time step, considering the bi-directional interconnection between the two
energy systems. The electric power system model from Chapter 4 is extended by a model
for dispatchable power system loads and by time transitional constraints such as the ramp
rate and the start-up time of different electric generators. Moreover, a number of security
of supply parameter are developed which are used to quantify the impact of disruptions
on security of supply. Finally, the developed model is implemented into the simulation




Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and discusses how the developed models can
be used and extended to address future research questions.
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2. Dynamic Simulation Model for Gas
Transmission Networks
This chapter is based on the following published peer reviewed journal article and con-
ference papers:
• K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “An integrated transient
model for simulating the operation of natural gas transport systems,” in
Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, vol. 28, pp. 672 – 690, 2016.
• K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “SAInt – A simulation
tool for analysing the consequences of natural gas supply disruptions,”
in Pipeline Technology Conference (PTC) 2016.
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. J. Dijkema, “An
integrated simulation tool for analysing the operation and interdepen-
dency of natural gas and electric power systems,” in Pipeline Simulation
Interest Group (PSIG) Conference 2016.
2.1. Introduction
Natural gas plays a vital role in the energy portfolio of the EU. In 2013 it accounted for
almost one quarter of the primary energy consumption in the EU-28 [64]. It is mainly
used for power generation, heating, transportation and as a feed stock for industrial pro-
duction.
Figure 2.1 shows a typical structure of the natural gas infrastructure. It basically consists
of three subsystems, namely, the gas production system which includes the exploration,
extraction and processing of natural gas, the national and/or regional gas transport sys-
tem, which contains the transit, the transmission and storage of natural gas, and the local
gas distribution system, which covers the distribution of natural gas to final consumers.
The three subsystems differ in their pressure levels and may be operated by different
independent entities. While in gas production systems the pressure can range from upto
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450 bar-g at extraction to 80 bar-g at the exit point to the transport system, in gas dis-
tribution systems pressures are typically below 1 bar-g. The focus of this thesis is mainly
on the operation of the gas transport system and the technical components and facilities
connected to the transport system.
The location of natural gas deposits is usually many kilometres away from where it is
demanded, therefore, natural gas is typically transported to market areas through a des-
ignated pipeline transport system. In cases where a direct pipeline connection between
production and demand sites is inefficient or even infeasible natural gas is liquefied and
then shipped as LNG in large vessels. At ports of destination, it is stored and finally
regasified and injected into the pipeline system.
A large quantity of gas entering the transport system may be transmitted to neighbouring
transport systems through a designated system of transit pipelines (see. Fig. 2.1), while
the remaining quantity is either directly used to cover national demands or injected into
storage facilities located close to consumption areas.
The driving force for the transport of natural gas in pipelines is the gas pressure. To
balance pipeline capacity and cost, the system operates at elevated pressure. When gas
is flowing, the pressure decreases (by approx. 0.1 bar/km) mainly due to friction be-
tween the gas and the inner surface of the pipeline. These losses are compensated for
by compressor stations typically installed at 150-200 km intervals along the pipeline sys-
tem. Compressor stations increase the inlet gas pressure to a higher outlet pressure in
order to ensure a continuous transport and delivery of natural gas to its customers at the
contracted nominations and delivery pressures. Natural gas arriving from the transport
pipelines to consumption regions is either directly served to large customers connected to
the transport pipeline, such as gas fired power plants and large industrial customers, or
delivered to the local gas distribution system, where it is distributed to smaller customers
(households, commercial customers, public services etc.). In both cases, the gas pressure
and gas quantity exiting the transport system are metered and controlled by pressure
reduction and metering stations, which consist of a number valves, regulators, metering
devices and other components.
Natural gas may also be injected into UGS for later withdrawal. UGS may be for seasonal
storage - store gas at long periods of gas surplus, usually during summer, and withdrawal
at periods of increased or even peak demand in winter. Furthermore, the function of a
UGS (e.g. salt cavern storage) can also be to facilitate market arbitrage - accommodating
rapid cycles of storage and withdrawal, to let parties benefit from dynamic gas prices.
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available in the pipeline. UGS facilities increase the flexibility of the transport system to
react to load fluctuations and supply disruptions.
The operation of natural gas transport systems is restricted by physical, technical and
contractual constraints imposed by the different facilities and stakeholders involved in the
gas supply chain. Pipelines, for instance, have a Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP),
which if exceeded can cause great damage to the transport system. Compressor stations,
on the other hand, have a limited compression power and usually require a minimum
gas inflow for surge prevention, while gas fired power plants can only operate above a
certain delivery pressure threshold [4]. In order to keep the network within its operational
envelope and to meet the contractual nominations, TSO are usually equipped with a
designated SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) - system together with
software applications to monitor and control the facilities and components in their trans-
port system. Controlling the system involves finding the most economical configurations
and control set points for the facilities without violating technical and legal constraints.
While the TSO may have a good picture of the current and projected state of its network,
it may however, not be fully aware of potential threats to security of gas supply originating
from external sources. For instance, there may be a supply disruption from an important
transit pipeline due to a failure in a facility located in an upstream transmission system,
or an interrupted supply from a major LNG import terminal due to a geopolitical crises.
Moreover, the growing dependency of the EU-28 upon gas imports from non-EU coun-
tries - mainly Russia, Norway and Algeria [64] - stresses the importance to examine the
resilience and vulnerabilities of gas transport systems from an independent multinational
perspective. By doing this, we can develop strategies to mitigate the potential threats to
security of gas supply.
The examination of multinational gas transport systems in terms of security of gas supply
requires the use of numerical models that are able to reflect the behaviour of gas transport
systems and the reaction of the system to supply disruptions in adequate and accurate
manner. The following three model requirements can be distinguished.
1. System Dynamic Behaviour:
The model should be able to capture accurately the reaction of (multi-) national
transport systems to load variations (i.e. daily and seasonal changes of gas demands
at offtake points) and disruption events (e.g. loss of supply from an entry point,
failure in a compressor station etc.) with reasonable computation cost, taking into
account the physical laws governing the dynamic behaviour of gas transport systems.
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2. System Components:
The model should include reasonable sub models of all important facilities com-
prising a gas transport system, such as pipelines, compressor stations, production
fields, cross-border entry and exit stations, city gate stations, stations of direct
served customers, LNG terminals and UGS facilities.
3. System Constraints:
The model should implement appropriately the constraints imposed by major facil-
ities and stakeholders (e.g. maximum operating pipeline pressures, maximum avail-
able compression power, maximum withdrawal rate from storages and production
fields, minimum delivery pressures at offtake points etc.).
The goal of this chapter is to present an integrated transient hydraulic model that fulfils
the criteria listed above. To achieve this goal the chapter follows the following pattern.
In the first part, we present the state of the art of hydraulic models dealing with the
simulation of gas transport systems and highlight the main contribution of this chapter.
Secondly, we derive the equations describing the gas flow in pipelines and make use of
commonly used assumptions in the state of the art to simplify and adapt the equations
to the prevailing conditions in gas transport systems. In addition, we present a lineari-
sation method for the pipe equations which has been used in the context of steady state
computations for pipelines without inclination but not to the transient simulation of non-
horizontal pipelines. The derivation and linearisation of the pipe equations is followed by
a mathematical description of the network system and the basic non-pipe components
included in the system, such as compressors, regulators, valves, resistors and nodes. Fur-
thermore, we apply the integral form of the continuity equation to derive the equation
system describing the integrated network model which includes generic sub models of all
relevant facilities. The derivation is followed by a description of the algorithm for the
solution of the system of equations based on an implicit time integration with an iterative
linearisation of the pipe equation for each simulation time step.
In the last part of the Chapter, the accuracy of the model is demonstrated by benchmark-
ing it against results from the literature and the commercial software SIMONE. Finally,
the model is applied to perform a dynamic simulation on a real-world network, namely,
the Bulgarian and Greek regional gas transmission system.
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2.2. State of the Art
The hydraulic gas models in the literature can be divided into two groups, namely, steady
state models and transient models. Steady state models are characterized by a balance
between total gas inflow and outflow, since pressures and flows are assumed constant in
time. Transient models in contrast, consider the time evolution of pressures and flows and
the changes in line pack. Steady state models are primarily used for optimization and
design purposes, mainly, due to their simplicity compared to transient models. While the
simulation of transients involves the solution of a set of non-linear PDEs, a steady state
problem requires only the solution of a set of non-linear algebraic equations. There are a
number of references addressing both groups of models in the scientific literature, which
are summarized in the following.
References mainly dealing with steady state models are [65–69]. Szoplik [65] applied a
steady state model to perform a succession of steady state simulation to capture the be-
haviour of a low pressure distribution network for different air temperatures. The size of
the investigated network amounts to 316 nodes, 319 branches. Woldeyohannes and Abd
Majid [66] used a steady state approach with a detailed non-linear compressor model
to simulate and analyze different configurations of an existing gas transmission network.
The size and complexity of the simulated network is relatively low (1 source, 1 compressor
station, 11 pipelines, 5 off take points, 1 loop). Mohring et al. [67] present a method to
reduce the complexity of gas pipeline networks. The method is based on finding a bottle-
neck model using symbolic simplification, i.e. identifying and extracting dominant network
components by combining computer algebra and numerical analysis. Finally, the method
is applied on the transmission network of Belgium by comparing steady state simulations
of the full network and the reduced network. Van der Hoeven [69] presented an approach
for linearising the pressure drop equation for horizontal pipelines to perform steady state
analysis on gas transport systems. The linearisation presented makes use of the positive
slope of the pressure drop curve due to the positive sign of the pipe resistance. He pre-
sented three linearisation approaches which differ in the way the linear approximation of
the pressure drop curve is obtained from the result of a previous iteration.
The majority of the references dealing with transient gas models either focus on the
numerical schemes for solving the partial differential equations describing the gas flow
through pipelines like for instance in [70–81] or on the comparison of different transient
models obtained by simplifying the flow equations as it is done in [70, 82–85]. The nu-
merical approaches adopted range from implicit finite difference methods to method of
characteristics, finite element and finite volume methods. Herrán-González et. al. [70]
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implemented the implicit Crank-Nicholson method and the method of characteristics to
develop a Matlab-Simulink library which can be used to simulate the transient behavior
of a gas network. Moreover, they stressed the importance of including the gravitational
term in the momentum equation by comparing results for different pipe inclinations. The
simulations they performed were applied to a single pipeline and a triangular network
with three pipelines. Ke and Ti [86] presented a more unconventional method for solving
transient flow in pipelines which is based on an analogy between the electrical grid and the
gas network. The basic idea of this approach is the transformation of the gas model to a
analogous electrical model with voltage, resistance, capacitance and inductance. Results
computed with this method are benchmarked against those computed for the triangu-
lar network in other papers. Reddy et al. [72] developed a dynamic simulator based on
a transfer function model to obtain an accurate on-line state estimation from measure-
ments and to estimate the demands. The model is applied on an example pipeline network
containing nine pipelines, one source node and two off-take points. Van der Hoeven [87]
discussed the dynamics in gas transport pipeline based on a concept of distributing the
dominant properties of a pipeline, namely, line pack and resistance by segmenting the
pipeline into a succession of volumes and resistance. Using this approach he showed how
the dynamics in gas transport systems can be described by a first order differential equa-
tion, which if solved yields an exponential function. Moreover, he presented the concept
of a time constant which is an indicator for how long a pipeline may need to recover from
a sudden change of demand at its outlet.
Furthermore, the suitability of steady state and transient methods for different appli-
cations have been discussed by a number of authors. Osiadazs [82] discussed the use of
steady state and transient models in the industry. According to Osiadazs [82] steady
state models are traditionally used for design purposes or in low pressure distribution
networks where the dynamics are very rapid and steady state conditions are reached very
fast, whereas in high pressure transmission networks where a very large amount of gas is
stored in the pipeline the dynamics are much slower and therefore transient models are
more appropriate. Modisette et al. [88] discussed the suitability of transient and succes-
sion of steady state models for different purposes like for instance product tracking, line
balance, line pack distribution, pressure monitoring or deliverability. The suitability of
each model depends on the application and the time step with which the information of
the network is retrieved. Product tracking for instance can be adequately performed with
succession of steady state due to large time step information points, while deliverabilty,
pressure monitoring and line pack distribution cannot be captured correctly by steady
state models due to the amplitudes in pressure and flows caused by short term changes in
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the network (e.g. use of line pack at delivery points till demand is balanced by the supply
source). Bachmann and Goodreau [89] discussed different sources of error causing steady
state simulations to be unrealistic. One of these sources pointed out by these authors is
the use of steady state models for solving problems of dynamic nature, like for instance,
the use of line pack as short term gas storage to balance a ramp up of demand at industrial
delivery points.
The state of the art of hydraulic gas models show that there are a number of hydraulic
models addressing the steady state and transient simulation of gas network systems,
however, the issue of security of gas supply has not been addressed in any of the hydraulic
models in the literature. Since most of the models were not developed from a security
of gas supply perspective they do not consider all relevant facilities which may play an
important role in case of a gas supply disruption. UGS facilities and LNG terminals,
for instance, have not been addressed in any of the hydraulic models in the literature.
Moreover, the transient models in the literature are primarily applied to relatively small
networks, without considering the technical and contractual constraints inherently present
in a gas transport system. Thus, there is a gap in the literature which we would like to fill
with the work in this chapter. The main contribution of this chapter is the development
of an integrated transient hydraulic model for gas transport systems that includes all
relevant facilities and their constraints and moreover enables the simulation of gas supply
disruptions at a regional (multinational) level.
2.3. Methodology
In this Section, we develop the model to perform transient simulation in gas transmission
networks. Firstly, we set the fundamental equations of gas flow and the corresponding
simplifying assumptions for transport pipelines, including linearisation of equations. Then
we describe the function of the different non-pipe facilities and develop generic models for
the most important facilities, in terms of security of supply. Next, we elaborate the system
of equations for the integrated network system and define the boundary conditions for
controlled facilities, which we integrate into the system of equations. Finally, we present
an algorithm for solving the developed model.
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2.3.1. Modelling of Pipelines
The gas flow through pipelines is generally governed by the constitutional laws of fluid
dynamics and thermodynamics, namely, the law of conservation of mass, Newton’s second
law of motion (conservation of momentum), the first law of thermodynamics (conservation

























Fig. 2.2.: Forces acting on a control volume in a general gas pipeline
(CV ) for a general pipeline with constant cross-sectional areaA and an infinitesimal length
dx (see Fig. 2.2) and moreover, assuming the parameters describing the gas flow along
the pipe coordinate x are averaged over A, yields the following set of partial differential
equations (PDEs) 2:

















+ λρv|v|2D︸ ︷︷ ︸
shear force
+ ρg sinα︸ ︷︷ ︸
force of gravity
= 0 (2.2)
2the assumption of averaging the flow parameters over the cross-sectional area can be justified as long
as the pipe length L is much greater than the pipe diameter D which is the case in transmission
networks where D
L
is of order O(10−5) or lower.
3see nomenclature for variable definitions
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+ ρvAg sinα = Ω˙ (2.3)
Real Gas Law - State Equation:
p
ρ
= Z RT (2.4)
The shear force term in the momentum equation is derived from the Darcy-Weisbach
relation, which relates the frictional shear stress τ to the dynamic pressure ρv2/2.




For turbulent flow (typical flow condition in transport pipelines) the friction factor λ is












where k is the integrated pipeline roughness and Re the Reynolds number, which is the




where η is the dynamic viscosity of the flowing gas. The Coolebrook-White equation
is implicit in λ, thus, it can only be solved iteratively. There are a number of explicit
approximations for the Coolebrook-White equation which are applicable for a specific
range of Reynolds numbers. One of these equations is the approximation by Hofer [90],















The friction factor λ is referred to a straight pipe without curvature. To account for the









where λe is the effective friction factor. Furthermore, the compressibility factor Z in
the state equation is a correction factor for real gases, which accounts for the deviation
from ideal gas behavior. Z depends on the gas pressure and temperature and can be
approximated by the following equation derived by Papay [91], which is valid for natural
gas upto a pressure of 150 bar.

























where pc and Tc are the critical pressure and temperature, respectively.
Simplifying Assumptions
As can be seen from the above derivations, the set of equations describing the gas flow in
pipelines is very complex and can only be solved numerically. For large pipeline systems
with hundreds or even thousands of interconnected pipeline elements the solution of the
integrated PDE system may be very costly regarding computing time and storage. There-
fore, it is reasonable to adapt the equations to the prevailing conditions in gas transport
systems by means of neglecting some of the terms in the PDE system, but at the same time
maintaining an appropriate level of accuracy. The process of simplifying the PDE system
has been thoroughly discussed in the available literature, thus, we make use of some of the
most common assumptions applied by a number of authors in the literature [70, 82, 92].
The following assumptions are generally accepted as reasonable approximations for the
prevailing conditions in gas transport systems.
1. Isothermal Flow:
The changes in gas temperature are negligible, therefore we can assume isothermal
flow, i.e. the gas temperature is constant in time and space and equal to the ground
temperature.
2. Creeping Motion:
The influence of the convective term is negligible compared to the other terms in
the momentum equation (2.2), due to the typically small velocities in transport
pipelines (v ≤ 10 m/s).
3. Slow Changes in Boundary Conditions:
The inertia term can be neglected if the boundary conditions in terms of pressures
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and flows do not change rapidly, which is the case in a normal operation of gas
transport systems, where load changes typically occur in a time scale of an hour.
The most common simplification is to assume isothermal flow, which means the gas tem-
perature is constant along the pipeline at any time. Since pipelines are typically installed
approx. two meters underneath the ground the gas temperature is assumed to be equal
to the prevailing ground temperature. In reality the gas temperature may change along
the pipeline, especially in submarine pipelines and in downstream pipelines of compressor
stations (increase in gas temperature) and regulator stations (decrease in gas tempera-
ture), though these stations typically mitigate large temperature changes by cooling or
preheating the gas. Changes in gas temperature along the pipeline are primarily caused by
the Joule-Thompson-Effect and heat exchange between the pipeline and its surroundings.
To capture this process adequately one would require a good knowledge of the thermal
resistance and the distribution of the ground temperature, which is typically difficult to
estimate. Moreover, due to the slow dynamics in transport pipelines (v ≤ 10 m/s) the
flowing gas typically has sufficient time to exchange heat with the ground and adapt
its temperature to ground temperature. Thus, it is reasonable to neglect the temperature
changes and assume a constant temperature equal to the ground temperature as it is done
by many authors in the literature [70,82,92]. If the isothermal condition is applied to the
set of PDEs the energy equation becomes redundant and can, therefore, be neglected.
Furthermore, the following relation for the isothermal speed of sound c can be obtained
from the state equation.
p
ρ
= c2 = ZRT (2.11)
The PDEs can be further simplified by comparing the different terms in the momentum
equation for typical conditions in transport pipelines. The convective term and the pres-
sure term, for instance, are both partial derivatives of the space coordinate x, thus, it is
reasonable to compare the magnitude of both terms for typical values for the flow velocity
(v = 10 m/s) and the speed of sound (c = 350 m/s, assuming p = 50 bar & T = 15 °C).
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[p (1 + 8.16 · 10−4)] ≈ ∂p
∂x
(2.13)
The convective term is negligible compared to the pressure term for typical flow conditions
in gas pipelines, therefore, this term can be neglected. Applying the above assumptions
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and the following relation for the flow rate Q and density ρn at standard conditions and
the mass flow rate M ,
M = ρnQ = ρvA (2.14)
























From these equations, we can conclude the following. A pipeline section has linepack
(i.e. the amount of gas stored in the pipeline) which is proportional to the gas pressure.
Pressure and linepack change in time whenever there is an imbalance between inflow and
outflow at the boundary of the pipeline section (continuity equation). At steady state (i.e.
time derivatives are equal to zero) there is a balance between incoming and outgoing flow
and the flow rate Q is constant along the pipeline (∂Q/∂x = 0). The second equation
explains the pressure drop along the pipeline as a result of inertia (force acting opposite
to the direction of flow acceleration), resistance (frictional force acting opposite to the
flow direction) and gravity (gravitational force due to pipeline inclination). Moreover, if
we consider the third assumption, eq. (2.16) can be further simplified to the following
ordinary differential equation with respect to the square pressure P = p2, which we will











The STE can be solved analytically if we assume the flow rate Q the compressibility factor
Z and the friction factor λ are averaged over the pipe section with length ∆x = l. The
solution yields the pressure drop equation.
∆P = Rf · |Q|Q (2.18)
with
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le =

l , h1 = h2
es − 1
s
l , h1 6= h2
where ∆P is the (corrected) square pressure drop, Rf the pipe resistance coefficient, e
Euler’s number and h1 and h2 the elevation at the pipe inlet and outlet, respectively. The
pressure drop equation (2.20) is parabolic and has a positive resistance Rf , i.e. the slope
of the parabolic curve is always positive, which is a beneficial characteristic in terms of
solving the set of equations for the entire network.
The assumption of slow transients may not be appropriate if the boundary conditions
change rapidly. The most rapid change one can think of is the opening or closure of a
valve, for safety or maintenance reasons, which may occur in a time scale of minutes.
Thus, for the simulation of fast transients in the transport system (e.g. disruption in a
compressor station, valve closure for safety reasons etc.) the inertia term is considered. In
contrast to the slow transient case, the momentum equation for fast transients contains
a time derivative which complicates the solution of the differential equation. Thus, we
make an intermediate step to approximate the inertia term by performing an implicit













Similarly to the slow transient case, if we average the coefficients of the flow rate Qn+1 on
the right hand side over the pipe segment ∆x = l we can obtain a pressure drop equation
which includes an additional term reflecting the influence of inertia for rapid changes in
the transport system.




∆Pn+1 = Pn+11 − Pn+12 es, Ri =
2ρnLepm
∆tA , pm =
2
3
p21 + p1p2 + p22
p1 + p2
As can be seen from the above equation, the pressure drop equation for fast transients
turns into the equation for slow transient if the changes in flow rate between two time
steps are marginal.
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p dx = pm
ρn · c2Vgeo (2.21)
Linearisation of the Pipe Equation
Both derived pressure drop equations are non-linear, thus, in order to solve the set of
equations for a pipeline network the equations have to be linearized and then solved
iteratively for each time step tn+1. We make use of the methods applied by van der Ho-
even [69] for the linearisation of the steady state pressure drop equation for horizontal
pipelines and extend his approach to the transient case taking into account the gravi-
tational term. Linearisation basically means approximating the non-linear pressure drop
curve with a tangent line that touches the curve at a specific point. The linearised pres-
sure drop equation for a pipe (i, j) around a point (∆P k,n+1i,j , Q
k,n+1
i,j ) can be expressed
by





(Qk+1,n+1i,j −Qk,n+1i,j ) (2.22)
The FTE yields the following linear equation.
∆P k+1,n+1i,j − (2Rf |Qk,n+1i,j |+Ri) Qk+1,n+1i,j = −Rf |Qk,n+1i,j | Qk,n+1i,j −RiQk,ni,j (2.23)
For the STE this expression yields
∆P k+1,n+1i,j − 2Rf |Qki,j | Qk+1,n+1i,j = −∆P k,n+1i,j (2.24)
The square pressure drop term ∆P may be converted to normal pressure drop ∆p by
dividing the pressure drop equation by (pi + pjes/2).
In the following subsection, we firstly give an overview of the different elements and
node types comprising a gas network, secondly, we present a general graph theoretical
representation of the gas network topology and finally, we use the integral form of the
continuity equation to derive the equation system describing the gas flow dynamics in the
integrated gas network system.
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2.3.2. Modelling of Non-Pipe Facilities
Non-pipe facilities, such as compressor stations, regulator stations and valves play a key
role in the operation and management of gas transport systems. These facilities enable
the TSOs to supervise and control the gas stream, the pressure, the temperature and the







































Fig. 2.3.: Functional diagram of a control system in compressor or regulator station
Compressor stations are usually installed at 100-200 kilometre intervals along the trans-
port system. Their function is to increase the gas pressure to compensate for the pressure
losses incurred during transportation. Regulator stations, in contrast, are primarily in-
stalled in combination with metering stations at all entry and exit stations (e.g. cross
border stations, city gate stations, gas production fields, UGS, LNG terminals, stations
at the interface to direct served customers such to Gas Power plants and large industrial
customers) and at the interface of two connected pipeline subsystems with different MOP.
The purpose of a regulator station is to reduce the inlet gas pressure to a lower outlet
pressure and/or to regulate the quantity of gas flowing through the station. Valves in
turn, are installed every 10-30 km along the pipeline system and serve the purpose of
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routing the gas stream and shutting down sections of the network for maintenance or in
case of a disruption.
Compressor stations and regulator stations are typically operated at a desired set point,
which is controlled by a designated Automatic Control System (ACS). The purpose of
such a system is to keep the station at the desired set point and to ensure that station
constraints are not violated. Figure 2.3 shows a simplified functional diagram of an au-
tomatic control system, where ~X marks the set of state variables at the station inlet and
outlet (e.g. gas pressure p, temperature T and flow rate Q), G the set of (differential)
equations describing the physical processes in the station (e.g. adiabatic gas compres-
sion, isenthalpic gas expansion etc.), ~Zext the set of external factors directly influencing
the physical process (e.g. ambient temperature Tamb, fluctuations in demand and supply
L(t), technical failures etc.), ~Xmet the set of metered state variables, ~Xset the set of con-
trol set points available to the dispatcher (e.g. flow rate set point Qset, inlet and outlet
pressure set point pi,set and po,set ), C the control algorithm of the controller, ~Xlim the
set of station constraints (e.g. maximum outlet pressure, maximum available compression
power) and ~Yact the set of available actuators to act on the process (percent opening of
the regulator flow area, shaft revolution etc.). The state variables ~X are continuously me-
tered by sensors and metering devices installed in the station ( ~Xmet). The metered data
is then compared to the desired operating set point ~Xset requested by the dispatcher.
The dispatcher can only assign one set point at a time, since the ACS typically permits
the control of only one state variable at a time. Additional set points are then treated
as constraints. The deviations between the metering data ~Xmet and the set point ~Xset
are forwarded to the controller C. The controller then checks if the deviations are within
acceptable margins and if the desired set point does not violate any station constraints
( ~Xlim). If a correction of the state variables is necessary to maintain the set point the
controller makes use of the actuators ~Yact to act on the physical process G. In case a
requested set point is not permitted the controller will typically relax the set point to the
next closest possible operating point.
In order to model the operation and control of non-pipe facilities, we need a mathematical
description of the physical process (i.e. an equation describing the correlation between the
state variables G = f( ~X)), a list of control settings that can be assigned to each facility
and a list of constraints limiting the operating region of each facility.
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Modelling of Compressor Stations
Compressor stations are the most important and complex non-pipe facilities in the gas
transport system. A compressor station usually consists of a number of compressor units
made up of centrifugal or reciprocating compressors which are propelled by asynchronous
electric motors or gas turbines. Centrifugal compressors are more common than recip-
stage 1 stage 2
compressor station
Qin Qout
Fig. 2.4.: Compressor station with two stages and a parallel configuration of units
rocating compressors, thus, the scope of this Section will be mainly on centrifugal com-
pressors. The compressor units may be positioned in parallel and/or in multiple serial
stages, in order to increase the compression capacity of the station and to enable a redun-
dant, reliable and economical operation of the station. Figure 2.4 shows an example of a
compressor station configuration, which consist of two stages, each stage with compressor
units installed in parallel. A parallel configuration increases the compression capacity, i.e.
the maximum quantity of gas that can be compressed per unit time, while a multistage
configuration enables higher compression ratios Π, i.e. the ratio between outlet and inlet
pressure. The compression process is a thermodynamic process that can be expressed by
the following equation, derived from the first and second law of thermodynamics and the











where Had is the adiabatic head, κ the isentropic exponent, R the specific gas constant,
Zi and Ti the gas compressibility factor and temperature at the inlet, respectively. The
adiabatic head Had is the amount of specific energy (energy per mass) required to increase
the inlet gas pressure pi to a higher outlet pressure po assuming an ideal isentropic process
(a reversible process without losses) with no heat transfer between the station and its
surroundings. The actual compression process, which takes place in the centrifugal or






where Hreal is the required specific energy for the actual process. A single centrifugal
compressor typically has an adiabatic efficiency from ηad = 0.75 ... 0.84 [93], depending
on its operating point (f(Π, Qvol)). The energy needed for the gas compression is provided
by the driver through a single or multiple rotating shaft connected to the compressor. The
required shaft power yields
PWS = Had · ρn
ηad
·Q (2.27)
where ρn is the gas density at reference conditions. The driver can be either a gas turbine,
which uses some of the transported gas from the pipelines as a fuel, or an electric motor,
which requires a reliable electric power source close to the station. The power input PWD









where ηm is the mechanical efficiency of the driver and GCV the upper calorific value of
the transported gas. The losses of the driver are accounted for by the mechanical efficiency
ηm. For gas turbines the mechanical efficiency typically ranges from ηm = 0.28 ... 0.38 [93],
while for electric drivers the efficiency is usually from ηm = 0.7 ... 0.92. The extracted fuel
from the network can be accounted for in the hydraulic model by applying the following
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where f is the fraction of driver power provided by gas turbines installed in the station.
f is equal one if only electric driven turbines are installed in the station.
The operation of a centrifugal compressor is usually limited to an operating region re-
ferred to as the compressor envelope. The compressor envelope is usually depicted in a
compressor wheel map, where the adiabatic head Had or the pressure ratio Π (Had ∼ Π)
is plotted against the volumetric flow rate (Qvol). Figure 2.5 a) shows a schematic view of
a compressor wheel map with the operating region restricted by the four solid red lines,
which are referred to as surge line, choke line, line of maximum and minimum shaft revo-
lution. The surge line determines the minimum volumetric flow rate (Qminvol ) for a specific
shaft revolution and is the most critical operating area. Operation beyond the left side of
the surge line can cause great damage to the compressor. Usually, this area is prevented by










































Fig. 2.5.: a) Typical operating envelope of a centrifugal compressor , b) Proposed aggre-
gated operating region for the generic compressor station model
2.3. Methodology 37
Facility Control Modes Constraints













po ≥ pi & Q ≥ 0
user defined limits:
max. outlet pressure (po,max,
80 bar-g)
min. inlet pressure (pi,min, 25 bar-g)
max. volumetric flow (Qvol,max,
100 m3/s)
max. flow rate (Qmax)
max. pressure ratio (Πmax, 2)
max. driver power (PWdmax,
100 MW)









pi ≥ po & Q ≥ 0
user defined limits:
max. outlet pressure (po,max,
80 bar-g)
min. inlet pressure (pi,min, 25 bar-g)
max. volumetric flow (Qvol,max,
100 m3/s)
max. flow rate (Qmax)
Valve Station closed (OFF )
opened (BP )
internal hard limit:
V ≤ 60 m/s
user defined limits:
max. flow velocity (Vmax, 30 m/s)
Tab. 2.1.: Overview of available control modes and constraints settings for non-pipe facil-
ities modeled as elements. Ad-hoc numeric values illustrated; values may differ
in other networks. Numeric values for the different limits a typical values in a
gas transport system, but may be different for different networks.
gas from the compressor outlet back to the inlet, in order to prevent an unstable operation
of the compressor. Another important line, is the line of maximum adiabatic efficiency
(ηmaxad , dotted green line in Fig. 2.5), which indicates the most economical working point
for a specific shaft revolution. Starting from this line the adiabatic efficiency decreases
left towards the surge and right towards the chock line. In contrast to the surge line,
the choke line is a soft limit, to avoid an uneconomical operation of the station, since a
working point allocated beyond this line is connected with a significant reduction of the
adiabatic efficiency ηad. The wheel map depicted in Fig. 2.5 a) describes the operation of
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a single centrifugal compressor of a compressor unit installed in a compressor station. As
explained in Fig. 2.4 a station may have a number of such units with different types of
machines and configurations. A detailed model of the entire station would require a large
pool of input data, such as the wheel maps of all compressors, the performance curves
of all drivers, the control laws implemented in the ACS, the characteristics of the cooler
and many more. From experience, these data are not completely available even to the
TSOs and if available they are not easily accessible to the public. In many practical cases,
a reduced model is sufficient to capture the basic characteristics of the entire station.
Thus, it is reasonable to use a number of aggregated parameters describing the operation,
control and constraints of the station. These parameters can be used to reduce the actual
station to a generic model. The control of the station can be modelled by the control
modes listed in Tab. 2.1. The aggregated operating region of the station can be captured
by the area bounded by the generic constraints Qvol,max, Πmax, PWDmax as depicted
in Fig. 2.5 b). Additional generic constraints and their corresponding default values are
listed in Tab. 2.1. The adiabatic efficiency ηad of the compressors and the mechanical
efficiency ηm of the drivers are aggregated to an average value for the entire station. If
the station is operated (i.e. control mode is neither OFF , BP ) the working point needs
to be checked against the defined generic constraints.
Modelling of Entry & Exit Stations
Each entry and exit point in the transport system and each transition point between
two different transmission networks is typically equipped with a regulator and metering
station to control and monitor the quantity of gas entering or exiting the network, and
the supply or delivery pressures at these crucial points of the network.
In the following, the structure and operation of gas stations are explained. Afterwards an
overview of the different types of gas stations in the gas transport system is given.
Figure 2.6 shows a typical schematic structure of a two street regulator and metering sta-
tion and the technical devices and components installed in such stations, such as valves,
filtering devices, heaters, regulators and flow meters. The primary street contains the
regulator which is typically controlled by a designated automatic control system as de-
scribed in Fig. 2.3. The secondary street, in contrast is not controlled and is available for
maintenance or in case of a disruption in the primary street. It contains a control valve
that can be adjusted manually. A gas station typically consist of more than two streets, in
order to increase the capacity of the station and to have a back up in case of a disruption











1 inlet valve 4 regulator 7 outlet valve
2 filter 5 manual regulator
3 heater 6 metering station
Fig. 2.6.: Typical schematic structure of a gas regulator and metering station
in the transport system, which can be subdivided into
I. Production Fields (PRO),
II. cross border import/export stations (CBI/CBE),
III. city gate stations (CGS, connection to local gas distribution system),
IV. stations of direct served customers (Gas Fired Power Plants (GFPP)),
and
V. transitional stations connecting the network systems of at least two in-
dependent entities
Production fields connected to the transport system require a gas station in order to re-
duce the field pressure to pipeline pressure and to monitor the gas entering the transport
system. The regulator stations in production fields are usually outlet pressure controlled.
Cross border import and export stations are located at the national borders of two na-
tional transport systems operated by different entities. Transitional gas stations, in turn,
are located at interconnection points between two transmission networks in one coun-
try owned by different TSOs and/or operated at different pressure levels. The quantity
of gas imported or exported through cross border and transitional stations is typically
characterized by relatively small daily and yearly fluctuations.
City gate stations, in contrast, are located at the interface to the local gas distribution
system. The amount of gas leaving the transport system at these stations is normally
connected with relatively large daily and seasonal fluctuations, since the majority of cus-
tomers supplied are small customers, like households, commercial customers etc., who use
gas mainly for heating and cooking. City gate stations play a crucial role in terms of se-
curity of gas supply, since protected customers receive gas from these stations. According
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to Article 2 of the Regulation [12] protected customers include all household customers
connected to a gas distribution network, social services, small and medium-sized enter-
prises that do not represent more than 20% of the final use of gas entering the distribution
station and district heating installations with no fuel switching that provide heating to
households. Stations of direct served customers, are at the interface to large consumers
such as gas fired power generation plants and large industries, which are served directly
from the transport pipeline. The quantity of gas delivered to these customers is usually
constant throughout the year and may fluctuate during the day, for instance, if a gas
power plant is used for peak load shaving.
At each of these presented stations, contractual agreements exist regarding gas quality,
quantity and pressure, which have to be met by the different parties to avoid legal penal-
ties. In a liberalized gas market, these contractual agreements are typically established by
gas traders, also referred to as shippers, who have contracts with gas producers for buying
a certain quantity of gas for a given market price, contracts with TSOs for booking entry,
exit and transport capacities (nominations) and contracts with consumers for delivering
the commodity [94]. Since most gas stations are typically controlled and are located at
the boundary of the network, it is reasonable to model these stations by a single node,
which can be used to reflect the pressure or flow control of the actual station. Table 2.2
shows the available control modes and constraint parameters for modelling an entry or
exit station. The contractual constraints, can be modelled by the limits for the flow rate
and pressure. In case a transitional gas station or a cross border station between two
pipeline elements is present in the network model, a regulator element is used to model
the operation of this station.
Modelling of Underground Gas Storage Facilities
The transport of natural gas from production sites to consumption areas may take a
significant amount of time depending on the distance, the quantity of gas transported
and the type of transportation chosen (e.g. LNG-vessels or solely pipeline transport).
While the quantity of gas supplied to the transport system remain relatively constant
throughout the year, demands may change depending on the season and the ambient
temperature. During winter gas consumption is inherently greater than during summer.
Thus, it may happen that gas arriving to the transport system from production fields
or cross border points may not be needed right away. However, in order to keep the
surplus of gas in the transport system and close to consumption areas for seasons of peak
demand, natural gas is stored in UGS facilities and withdrawn when demanded. Gas
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min. supply flow (Qmin)
max. supply flow (Qmax)
min. supply pressure (pmin)








min. delivery flow (Qmin)
max. delivery flow (Qmax)
min. delivery pressure (pmin)
max. delivery pressure (pmax)
UGS pressure (pset)
withdrawal/injection rate (Qset)




Lwdr ≤ 0 & Linj ≥ 0
user defined hard limits:
max. working inventory (Iw,max)
max. withdrawal rate (Qwdr,max)
max. injection rate (Qinj,max)
user defined limits:
max. supply pressure (pwdr,max)
min. offtake pressure (pinj,min)
LNG Terminal pressure (pset)
regasification rate (Qset)
initial working inventory (INV )
arriving vessel size (V ESSEL)
internal hard limits:
L ≤ 0
user defined hard limits:




max. supply pressure (preg,max)
Tab. 2.2.: Overview of available control modes and constraints settings for non-pipe fa-
cilities modelled as nodes
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storage facilities increase the flexibility and ability to react to long-term and short-term
fluctuations and to disruptions in gas supply and demand.
The operation of UGS facilities can be characterized by different parameters. The most
important ones are described below.
I. Storage Inventory I:
Quantity of natural gas currently stored in the storage reservoir.
II. Maximum Storage Inventory Imax:
Maximum quantity of gas that can be stored in the storage reservoir.
III. Base Gas Inventory Ib:
Minimum quantity of gas that remains in the storage reservoir to ensure an adequate
reservoir pressure for the withdrawal process.
IV. Working Gas Inventory Iw:
Difference between storage inventory and base gas inventory.
V. Maximum Working Gas Inventory Iw,max:
Total amount of gas that can be withdrawn from the storage reservoir during normal
operation.
VI. Withdrawal Rate Qwdr:
Flow rate at which natural gas is withdrawn from the storage facility and injected
into the transport system.
VII. Maximum Withdrawal Capacity Qmaxwdr :
Maximum possible withdrawal rate at which natural gas can be withdrawn from
the storage facility and injected into the transport system. Maximum withdrawal
capacity is at its peak when storage inventory reaches maximum storage inventory
and decreases as gas is withdrawn from storage
VIII. Injection Rate Qinj:
Flow rate at which natural gas is withdrawn from the transport system and injected
into the storage reservoir.
IX. Maximum Injection Capacity Qmaxinj :
Maximum possible injection rate at which natural gas can be withdrawn from the
transport system and injected into the storage reservoir. Maximum injection ca-
pacity is at peak when working gas is fully withdrawn and decreases while gas is
injected into the reservoir.
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X. Turn-Over Rate TI:
Time required for a storage cycle, i.e to empty and refill the working inventory of
the storage reservoir
In principle, two kinds of storage facilities can be classified, namely, base load and peak
load facilities [95]. Base load storages can store large amounts of natural gas in their
reservoirs, but have relatively low withdrawal and injection rates. They are suitable for
covering long-term seasonal demands. In these facilities gas is injected during seasons of
low demand, mostly in non-heating periods from April to October, and withdrawn during
seasons of high demand, mostly in heating periods from November to February. The
most common type of base load facility connected to gas transport systems are depleted
gas fields, which are emptied gas production fields close to consumption areas that were
converted to UGS facilities. Depleted gas fields have several advantages. They do not
require further exploration and can take advantage of existing wells and technical devices
of the former production field. Depleted gas fields are characterized by their reservoir
depths that can be from 2,500-4,500 m, their enormous storage capacity which can amount
to several billion cubic meters and their relatively low withdrawal and injection rates.
They normally have a turn-over rate of one year. Moreover, they may require a base gas
inventory of up to 50% of working gas inventory [96].
In contrast to base load facilities, peak load facilities have relatively high withdrawal
rates, but smaller storage capacities compared to base load storages. These facilities have
relatively short turn-over rates and are mostly used to cover short-term peak demands.
Salt cavern facilities are the most common type of peak load storages. They are formed in
underground salt deposits and are utilized for storing large volumes of natural gas close
to consumption areas. The storage capacities of salt caverns is much lower than that of
depleted fields, however, salt caverns have much higher withdrawal rates. Their turn over
rates are between a day and a week [95]. Moreover, they require relatively small amounts
of base gas inventory (usually 20-30% of working gas inventory) [96].
Another type of storage facility, which has characteristics of base load and peak load
storages are formed in aquifers. Aquifer storages originated from natural aquifers which
were converted to allow the storage of natural gas. Their geological structure is similar
to depleted gas fields. The storage reservoir in aquifer storages is formed between an
overlying impermeable cap rock and the underlying ground water, which contribute to
maintaining reservoir pressure during withdrawal. Aquifer storages require a relatively
large amount of base gas inventory which can be as high as 80% of working gas inventory.
Due to their high development, maintenance and operating costs aquifers are the least
attractive type of UGS.



























1 liquid separator 4 cooler 7 dehydrator
2 meter 5 regulator 8 filter
3 preheater 6 compressor 9 valve
Fig. 2.7.: Typical schematic structure of the above ground components of an underground
gas storage facility
The structure of the overground section of UGS facilities is very similar for all three types
of storages and is illustrated schematically in Fig. 2.7. Some of the overground components
are well heads, pipe gatherings, liquid separators, coolers, heaters, regulators, compressors,
dryers, filters, valves and metering devices.
The operation of UGS facilities is divided into two processes, namely, the withdrawal
process, where working gas is withdrawn from the reservoir and added to the pipeline,
and the injection process, where gas is taken from the pipelines and injected into the
reservoir. The withdrawal process is controlled by a regulator station, which reduces the
pressure of the gas withdrawn from the reservoir (upto 350 bar-g depending on the storage
type and stock level) to pipeline pressure, while the injection process is controlled by a
compressor station, which increases the pressure of the gas taken from the pipeline to
reservoir pressure. The pressure in the reservoir depends on the total gas inventory in the
reservoir. The more gas is withdrawn from the reservoir, the lower the reservoir pressure
and the lower the maximum withdrawal rate of the station. In order to reflect the injection
and withdrawal process, UGS facilities are modelled as a single node (storage node),
which is either a supply node, during the withdrawal process or a demand node during
the injection process. During the withdrawal process the load of the node corresponds
to the withdrawal rate, while during injection the load is equal to the injection rate.
Furthermore, the characteristics of UGS facilities are modelled by the scenario parameters
listed in the second column of Tab. 2.2. The control mode of the facility can be either
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Fig. 2.8.: Typical UGS envelopes for depleted gas fields, aquifer and salt cavern storage
for the withdrawal process (top) and the injection process (bottom) [97,98]
pressure control (pset) or flow control (Lset). The current process at the station can be
specified by the injection state INJ or withdrawal state WDR (default state), while the
initial working gas inventory can be set by the parameter INV . The initial working gas
inventory is important, since it determines the working point of the facility at the start of
the simulation. In addition, the third column in Tab. 2.2 gives an overview of parameters
describing the constraints of UGS facilities, in particular, their operating envelope.
The operating region of a storage facility is typically reflected by its storage envelope,
which depicts the technically possible operating points of the facility in terms of with-
drawal rate (Qwdr), injection rate (Qinj) and working gas inventory (Iw). The shape of
the storage envelope depends on a number of properties, such as, the storage type, the
maximum and minimum reservoir pressure, minimum gas inventory (cushion gas), the
available compression power for injection and withdrawal etc. Figure 2.8 shows typical
storage envelopes for the withdrawal and injection process of the three storage types.
The actual operating point of the storage facility will be considered by monitoring the
withdrawal/injection rate and working gas inventory in each time step and ensuring this
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point lies within the storage envelope. The working gas inventory in the storage reservoir
at each time step can be obtained by




where t0 is the initial time point. Knowing the working gas inventory and the withdrawal
or injection rate, the operating point can be determined and checked for each time step.
If the operating point is outside the storage envelop, the time step will be recalculated
using the boundary values.
Modelling of LNG Terminals
In cases where a direct pipeline connection between the gas producing region and the
consumption area is unfeasible or inefficient due to the distances and the geographical
conditions (e.g. production and consumption sites are separated by waters), natural gas
may be liquefied and then transported with specially designed LNG vessels to consumption
regions. Since the volume occupied by LNG is almost 600 times smaller than that occupied
by gaseous natural gas at atmospheric condition a large quantity of gas can be transported
with LNG vessels, which can accommodate upto 150,000 m3 of LNG [93]. The liquification
of natural gas is conducted at temperatures of approximately -160 °C in liquification
plants located close to shipping ports in the producing regions. During transportation
this temperature has to be maintained in order to keep LNG in liquefied form. The
vessels transporting LNG to the consumption regions are normally powered by steam
turbines, which use a fraction of the transported LNG as a fuel. These vessels can reach
velocities of upto 20 knots (approx. 37 km/h) [93]. The transported LNG arrives to the
consumption regions at LNG regasification terminals which are located at shipping ports
close to consumption areas.
Figure 2.9 shows a typical schematic structure of a LNG regasification terminal, which
comprises of a number of technical components such us pipe gatherings, high pressure
pumps, vaporizers and metering devices. When the LNG vessel arrives to the terminal
the transported LNG is firstly withdrawn from the vessel and injected into a designated
LNG storage tank from the top, where the LNG is kept at a temperature of approx. -
160 °C and a pressure of 150-250 mbar-g. During the relocation process some of the LNG
may vaporize in the piping system and in the LNG storage tank. Some of the vaporized





















T [◦C]: −160 −160 −160 −150 > 0
p [bar-g]: 0.15 4 − 6 0.15 − 0.25 80 < 80
Fig. 2.9.: Typical schematic structure of a LNG regasification terminal
stored in the storage tank is withdrawn from the bottom of the tank and directed to
a number of high pressure pumps where the pressure of the LNG is raised to pipeline
pressure (in this case 80 bar-g). The actual regasification of the LNG is then conducted
at vaporizing station, where the LNG is vaporized using air and/or the heat energy from
the surrounding sea. After the regasification, the gas may be processed (filtering, water
separation etc.) and then forwarded to the metering station before it is injected into the
transport system.
LNG terminals can be used to increase the storage capacity, thus, the flexibility of the
transport system to react to variations in demand and supply. Some LNG terminals can
have storage capacities of upto 540,000 m3 of LNG, which is normally spread on a number
of storage tanks.
The operation of LNG Terminals can be characterized by the following parameters:
I. Gross Storage Capacity ImaxLNG:
Maximum amount of LNG that can be stored in the storage tanks.
II. Maximum Working Inventory Imaxw,LNG:
Maximum amount of LNG that is available for regasification. The gross capacity is
not completly availabe for regasification, since a small amount of LNG always remain
48 2. Dynamic Simulation Model for Gas Transmission Networks
in the storage tank, to ensure a smooth operation of the facility. The maximum
working inventory is the actual amount of LNG available for operation.
III. LNG Inventory ILNG:
Amount of LNG currently stored in the LNG storage tanks.
IV. LNG Working Inventory Iw,LNG:
Amount of LNG currently stored in the LNG storage tanks that can be regasified
and injected into the transport system.
V. Regasification Rate Qreg:
Flow rate at which LNG is regasified and injected into the transport system.
VI. Maximum Regasification Rate Qmaxreg :
Maximum possible flow rate at which LNG can be regasified and injected into
the transport system. Unlike UGS facilities the maximum regasification rate does
not depend on the LNG inventory. Thus, the maximum regasification rate remains
constant, when LNG is withdrawn from storage.
VII. Vessel Discharge Rate Qdis:
Indicates how fast LNG transported in the vessel can be relocated from the vessel
to the storage tanks
Similar to UGS facilities, LNG terminals can be regarded as supply nodes with an oper-
ating region limited by the LNG working inventory (the amount of LNG in the storage
tanks available for regasification) and maximum regasification rate Qmaxreg . The working
gas inventory decreases during withdrawal from storage and increases when LNG is dis-
charged from an arriving LNG vessel and injected into storage, while the regasification
capacity, remains constant, and is independent of the fluctuations in storage level.
The storage inventory in the tanks is monitored each time step in order to capture the
operating point of the station correctly. Therefore, the LNG in storage will be transformed
to an equivalent quantity of gaseous natural gas at standard conditions using the following






which is the ratio between the density of LNG (ρn,lng ∼= 421 kg/m3) and gaseous natural
gas ρn,gas at standard condition. Using this relation the equivalent standard volume of
working gas inventory in the LNG tank at any instant of time Iw(t) yields
Iw(t) = dlng · ILNG(t0) +
t∫
t0
dlng ·Qdis(t)−Qreg(t) dt (2.33)
where ILNG(t0) is the LNG in storage at the initial time point t0, Qdis(t) the vessel
discharge rate and Qreg(t) the regasification rate. If Iw exceeds the equivalent maximum
working gas capacity of the LNG terminal the load of the supply node will be set to
zero.
Another constraint of LNG terminals is the maximum send-out pressure (pmax) which is
restricted by the maximum compression power of the high pressure pumps. This constraint
may restrict the regasification rate, since to inject gas into the transport system a pressure
gradient between the terminal and the transport pipeline is needed. Thus, the send-out
pressure constraint will be checked together with the other constraints after each time
step. If any of the constraints is violated the boundary values will be applied and the time
step will be recalculated. If no compatible set point can be found the load will be set to
zero.
2.3.3. Network Description
The components in a gas transport system can be described using basic elements of graph
theory, namely, nodes and directed edges. A directed edge represents an element with an
inlet, an outlet and a flow direction. The following elements listed in Tab. 2.1 are de-
scribed by directed edges, namely, pipelines, compressors, regulators, valves and resistors.
Pipelines and resistors are passive elements, since their behaviour is fully described by
the physical equation, while compressors, regulators and valves are considered active el-
ements, since their states can be controlled externally. Furthermore, for each element in
Tab. 2.1 a description of the function and the basic equation describing their operation
are listed. The operation of a compressor station for instance is generally an equation
describing the required compression power from the driver, which can be either a gas
turbine or electric driver.
The interconnection points between the individual network elements in Tab. 2.1 are re-
ferred to as nodes. Each element typically has at least one common inlet or outlet node
with another element in the network. Moreover, nodes are the only location in the net-
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Element Types Description
Passive Elements
pipe models a section of a pipeline, basic properties are length, diameter,
roughness and pipe efficiency
resistor models passive devices that cause a local pressure drop (e.g. meters,
inlet piping, coolers, heaters, scrubbers etc.)
Active Elements
compressor models a compressor station with generic constraints, allows the
specification of a control mode of the station (e.g. outlet pressure
control, inlet pressure control, flow rate control etc.)
regulator models a pressure reduction and metering station located at the interface
of two neighbouring networks with different maximum operating
pressures, allows the specification of a control mode of the station (e.g.
outlet pressure control, inlet pressure control, flow rate control etc.)
valve models a valve station, which is is either opened or closed
Tab. 2.3.: Basic elements comprising gas transport networks
work where gas can be injected or extracted from the network. Similar to elements, we
can distinguish the following type of nodes listed in Tab. 2.4, namely, demand, supply,
storage and junction nodes. Demand nodes are points in the transport system, where
gas is extracted from the network, such as city gate stations (CGS, connection to the
local, low pressure distribution network), cross border export stations (CBE, transport of
natural gas to neighbouring network systems) gas fired power plants and large industries
(IND), which are directly served from the transport system. Supply nodes, in contrast,
are entry points to the gas system from production fields (PRO), cross border import
stations (CBI, gas import from neighbouring countries through pipelines) and LNG ter-
minals, while storage nodes are locations of UGS facilities, where gas can either enter
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Node Type Description Facilities
demand
L > 0
point, where gas is extracted from the
network
CGS, CBE, GFPP, IND
supply
L < 0




L ≥ 0 or L ≤ 0





point, where a topological change or a
change in pipe properties occurs (e.g.
diameter, inclination)
-
Tab. 2.4.: Classification and characteristics of nodes in the network
or exit the network. The topology of the entire network is described by the following
node-branch incidence matrix:
A = [ai,j ]n×m ai,j =

+1, node i is outlet of element j
–1, node i is inlet of element j
0, node i and element j are not connected
(2.34)
where n is the number of nodes, m the number of elements and ai,j the elements of matrix
A. Matrix A can be decomposed in a node-pipe incidence matrix AP describing only pipe
connections and a node-non-pipe incidence matrix AN describing non-pipe connections.
A = [AP|AN] (2.35)
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Each node in the network is characterized by its nodal pressure pi and nodal load Li,
while each branch is characterized by its gas flow rate Qj . The set of nodal pressures,

































> 0, flow direction is from inlet to outlet
< 0, flow direction is from outlet to inlet
(2.37)
Similarly to the incidence matrix A, the flow vector Q can be decomposed in a pipe and
non-pipe component.
Q = [QP |QN ]T (2.38)
2.3.4. System of Equations for the Total Network
The dynamic behaviour of a gas transport system is primarily determined by the pipeline
elements. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, gas pipelines have four basic properties, namely,
linepack, resistance, inertia and gravity. Linepack and resistance are the most dominant
properties, while gravity and inertia play a secondary role. A pipeline network can be
segmented into a number of pipeline sections, by distributing the aforementioned proper-
ties to the corresponding pipe segments. Figure 2.10 demonstrates how this can be done
for a section of a pipe network. In this example, the volumes of the pipelines are equally
distributed and assigned to the inlet and outlet nodes of each pipeline. The quantity of
gas Qi,j transferred between two nodal volumes depends on the pressure difference pi and
pj , the resistance, the inertia and the inclination of the pipeline segment between the two
nodal volumes. This relation is described by the pressure drop equation (2.16) derived
in Section 2.3.1. According to the continuity equation (2.15), the pressure in the nodal
volume may change in time if there is an imbalance between inflows and outflows to the
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nodal volume Vi. This can be expressed by the integral form of the continuity equation
















where Li is the external load extracted/injected to node i with volume Vi and Di,j the




















Fig. 2.10.: Law of mass conservation for a nodal control volume in a gas network
The continuity equation can be expressed for each node in the network, thus, we obtain
a set of equations equal to the number of nodes defined for the network. If we perform an
implicit time integration of the set of integral continuity equations for a time step ∆t =
tn+1− tn and order the equation in terms of known variables and boundary conditions at
time tn and tn+1 (right hand side) and unknown variables at time tn+1 (left hand side)
we obtain the following finite difference matrix equation for the integrated network:
Φ pn+1 −A Qn+1 = Φ pn − 0.5 (Ln + Ln+1) (2.41)
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where A is the incidence matrix described in eq. (2.34), Q and L the vectors of ele-
ment flows and nodal loads described in eq. (2.36) and Φ the following diagonal matrix
describing the pressure coefficients φi:
Φ = diag{φ1, φ2, ..., φn}, φi = Vi
ρnc2i,j∆t
(2.42)
As can be seen from the right hand side of equation (2.41), to obtain the state of the
network for a time in the future (tn+1) we need information on the state in the past (tn)
and the boundary conditions in the future (Ln+1), thus, a transient simulation requires
an initial state and boundary conditions. Typically, a steady state solution of the network
is chosen as an initial condition to start the transient calculation. The equations for the
steady state can be obtained if we set pn = pn+1 and Ln = Ln+1 or the nodal volume
Vj to zero, which will result in an equation describing Kirchhoffs’ first law, which implies
the sum of incoming and outgoing flows Qj in a node i to be equal to the nodal load Li.
A Q = L (2.43)
2.3.5. Boundary Conditions
The matrix equation derived in the previous section requires additional linear independent
equations in order to close the entire problem, since the number of unknowns is greater
than the number of equations. These equations are provided by the linearised pressure
drop equations (2.22) and additional equations describing the control mode of non-pipe
elements (e.g. compressors and regulators), and the control of facilities at entry and exit
points of the network. The operation of compressor stations and regulator stations are
typically controlled by a designated automated control system, which ensures the desired
operating set point (e.g. outlet pressure, flow rate, inlet pressure etc.) is maintained and
constraints are not violated. At each gas entry and exit point in the transport system there
is typically a regulator station that controls the flow rate or pressure at a desired set point.
Thus, we can reflect this control by assigning to each demand, supply and storage node
the corresponding control of the connected facility. In the following the missing equations
describing the control modes are elaborated.
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Control Mode Equation Coefficients
c1 · p1 + c2 · p2 + c3 ·Q = d
inlet pressure (pi,set) pi = pi,set c1 = 1, c2 = 0, c3 = 0, d = pi,set
outlet pressure (po,set) po = po,set c1 = 0, c2 = 1, c3 = 0, d = po,set
pressure ratio (Πset) po
pi
= Πset c1 = −Πset, c2 = 1,
c3 = 0, d = 0
pressure difference
(∆pset)
po − pi = ∆pset c1 = −1, c2 = 1,
c3 = 0, d = ∆pset
flow rate (Qset) Q = Qset c1 = 0, c2 = 0, c3 = 1, d = Qset
volumetric flow (Qvol,set) Q = pi
ZiTiRρn
Qvol,set c1 = −
Qvol,set
ZiTiRρn
, c2 = 0,
c3 = 1, d = 0




















[Πcκ − 1], d = PWsset




















[Πcκ − 1], d = PWdset




















[Πcκ − 1], d = Qf,set
bypass (BP ) pi = po c1 = −1, c2 = 1, c3 = 0, d = 0
off (OFF ) Q = 0 c1 = 0, c2 = 0, c3 = 1, d = 0
Tab. 2.5.: Control modes for non-pipe facilities and their mathematical implementation
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Non-Pipe Equations
The general equations for non-pipe elements are provided by the following linear equation:
c1,j p
n+1
1 + c2,j pn+12 + c3,j Qn+1j = dj (2.44)
where c1,j , c2,j and c3,j are scalar coefficients of the inlet node pressure p1, the outlet
node pressure p2 and the flow rate Qj of non-pipe element j, respectively. In addition
dj is a constant on the right hand side. The different control modes for each non-pipe
element and their corresponding equations are summarized in Tab. 2.1 & 2.5. The set of
control modes for compressor stations are similar to that for regulator stations, while for
valves only the control mode bypass and inactive is possible. Moreover, compressor and
regulator elements may have constraints, which will be checked during the time integration
process.
Nodal Equations
For each node either the nodal pressure pi or the nodal load Li has to be known for a
future time step tn+1. If the node is pressure controlled the pressure pi is set to a desired
set point pset, while the corresponding load Li is calculated for the equivalent time step.
In contrast, if the node is load controlled, the load Li is assigned a desired set point Lset
and the resulting nodal pressure pi is calculated. For junction nodes the control mode is
always inactive since these nodes are characterized by a zero nodal load, thus, for these
nodes a resulting pressure is calculated. The control mode for each node i can be generally
Control Mode Equation Coefficients
pressure (pset) pj = pset kp = 1, kL = 0, b = pset
supply/offtake flow (Qset) Lj = Qset kp = 0, kL = 1, b = Qset
off (OFF ) Lj = 0 kp = 0, kL = 1, b = 0
Tab. 2.6.: Overview of available scenario parameter (control modes) for facilities modelled
as demand, supply or storage nodes and their mathematical implementation
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described by the following linear scalar equation.
kp,i · pn+1i + kL,i · Ln+1i = bi (2.45)
where kp,i and kL,i are scalar coefficients of the nodal pressure pi and nodal load Li,
respectively, and bi is the value of the desired load or pressure set point (see Tab. 2.6
for values for coefficients for different control modes). Moreover, for each demand, supply
and storage node constraints on load and pressure can be defined, which are listed in the
last column of Tab. 2.2.
2.3.6. Algorithm
The equations elaborated for the nodes, non-pipe and pipe elements can be combined with
eq. (2.41) to the following linear matrix equation for computing the state of the network
for a future time step tn+1 based on an initial time step tn and prescribed boundary
conditions at nodes and non-pipe elements:
Φ −AP −AN I
ADP −R 0 0
Cp 0 CN 0














The first row of the matrix equation describes the set of nodal continuity equations (2.41),
while the second row describes the linearized pipe equation (2.24)-(2.23), where matrix
R is a diagonal matrix representing the slope of the linearized pressure drop equations,
B the intersection with the y-axis and ADP the pipe-node incidence matrix describing
the pressure drop term DP . Finally, the third and fourth row describes the control mode
of non-pipe elements (eq. (2.44)) and node facilities (eq. (2.45)), respectively.
Figure 2.11 shows a flow chart of the algorithm for the transient simulation. After an
initial steady state solution is obtained the network is discretized in space (∆x) and
time (∆t). In addition, the initial steady state solution is projected on the generated
simulation grid, i.e. pipe flows, pressure distribution of the original network are assigned
to the corresponding grid pipes and grid nodes. After the simulation grid is generated the
matrix equation eq. (2.46) is solved iteratively for each time step tn+1. First an initial
approximation is made for the pressure drop equation using the linearisation described in
eq. (2.22) then the matrices and vectors in eq. (2.46) are assembled in order to solve the






grid using time (∆t) and
space (∆x) discretization
Start time integration
for time step tn+1 = tn+∆t
and set k = 1 & kc = 1
Make an initial approx-
imation for the pressure
drop equation according to
eq. (2.22) using Qn from
the previous time step
Assemble system matrices
and vectors in eq. (2.46)
Solve eq. (2.46) for it-
eration k and deter-
mine residual ‖Res‖
‖Res‖ ≤ ?k ≤ kmax?
Check if the converged solu-
tion violates any constraints






for new time step tn+1
Linearize pressure drop
equation around Qk
using eq. (2.22) and fill
ADP, R and B with new
values. Run a new iteration
k=k+1
Set the violated parameters
and boundary conditions
to the violated upper or
lower bound and re-iterate
using the last solution as
an inital approximation

















Fig. 2.11.: Flow chart for transient simulation
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linearized matrix equation for the iteration step k. The obtained solution is then used to
calculate the residual vector for the non-linear pressure drop equation.
Res = ∆Pn+1 − [Rf · |Qn+1|Qn+1 +Ri · (Qn+1 −Qn)] (2.47)
The euclidean norm of the residual vector
‖Res‖ =
√
Res21 +Res22 + ...+Res2mp , ‖Res‖ :
≤  , converged solution
>  , solution did not converge
(2.48)
is then compared against a tolerance  = [10−3, ..., 10−8]. The iteration continues if the
residual is above the tolerance and if a maximum number of iterations (kmax) has not
been exceeded. The residual will typically converge quadratically if the solution for an
iteration step is relatively close to the final solution, which is the case if the boundary
conditions between two time steps do not change rapidly. Depending on the magnitude
of the changes between two time steps and the prescribed residual tolerance a converged
solution is usually obtained within 1 to 5 iterations. In case a converge solution is not
obtained for a time step one can adjust the residual tolerance  and the maximum number
of iterations kmax and then reiterate.
After a converged solution is obtained for a time step the solution is checked for constraints
violation. If violations are found the iteration for the last time step will be repeated adapt-
ing the boundary conditions to the violated constraints. The algorithm continues with the
next time step if a converged and feasible solution is found, otherwise the simulation is
terminated. The entire simulation process ends successfully if for each time step a con-
verged and feasible solution is obtained.
The algorithm is implemented into a numerical code using the programming language
Visual Basic .NET.
2.4. Model Benchmarking
In this section, we benchmark the model proposed against the solutions obtained with
other models available in the literature for a well-known triangular network and 30-Node
sample network, in order to check the accuracy of the solutions obtained. Moreover,
we make a specific study about the accuracy concerning the gravitational term in the
momentum equation, and its importance in the solution for relatively small average slopes.
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Proper validation is almost impossible given the scarcity of experimental data available
for real networks.
2.4.1. Simulation of a triangular Network
The model is applied to solve the gas network depicted in Fig. 2.12 using the STE.
The example network has been used in a number references [70, 73, 76, 77, 79, 86, 92] to
benchmark the results with different transient methods. The results obtained with the
model will be benchmarked against two of these references, namely, Osiadacz [92] and
Ke and Ti [86] and the commercial software SIMONE. The network in Fig. 2.12 consists
of three pipelines and two demand nodes (node 2 and node 3) that are supplied with










Fig. 2.12.: Topology of the 3 pipeline network
Pipe Inlet Outlet Diameter [mm] Length [km] Roughness [mm]
1 1 3 600 80 0.012
2 1 2 600 90 0.012
3 2 3 600 100 0.012
Tab. 2.7.: Pipe data of the 3 pipeline network
listed in Tab. 2.7 while the simulation properties and gas properties are shown in Tab.
2.8. The properties are chosen according to those from the references in order to compare
the results. To show the efficiency and the accuracy of the proposed model for low space
resolutions the pipes are discretized by only one segment per pipeline (∆x = l)4. Unlike
4in [92] the pipelines are discretized in 10 segments while in [86] the pipelines are discretized in 5
segments
2.4. Model Benchmarking 61
the pipe properties in the references [86,92]5 the pipe roughness is taken into account for
the computation of the friction factor. Thus, for each pipeline a roughness value typical
for transport pipelines is assigned (r = 0.012 mm). Moreover, for the transient simulation
a time step of 180 s and a total simulation time of one day is chosen. The boundary
parameter symbol value unit
grid segments per pipe J 1 [-]
time step ∆t 180 [s]
total simulation time tmax 24 [h]
residual tolerance  10−4 [-]
gas temperature T 278 [K]
dynamic viscosity η 10−5 [kg/m · s]
standard pressure pn 1.01325 [bar]
standard temperature Tn 273.15 [K]
relative density d 0.6 [-]
Tab. 2.8.: Input parameters for the transient simulation of the 3 pipeline network
conditions for the supply and demand nodes are shown in Fig. 2.13, where in a) the
prescribed pressure profile of the supply node and in b) the load profile of the demand
nodes are depicted. The supply node is pressure controlled with a constant pressure of
50 bar while the demand nodes are flow controlled with a fluctuating load profile according
to Fig. 2.13 b). The required initial condition for the transient simulation is obtained
through an initial steady state computation using the boundary conditions of the initial
time step t0 = 0 s (p1 = 50 bar, L2 = 20 sm3/s and L3 = 40 sm3/s). For both steady
state and transient simulation a computation time of less than 1 s was needed to obtain
a converged solution. The computations were run on an 2.4 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU with
a 8GB RAM.
Figure 2.14 compares the computed pressure profile at the demand nodes with results
from Osiadacz [92], Ke and Ti [86] and the SIMONE software. In general, the pressure
at the demand nodes decreases with increasing nodal loads and increases as the nodal
loads are decreasing. The results obtained with the integrated model is very similar to the
results from the SIMONE software. In contrast, there are deviations between the model
and the results from Osiadacz [92] and Ke and Ti [86], which could be caused by the
different treatment of the friction and compressibility factor. However, the deviations are
marginal (below 1%).
Figure 2.15 shows the evolution of a) the average pipeline flow and b) the total line pack
and Fig. 2.16 a) the resulting load profile at supply node 1 and b) the total load balance
5in [92] the friction factor is assumed to be constant with a value of λ = 0.012 while in [86] the friction
factor is computed without considering the pipe roughness
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Fig. 2.13.: Initial conditions and boundary conditions for the transient simulation of the
3 pipeline network a) pressure condition at the supply node 1 and b) Load
profile at the demand nodes 2 and 3
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p [bar]




















Osiadacz [92] KE and TI [86]
SIMONE Model results
a)pressure profile node 2 b) pressure profile node 3
Fig. 2.14.: Computed pressure profiles at node 2 and node 3 compared to results from the
literature and SIMONE
of the network. Since for these parameters no results are provided by Osiadacz [92] and
Ke and Ti [86] the results obtained from the integrated model are only compared to SI-
MONE.
The evolution of the pipeline flow for pipe 1 and 2 fluctuates very similar to the cor-
responding nodal loads, while for pipe 3 the flow remains constant (see Fig. 2.15). The
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a) pipe flows b) total line pack
Fig. 2.15.: a) average pipe flow rate in pipelines b) total line pack in network
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5 SIMONE Model results
a) load at supply node 1 b) load balance
Fig. 2.16.: a) resulting load profile at supply node 1 b) load balance of the network
latter is due to the fact that the load difference between the inlet and outlet of pipe 3
(i.e. between node 2 and 3) is constant throughout the simulation even though both loads
fluctuate. The results obtained for the pipe flows from the integrated model is again very
similar to the SIMONE results.
The correlation between the total line pack of the network and the flow balance can be
seen if we compare Fig. 2.15 b) to Fig. 2.16 b). The load balance is equal to the time
derivative of the line pack, i.e. the slope of the line pack curve. Whenever the load balance
is zero the line pack is at its local minimum/maximum and whenever the load balance
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is negative/positive the line pack decreases/increases, respectively. The linepack can be
viewed as a buffer to balance short term load fluctuations until the supply node is able
to react to the changes. The results obtained for the linepack and the flow balance from
the integrated model and from SIMONE are similar. The deviation of the line pack is less
than 0.5% and originates from the initial steady state calculation then remains constant
throughout the transient simulation. The deviations of the load balance is less than 1%
compared to the calculated load profile at the supply node shown in Fig. 2.16 a). These
deviations observed for the load balance is actually the difference between the two curves
in Fig. 2.16 a).
2.4.2. Influence of the inclination term
The majority of the hydraulic gas models in the literature do not consider the gravita-
tional term in the momentum equation. In this section, we demonstrate the influence of
the gravitational term for even small pipe inclinations and compare the results to SI-
MONE computation in order to verify the accuracy of the model. The computations are
conducted on the three pipeline network from the previous section using the same data
as in Tab. 2.7 and 2.8 and Fig. 2.13. The elevation h1 of the supply node 1 is varied from
(-1000 m, ... 1000 m) in 500 m intervals which corresponds to the following inclinations
αj for each pipe j in the network. The inclination angle of pipe 3 remains zero since it is
Elevation h1 [m] α1 [°] α2 [°] α3 [°]
-1000 0.716 0.637 0
-500 0.358 0.318 0
500 -0.358 -0.318 0
1000 -0.716 -0.637 0
Tab. 2.9.: Inclination angles for different elevations of node 1
not connected to the supply node. The results are shown in Fig. 2.17, where the resulting
pressure profile for node 2 and 3 are plotted for different elevations of the supply node h1.
The results show pressure shifts of approx. 2 bar per every 500 m of elevation compared to
the horizontal case. The pipe outlet pressure decreases if the pipe is ascending (α > 0) and
increases if the pipeline is descending (α < 0). Moreover, a remarkable observation can
be made if the inlet and outlet pressures for the descending pipes are compared. For the
chosen inclination for this pipelines the pressure increases in flow direction, i.e. the outlet
pressure is greater than the inlet pressure, since the potential energy of the gas at the
inlet is transferred to static pressure. The elevation change does not influence the shape
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SIMONE Model results
a)pressure profile node 2 b) pressure profile node 3
Fig. 2.17.: Computed pressure profiles at node 2 and node 3 for different elevations H1 of
node 1 compared to results from SIMONE
of the pressure profile since for each elevation the shape of the pressure profile remains
unchanged and is just shifted by a certain amount along the vertical axis. The results
obtained from the integrated model are very similar to those obtained from SIMONE,
which confirms the accuracy of the integrated model. Moreover, the magnitude of the
differences in pressure for the different inclinations indicate the importance of this term,
which should not be neglected in large areas of the EU transmission networks, where
easily these average slopes are exceeded.
2.4.3. Simulation of a 30-Nodes Gas Network Model
In the following, we benchmark the accuracy of the presented gas model against results
from the commercial software SIMONE for a 30-Node sample network adapted from [92].
The data of the network topology, gas and pipe properties and steady state boundary
conditions are given in Tab. A.1 and A.2. In the first step, we run a steady state simulation
to obtain an initial state of the network, which we then use in a second step to compute
a dynamic simulation over 24 hours, using the load profile shown in Fig. A.1, which we
multiply with the steady state load for each demand node.
Figures 2.18 and 2.19 show the steady state solution, while Fig. 2.20 illustrates the results
for the dynamic simulation. As can be seen, the results obtained with the developed
gas model are very similar to the SIMONE results, which confirms the accuracy of the
simulation model. The comparison of the steady state results obtained with the gas model
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Fig. 2.18.: Steady state solution for the sample network obtained with the developed gas
model
(see Fig. 2.18) and SIMONE (see Fig. 2.19) shows small deviations (< 0.2 bar) in the nodal
pressure and compressor flow rate (< 2 ksm3/h) in the area around compressor station
Co3. Similar observations can be made for the time plots for the dynamic simulation (see
Fig. 2.20). The shape of the time plots for the gas supply in the source node (see Fig. 2.20
a)) and the nodal pressure for three selected nodes (see Fig. 2.20 b) c) and d)) obtained
with the gas model and SIMONE are very similar, however, small deviations (< 0.2 bar)
can be observed for the last five simulation hours. Discrepancies for the transient model in
other nodes are in the same range as the ones shown here. We consider these discrepancies
(below 0.5%) as quite good results.
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Fig. 2.19.: Steady state solution for the reference network obtained with SIMONE
2.5. Model Application: Bulgarian and Greek National Gas
Transport System (NGTS)
The integrated model is applied to perform a transient simulation on a simplified model
of the Bulgarian and Greek NGTS depicted in Fig. 2.21. The model comprises of 210 pipe
elements (total pipe length of approx. 3600 km and total geometric pipe volume of approx.
1,600,000 m3, 11 compressor stations (10 located in Bulgaria and 1 in Greece) and 217
nodes (67 exit stations to the local distribution system (CGS) and to direct served cus-
tomers (GFPP, IND), two Cross Border Export Stations (CBE), 2 Cross Border Import
Stations, one LNG Terminal and one UGS facility). The Bulgarian-Greek NGTS is basi-
cally structured into two national transmission systems and a transit pipeline transporting
a large quantity of gas from CBI Negru Voda to the CBEs at the border to Turkey (Mal-
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Fig. 2.20.: Comparison of simulation results for the sample network obtained with devel-
oped gas model and SIMONE
coclar), FYRO Macedonia (Zidilova) and Greece (Sidirokastron). Apart from the CBI in
Negru Voda, there are three additional entry points to the transport system, namely, the
UGS Chiren in Bulgaria (supply from storage during winter and injection during sum-
mer), the LNG Terminal Revythoussa in Greece, and the CBI-Kipi at the Greek-Turkish
border.
Figure 2.21 shows the steady state pressure and load distribution and the flow direction
for the network model computed with the integrated model. The input data for the loads
are based on peak winter consumption in 2011. Moreover, each supply node in the model is
pressure controlled while each compressor station (except the compressor station at UGS
Chiren, which is typically used to increase the gas pressure for storage injection) is pressure
ratio controlled with a pressure ratio set point ranging from 1.02− 1.2. The diameter of
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Fig. 2.21.: Steady state pressure and load distribution for the Bulgarian and Greek NGTS
the circles representing demand and supply nodes correspond to the magnitude of the
steady state loads in logarithmic scale, as can be seen from the legend in the bottom
left corner. Moreover, the colors of the pipe elements correspond to the pressure levels
indicated in the color bar on top.
In the following, we use the steady state solution of the network depicted in Fig. 2.21 as an
initial state to simulate and compare two different transient scenarios. In the first scenario
(case 1) we simulate the normal operation of the Bulgarian-Greek NGTS by assigning the
characteristic (relative) load profile depicted in Fig. 2.22 to all exit stations to the local
distribution system (CGS), while for all other exit stations we assume a constant load
profile corresponding to the steady state load. The absolute values of the load profile
for the CGS nodes is obtained by multiplying the steady state load with the relative
values in Fig. 2.22. Moreover, we change the control of CBI Negru Voda and CBI Kipi to
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flow control with a flow rate set point corresponding to the steady state load, while the
pressure set point for UGS Chiren and LNG Revythoussa as well as the pressure ratio set
points for the compressor stations remain unchanged. Furthermore, we set a minimum
pressure constraint for both CBE nodes to 30 bar-g and a minimum delivery pressure
for all CGS nodes to 20 bar-g. In addition, we consider the constraints on the maximum
withdrawal rate from UGS Chiren (175 ksm3/h) and the maximum regasification rate
from LNG Terminal Revythoussa (570 ksm3/h).
In the second scenario (case 2) we simulate a supply shortage of 25% at the largest entry
point to the NGTS, namely, CBI Negru Voda by successively reducing the steady state
load from the initial time to 18:00 and then maintaining the value till the end of the
simulation, as shown in Fig. 2.24. All other settings remain the same as in case 1. Both
scenarios are computed for two gas days using the fast transient equation (FTE) derived
in eq. (2.23). Table 3.7 lists additional settings for the simulation parameters.
The simulation grid is generated with a time resolution of 300 s and a space discretization










which basically means each pipe element is segmented in such a way that the elevation
change between the inlet and outlet node is not greater than 200 m and the ratio between
the pipe length l and pipe diameter D is not greater than 30,000. Applying this criteria to
the network model yields a total grid size of 345 pipe segments and 352 nodes. Simulation
results are shown in Fig. 2.23-2.29 and are discussed in the following.
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Fig. 2.22.: Load profile assigned to city gate stations
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parameter symbol value unit
time step ∆t 300 [s]
total simulation time tmax 48 [h]
residual tolerance  10−4 [-]
gas temperature T 288.15 [K]
dynamic viscosity η 10−5 [kg/m·s]
standard pressure pn 1.01325 [bar]
standard temperature Tn 273.15 [K]
relative density d 0.6 [-]
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Fig. 2.23.: Load balance and line pack evolution of the network
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Fig. 2.24.: Load & pressure evolution at CBI Negru Voda
The results show how the supply reduction from the main entry point in CBI Negru Voda
propagates through the network and affects the pressures and loads at downstream exit
and entry points. Figure 2.23 illustrates the time evolution of the load balance (i.e. sum
of inflow minus sum of outflow) and the total line pack in the combined NGTS for the
examined cases. In both cases the initial line pack in the network decreases, however, the
decrease in line pack is much greater for case 2 than for case 1, which can be explained by
the difference in load balance for both cases. In case 2, the amount of gas extracted from
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Fig. 2.25.: Load & pressure evolution at CBE Malcoclar
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Case 1 Case 2
Fig. 2.26.: Load & pressure evolution at UGS Chiren
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Case 1 Case 2
Fig. 2.27.: Load & pressure evolution at CBE Zidilova
the network is significantly higher than the amount injected due to the supply reduction in
CBI Negru Voda, thus, the line pack in the pipelines is used as a buffer to satisfy demands
until the system catches up. The observation for the total line pack are in line with the
pressure profiles at the downstream entry and exit points. The nodal pressures for case 2
are either lower or equal to those for case 1 (see pressure profiles in Fig. 2.24-2.29).
In addition, the results show the capability of the model to consider constraints imposed on
the network. For example, the load set point at CBE Malcoclar (Fig. 2.25) is not attained
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Fig. 2.28.: Load & pressure evolution at CBI Kipi
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Case 1 Case 2
Fig. 2.29.: Load & pressure evolution at LNG Terminal Revythoussa
due to the delivery pressure constraint (30 bar-g) imposed on the CBE stations. After a
simulation time of approx. 24 h the pressure reaches minimum delivery pressure. In order,
to maintain the minimum pressure the load is reduced continuously. Another example
of constraints consideration can be observed in Fig. 2.26, where the load and pressure
evolution for UGS Chiren is depicted. Due to the supply reduction at CBI Negru Voda
(case 2) the storage withdrawal increases rapidly in order to feed the gas customers in the
consumption area around Sofia with gas. Around 12:00 on simulation day 2 the withdrawal
rate reaches its maximum value (175 ksm3/h), thus, the pressure set point cannot be
maintained and reduces slightly, while the withdrawal rate is kept at its maximum value.
Moreover, looking at the pressure and load evolutions for the exit and entry points down-
stream CBI Negru Voda, we can notice that the farther an entry or exit point is located
from CBI - Negru Voda the later its loads and pressures are affected by the supply re-
duction. For instance, the resulting load profile for the LNG Terminal in Revythoussa is
indifferent for both examined cases up until 12 hours after the beginning of the supply
reduction at CBI Negru Voda, while for UGS Chiren and CBE Malcoclar an impact can
be noticed a few hours after the start of the supply reduction. The magnitude of the reac-
tion time roughly corresponds to the gas travel time, i.e. the ratio of total pipe length to
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mean velocity from point A to B which corresponds to the amount of time a gas particle
will need to travel between to points.
In conclusion, the results demonstrate the capability of the developed model to simulate
the dynamic behaviour of a real gas transport systems and the reaction of the system to
supply disruptions.
2.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a transient hydraulic gas model for simulating the operation
of real world natural gas transport systems in the context of security of gas supply. The
model considers the physical laws governing the gas flow in pipelines, the most important
facilities (e.g. compressor stations, entry and exit stations, storage facilities and LNG
terminals) and their technical constraints. The set of equations describing the dynamics
of the transport system were obtained by simplifying and adapting the full equations
to the prevailing conditions in gas transport systems. Next, the equation system was
discretised and linearised using an implicit time integration and a linearisation technique
for the non-linear pipe equations.
Furthermore, the model was benchmarked against results from the literature and the
commercial software SIMONE. The comparison of the results confirmed the capability of
the model to reflect the dynamic behaviour of gas transport networks in an adequate and
accurate manner.
In addition, the model was applied to a real world instance, namely, the operation of
the Bulgarian-Greek national gas transport system under normal conditions and in the
instance of a supply reduction from a main entry point. Again, the results obtained
demonstrate the ability of the model to capture appropriately, the propagation of load
and pressure fluctuations at entry and exit points and the flexibility to adapt accordingly
the boundary conditions of the network in case of a constraints violation.
In this chapter, we addressed the gas system part of the following sub-research ques-
tions:
• What are the most important facilities in the gas and electricity trans-
mission networks in terms of security of supply?
• How can we develop a mathematical model that reflects appropriately
their physical behaviour and their technical and contractual constraints?
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The developed gas model is suitable for scenarios with no control mode changes at con-
trolled facilities such as compressor stations and valve stations during the simulation.
In real time operation, TSOs may change the control mode and set points of facilities
to mitigate the consequences of disruptions. These control changes will depend on the
conditions in the gas network at the time of the disruption and the technical limits of
the gas transport system. To address these aspects, the gas model needs to be extended
by additional models. Furthermore, to ease the set up and analysis of different security
of supply scenarios, a simulation platform is needed, where the such similation models
can be implemented and executed. In the next chapter, we extend the gas system model




3. Model Extension and Implementation into a
Simulation Software
This chapter is based on the following published conference paper:
• K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “SAInt – A simulation
tool for analysing the consequences of natural gas supply disruptions,”
in Pipeline Technology Conference (PTC) 2016.
3.1. Introduction
The interruption of the gas flows to the EU through Ukraine in January 2009 has been
the largest gas crises in the EU ever. Russian gas exports through Ukraine were drasti-
cally reduced on January 6th, 2009, and completely interrupted the day after. Gas flows
resumed on January 20th and were completely restored only on January 22nd. This event
triggered a deep analysis, led by the European Commission, of EU vulnerability to gas
disruptions. The final result of this effort was the enactment of Regulation 994/2010 [12]
on security of gas supply. According to this Regulation, MS have to develop a Risk As-
sessment (RA), a Preventive Action Plan (PAP) and an Emergency Plan (EP), among
other obligations. The target of the RA is to identify the scenarios that introduce most
risk into the system (more likely to happen and more severe in consequences). Results of
the RA are input to the PAP and the EP. The target of the PAP is to deploy measures to
prevent the occurrence of scenarios that contribute most to the risk, or at least to make
them less likely to happen. The target of the EP is to design strategies to mitigate the
consequences of severe scenarios, should they happen.
The development of a RA needs the identification of a number of scenarios, and the
estimation of their probabilities and consequences. Normally, consequences are given in
terms of non-supplied gas per off-take point of the gas transport network, and eventually
integrated for the entire network. In this chapter, we focus our effort on the correct esti-
mation of consequences of potential scenarios. Given the complex and dynamic behaviour
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of a national or regional gas transport system, this estimation can only be done with
adequate gas transport network simulation models. In the previous chapter, a mathemat-
ical model for gas transport networks was developed for simulating hydraulic transients
in gas transport networks under isothermal conditions. The use of a transient hydraulic
model is inevitable, due to the dynamic nature of the prevailing processes in gas systems.
Nevertheless, the actual resolution of transport equations is not sufficient to simulate the
degrees of freedom of a network to react to a transient or, more severe, to a gas disruption.
In normal operation TSOs, following market decisions, network codes and network good
practice management, have the capability to make decisions concerning the use of differ-
ent network facilities (production sites - PS, underground gas storage facilities - UGS,
liquefied natural gas regasification terminals - LNG, compressor stations – CS, cross bor-
der import stations - CBI, cross border export points – CBE, etc.) in order to optimize its
use. When a gas disruption takes place, according to the EP other actors may intervene,
as for example the Competent Authority (CA), obliging the TSO to adopt specific actions
to mitigate the impact of the crises on gas customers.
In this chapter, the different actions that the operator, market actors and authorities may
adopt in the event of a gas crisis as well as the infrastructural elements used to implement
them are identified. Furthermore, the different possible control modes and constraints of
each infrastructure element are identified and implemented into an integrated simulation
software to analyse gas supply disruptions. The chapter is structured as follows: In Section
3.2 a formal definition of risk is provided, where we focus on the ’consequence’ element
of the term ’Risk’. Section 3.3 addresses the identification of the different measures that
TSOs, authorities and market actors may adopt in the different steps of a gas crisis,
and the types of facilities that may be affected by such decisions. Section 3.4 extends
the gas network model developed in Chapter 2 by additional features that are needed to
implement the potential countermeasures taken by TSOs during a gas crises. Finally, in
Section 3.6 we demonstrate the actual implementation of the developed models in the
previous sections by means of a real world instance.
3.2. Definition of Risk
The word ’risk’ is frequently used in a very informal manner. Quite often, risk is defined
as probability times consequence (or impact, or damage). Essentially, this means that a
measure of risk has to account for potential consequences and weigh them with their cor-
responding probabilities (likelihoods). A more operational definition of risk is illustrated
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in the following paragraphs. Standard ISO 31010 indicates that Risk Assessment attempts
to answer the following fundamental questions:
• What could happen and why?
• What are the consequences?
• What is the probability of its future occurrence?
Kaplan and Garrick [100] showed that a formal answer to these three questions requires
describing risk through the use of a set of triplets
R = {< si, φi, yi >} i = 1, 2, . . . , N (3.1)
where
1. si represents scenario i in the set of N scenarios considered.
2. φi is the probability of scenario i.
3. yi is the potential consequence under the conditions of scenario i.
This constitutes a formal mathematical definition of risk, although it does not account for
all sources of uncertainty. Under this definition each scenario is characterized by its prob-
ability and its consequence(s) (one or several consequence variables may be considered,
but only one possible value of each consequence variable is considered). Adopting this
definition of Risk means that all possible scenarios must be identified and the probability
of each must be estimated. Moreover, for each scenario, the consequence(s) for the system
must be assessed.
An RA, in order to be useful, has to be as accurate as possible, and certainly free of
bias. The introduction of bias is a pervasive problem in RA. The most frequent reason
to introduce bias in a RA is a poor identification of sources of risk (typically classified as
hazards, equivalent to non-intentional events, and threats or intentional actions leading
to undesired events). This problem produces in most occasions a severe underestimation
of risk. This is the reason why many techniques have been developed in order to avoid
this problem, from the simple brainstorming to the much more elaborate Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) or the Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP).
Nevertheless, the incorrect assessment of consequences of different scenarios leads certainly
to biases in the estimation of risk, probably not as severe as the ones derived from a poor
identification of sources of risk, but certainly undesired. This is a problem that has been
80 3. Model Extension and Implementation into a Simulation Tool
systematically ignored in the literature. Typically, problems of gas disruptions have been
addressed at a very coarse level of granularity, as much in space as in time [101–106].
3.3. Measures to Mitigate the Impact of Gas Disruptions
Regulation 994/2010 [12] on security of gas supply has as one of its key elements the EP.
According to the Regulation, the EP has to be designed taking into account the results
of the RA. The target of the EP is to mitigate as much as possible the effects of risky
scenarios, in order to contribute to decreasing the risk level associated to the studied gas
system. This means it has to be designed to react to the scenarios that introduce more
risk into the system, decreasing their consequences as much as possible.
Regulation 994/2010 [12] builds the EP upon three crisis levels:
1. ’Early warning’: when there is concrete, serious and reliable information that an
event may occur which is likely to result insignificant deterioration of the supply
situation.
2. ’Alert’: when a supply disruption or exceptionally high gas demand occurs which
results in significant deterioration of the supply situation, but the market is still
able to manage the situation.
3. ’Emergency’: in the event of exceptionally high gas demand, significant supply dis-
ruption or other significant deterioration of the supply situation and in the event
that all relevant market measures have been implemented but the supply of gas is
insufficient to meet the remaining gas demand so that non-market measures have
to be additionally introduced.
As it can be seen in the definition of the three crisis levels, security of gas supply market
measures and non-market measures are listed. The Regulation [12] considers in its annexes
II and III the main market and non-market measures that may be adopted, and these
are further classified as either supply side or demand side measures. This classification
is provided in Tab. 3.1. Some of these measures have more to do with the PAP than
with the EP, as for example diversification of gas supply routes, the deployment of new
LNG regasification facilities or of new gas storage facilities, investments in infrastructure,
including bi-directional capacity, among others. These are options that, if adopted, lead
to decreased probabilities of some potential events / crises, but cannot be adopted when
the crisis has already started. Measures that have to do with the EP are, for example,
increased production flexibility, increased import flexibility, and reverse flows, among
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others. The security of supply measures considered in the Regulation [12] related to the










s • increased production flexibility,
• increased import flexibility,
• facilitating the integration of gas
from renewable energy sources
into the gas network infrastructure
(power to gas),
• commercial gas storage-withdrawal
capacity and volume of gas in
storage,
• LNG terminal capacity and
maximal send-out capacity,
• diversification of gas supplies and
gas routes,
• reverse flows,
• coordinated dispatching by
transmission system operators,
• use of long-term and short-term
contracts,
• investments in infrastructure,
including bi-directional capacity,
• contractual arrangements to
ensure security of gas supply.
• use of strategic gas storage,
• enforced use of stocks of
alternative fuels (e.g. in
accordance with Council Directive
2009/119/EC of 14 September
2009 imposing an obligation on
Member States to maintain
minimum stocks of crude oil
and/or petroleum products ( 1 )),
• enforced use of electricity
generated from sources other than
gas,
• enforced increase of gas
production levels,











s • use of interruptible contracts,
• fuel switch possibilities including
use of alternative back-up fuels in
industrial and power generation
plants,
• voluntary firm load shedding,
• increased efficiency,
• increased use of renewable energy
sources.
• enforced fuel switching,
• enforced utilisation of interruptible
contracts, where not fully utilised
as part of market measures,
• enforced firm load shedding.
Tab. 3.1.: Security of gas supply measures. Adapted from Regulation 994/2010 [12] on
security of gas supply.
EP, when implemented in case of crisis, involve necessarily the use of some network
facilities. Normally, the operator will have to react to the event triggering the crisis by
changing the operational mode of some of the facilities. For example, to react to a sudden
drop in imports through an entry point, the operator could change the control mode
of some other entry points from flow control to pressure control in order to keep the
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pressure at the normal operational level in the network, allowing the transport of gas to
the areas close to the entry point affected by the gas disruption. This can be combined
with a change in the control mode of other facilities to enhance the transport of gas in the
desired direction, as for example CS. Table 3.2 shows the correspondence between the EP
Measure adopted Facility used
• increased production flexibility,
• increased import flexibility,
• use of long-term and short-term contracts, contractual
arrangements to ensure security of gas supply.
• enforced increase of gas production levels,
• use of long-term and short-term contracts, contractual
arrangements to ensure security of gas supply.
Entry Stations:
CBI - Cross Border
Entry Stations,
PRO - Gas Production
Fields
• use of interruptible contracts,
• fuel switch possibilities including use of alternative back-up fuels
in industrial and power generation plants
• voluntary firm load shedding
• enforced use of stocks of alternative fuels (e.g. in accordance with
Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing
an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of
crude oil and/or petroleum products ( 1 ))
• enforced use of electricity generated from sources other than gas,
• enforced fuel switching
• enforced utilisation of interruptible contracts, where not fully
utilised as part of market measures
• enforced firm load shedding
Exit Stations:
CGS - City Gate
Stations,
GFPP - Gas Fired
Power Plant Stations,
IND Stations of Large
Industrial Customers,
CBE - Cross Border
Export Stations
• commercial gas storage,
• use of strategic gas storage,
• enforced storage withdrawal.
UGS - Underground
Gas Storage Facility
• LNG terminal capacity and maximal send-out capacity,
• increased import flexibility,
• use of long-term and short-term contracts, contractual





• coordinated dispatching by transmission system operators All
Tab. 3.2.: Correspondence between EP measures and network facilities needed to imple-
ment them.
measures considered in the Regulation [12] and the network facilities needed to implement
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them. For example, increased import flexibility means having in place the right contracts
that allow increase flows with relatively short notice to react to problems. The way to
implement this measure in the model is acting on the control mode of the entry stations
across which the shipper that provides that flexibility can put gas into the system. The
same would apply to contractual arrangements signed to ensure security of gas supply.
The facilities modelled in gas network model to simulate the flexibility of a gas transport
network under normal operation and under gas crisis situations are: entry stations (CBIs,
PROs), exit stations (CGS,GFPP,IND), UGS, LNG, and CS. In fact, entry and exit
stations are modelled as nodes with flow or pressure control similar to the regulator and
metering station installed in the actual station.
All measures that have to do with reduction of demand are simulated via exit stations.
At the bottom of the table we can see coordinated dispatching by TSOs. This necessarily
demands the use of all facilities available in the network.
3.4. Extended Model for Gas Infrastructures
The gas network model derived in the previous Chapter requires additional considera-
tions in order to be suitable for examining security of supply scenarios, where the control
modes of non-pipe facilities like compressor stations and UGS facilities may change in
time due to an action of the TSO or a condition in the network. Thus, in this section we
extend the algorithm for the gas network model presented in Chapter 2 by a Dynamic
Event Feasibility Checking Algorithm (DFC), a Simulation Control Evaluation Algorithm
(SCE) a Constraints and Control Handling Algorithm (CCH) for non-pipe facilities and
a Dynamic Time Step Adaptation Method (DTA), which adapts the simulation time step
∆t according to the changes in boundary conditions (e.g. changing the control mode in
a compressor station, UGS, LNG terminals etc.) in order to capture rapid changes with
a higher time resolution. The extended algorithm has been implemented into a software
tool named SAInt (Scenario Analysis Interface for Energy Systems), which contains a
graphical user interface and is developed in MS Visual Studio .NET with the object ori-
ented programming language VB.NET. The algorithm implemented in SAInt is depicted
in Fig. 3.1 and discussed further in this section.
Each case study in SAInt is modelled as a scenario which includes a time window, a global
time step ∆tg, an initial state for the studied network and a list of scenario definition
objects, defined by the user prior to the actual solution process. A scenario definition
object, in turn, consist of a number of properties, which are specified in Tab. 3.3. Among
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Fig. 3.1.: Flow diagram of the transient hydraulic solver implemented in the simulation
tool SAInt
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Scenario Definition Object (user
defined)



























Tab. 3.3.: Overview of the properties of the scenario definition object and the simulation


















Tab. 3.4.: Overview of the properties of the profile object and their corresponding data
types
these properties are the EventParameter with its corresponding Value, i.e. the requested
change in boundary condition (e.g. change in control set point, initial storage level, arrival
of LNG vessel etc.) and the EventTime, i.e. the time at which the requested change should
take place. In order to model the load fluctuations at these stations, the scenario event
object contains a Profile property (s. Table 3.3) which can be used to assign a profile object
to a flow controlled gas station. As shown in Fig. 3.1 before the actual time integration
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process the program iterates through the list of scenario definitions and adds for each
requested control change an additional simulation time point
tnr = te −min(∆tg, ∆tr) (3.2)
before the actual specified event time te. The default value for the reaction time ∆tr is set
to three minutes (∆tr). This enables a higher resolution for changes in control set points,
if the global time step is chosen relatively high (∆tg  ∆tr). The algorithm for the
remaining solution process contains three major loops, namely, the time integration loop,
marked by the solid blue flow arrows, the constraints and control handling loop, illustrated
by the dashed red flow arrows and the iterative loop, indicated by the dashdotted green
flow arrows in Fig. 3.1.
Time Integration Loop
The time integration loop is the outer loop of the transient solver. It has been extended by
a dynamic event feasibility checking algorithm (DFC), which checks if a requested control
set point for a future time point tn+1 is feasible, considering the present control of the
station at time point tn. If a requested set point is not feasible, the DFC will change the
station control to the next closest feasible working point. In addition, for some requested
control changes, like for instance, turning an operating compressor station into bypass, the
DFC makes use of a simulation control object (SCO), which is an extension of a scenario
definition object. The SCO inherits all properties of the scenario definition object and
has, in addition, the properties listed in the third column of Tab. 3.3, which enable the
control of the station until a specified simulation time (property DoUntil) and/or until a
specified Condition is fulfilled. Moreover, the SCO has two properties named InterControl
and InterControlValue which can be used to instruct the solver to apply a specific control
of the station before the final control (EventParameter) is set. This property, for instance,
can be used to model the transition of the control mode of a compressor station from
operating (po > pi and Q > 0) to bypass (po = pi) more realistically. In reality, the
station will not go directly from operating into bypass, since this would cause an undesired
backflow (Q < 0) due to the higher pressure at the station outlet compared to the inlet.
To prevent this, the flow through the station is typically interrupted by a valve until the
inlet pressure is slightly greater or equal to the outlet pressure. In this case, the bypass
valve is opened to allow the flow to bypass the station. This situation can be modelled
by the definition of a SCO as shown in listing 3.1 & 3.2. Listing 3.1 shows how the SCO
is instantiated, while listing 3.2 illustrates how the instantiated SCO is evaluated in the
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SCE algorithm. For this example, the InterControl property is set to the control mode
OFF (Listing 3.1, l. 9) until the Condition property (Listing 3.1, l. 11), which verifies if
the inlet pressure is greater outlet pressure, is True. If the condition is False, then the
SCO requests a higher time resolution for future simulation time steps, depending on
the difference between the inlet and outlet pressure (Listing 3.1,l. 19). The reason for
increasing the time resolution is to capture the simulation time at which the condition
function is fulfilled (pi ≥ po). Finally, the instantiated SCO is added to the simulation
control list (listing 3.1, l. 25), in order to enable its evaluation by the SCE algorithm.
The SCE algorithm iterates through the SCOs in the simulation control list and evaluates
all unprocessed SCOs. Listing 3.2 demonstrates how the SCO instantiated in Listing 3.1
would be processed by the SCE. The SCE, firstly, evaluates the condition function of the
SCO (Listing 3.2, l. 2-3). If the condition function is True, the control of the station is set
to the final control specified by the EventParameter and the Value property of the SCO
(Listing 3.2, l. 7-8). Otherwise, the control of the station is set to the Intercontrol property
of the SCO (Listing 3.2, l. 35-36) and an additional simulation time step is added (Listing
3.2, l. 38).   
1 ’instantiate the simulation control object
2 Dim SimCtrl = New SimulationControlObject With
3 {
4 .Active = True ,
5 .Processed = False ,
6 .EventTime = Solver.Time(n + 1),
7 .Object = Compressor (1),
8 .EventParameter = ScenarioParameter.BP ,
9 .InterControl = ControlType.OFF ,
10 .DoUntil = Solver.EndTime
11 .Condition =
12 Function(obj As NetObject , t As Integer , smc As ↘
→SimulationControlObject)
13 ’check if compressor inlet pressure is greater outlet pressure
14 If (obj.FromNode.P(t) - obj.ToNode.P(t)) > 0 Then
15 Return True
16 Else
17 ’compute the time step to be added to the
18 ’simulation time to increase the time resolution
19 smc.AddSimulationTime = Math.Min(15, Math.Ceiling (3 * Math.Abs(↘





24 ’add simulation control object to simulation control list
25 Scenario.SimCtrlList.Add(SimCtrl)
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  
Listing 3.1: Instantiating a simulation control object for modeling the transition of
a compressor station from operating into bypass in SAInt using the
objectoriented programming language VB.NET
Iterative Loop
The iterative loop, in contrast, is the inner loop of the transient solver and serves the
purpose of solving the linearised non-linear system of equations (eq. (2.46)) iteratively.
The solution of the system of equations requires an efficient linear equation solver for each
iteration step. We have extended the linear solver used in Chapter 2, by a direct sparse
solver specifically designed for solving large scale unsymmetric sparse linear systems such
as the system of equations expressed in eq. (2.46). The new solver enhances the capability
of the simulation tool for solving large scale gas systems with thousands of elements
with reasonable computation time and storage demand. Explaining the details of the
sparse solver would go beyond the scope of this chapter. Thus, for more details we refer
to [107–109].   
1 ’Evaluate the condition function of the SCO
2 If SimCtrl.Condition.EndInvoke( _
3 SimCtrl.Condition.BeginInvoke(Compressor (1), n, SimCtrl , Nothing , ↘
→Nothing)) Then
4 ’add an additional simulation time for processing the new control ↘
→setting
5 Solver.AddTimeStep(Solver.Time(n).AddMinutes (3))
6 ’assign the final control setting for the station
7 Compressor (1).Ctrl(n+1) = SimCtrl.EventParameter
8 Compressor (1).CtrlVal(n+1) = SimCtrl.Value
9 ’check if a subsequent SCO is defined
10 If SimCtrl.DoNext IsNot Nothing Then
11 ’assign the event time for processing the proceeding SCO
12 SimCtrl.DoNext.EventTime = Solver.Time(n).AddMinutes(SimCtrl.↘
→DoNextAfter)
13 ’add the event time to the simulation time
14 Solver.AddTimeStep(Solver.Time(n).AddMinutes(SimCtrl.DoNextAfter))
15 ’add the subsequent SCO to the simulation control list
16 Scenario.SimCtrlList.Add(SimCtrl.DoNext)
17 End If
18 ’mark the SCO as processed to avoid future evaluation
19 SimCtrl.Processed = True
20 ’check if the termination time for the SCO has been reached
21 ElseIf Solver.Time(n + 1) > SimCtrl.DoUntil Then
22 ’check if a subsequent SCO was defined
23 If SimCtrl.DoNext IsNot Nothing Then
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24 ’assign the event time for processing the subsequent SCO
25 SimCtrl.DoNext.EventTime = Solver.Time(n).AddMinutes(SimCtrl.↘
→DoNextAfter)
26 ’add the event time to the simulation time
27 Solver.AddTimeStep(Solver.Time(n).AddMinutes(SimCtrl.DoNextAfter))
28 ’add the subsequent SCO to the simulation control list
29 Scenario.SimCtrlList.Add(SimCtrl.DoNext)
30 End If
31 ’mark the SCO as processed to avoid future evaluation
32 SimCtrl.Processed = True
33 Else
34 ’assign the intermediate control setting for the station
35 Compressor (1).Ctrl(n+1) = SimCtrl.InterControl
36 Compressor (1).CtrlVal(n+1) = SimCtrl.InterControlValue
37 ’add the additional simulation time computed in the condition function
38 Solver.AddTimeStep(Solver.Time(n).AddMinutes(SimCtrl.AddSimulationTime))
39 End If  
Listing 3.2: Excerpt of the Simulation Control Evaluation Algorithm (SCE) for
a compressor station implemented in SAInt using the objectoriented
programming language VB.NET
Constraints and Control Handling Loop
The constraints and control handling loop is entered when a station constraint has been
violated. In this case, the CCH algorithm for the station is invoked. The idea behind
the CCH loop is to repeat the iterative loop for the last time point tn using new control
settings for the affected station. The new settings are generated by the CCH algorithm
implemented for the specific station. The solver delivers a list of constraint violation
objects(which contain information on the violated parameters and their corresponding
constraint levels) to the CCH algorithm . The constraint level is an indicator of the
significance of each constraint and how it should be treated by the solver. It is subdivided
into the following four levels:
1. Warning:
The solver issues a warning of a constraint violation without invoking the CCH
algorithm.
2. Soft limit:
The solver invokes the CCH algorithm, which tries to find a feasible working point
for a limited number of iterations. If no feasible working point is found the solver
ignores the violated constraint and proceeds with the next time step (tn+1).
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3. Hard limit:
The solver invokes the CCH algorithm, which tries to find a feasible working point
for a limited number of iterations. If no feasible working point is found the simulation
is aborted.
4. Stop limit:
The solver aborts the simulation without invoking the CCH algorithm.
The CCH algorithm tries to find a compromise between the violated parameter and the
existing control set point by generating a new control setting for the station. If necessary,
the CCH algorithm can issue an SCO for the affected station, which is then added to the
simulation control list and evaluated in the SCE for the specified event time.
The design of the facility specific CCH algorithm requires a good understanding of the
operation, the control and the technical limits of the key facilities in the gas system, which
has be elaborated Chapter 2.
In the next section, we use these information to develop the CCH algorithm for compressor
stations, UGS facilities, LNG terminals and exit/entry stations.
CCH Algorithm for Compressor Stations
The CCH algorithm for a compressor station is invoked whenever the solver detects a
constraint violation after exiting a converged iterative loop for a simulation time (tn). The
algorithm is visualized in the flow diagram shown in Fig. 3.2. In the first CCH iteration
(kc = 1) for each affected simulation time tn the saved constraint control for the station,
which will be explained below, is cleared. In the first step of the CCH algorithm we check
if internal constraints of the station are violated, thus, if the outlet pressure is greater
or equal to the inlet pressure (po ≥ pi) and if the flow direction is from the inlet to the
outlet (Q ≥ 0). If internal constraints are violated the algorithm will change the control
of the station to OFF for the subsequent repetition of the iterative loop and, in addition,
instantiate a simulation control object (SCO) for turning the station into bypass, similar
to the example discussed in listing 3.1 & 3.2. Moreover, a subsequent SCO is assigned to
the DoNext property of the instantiated SCO, which enables the station to attempt to
return to its original control before the violation of the internal constraint (s. listing 3.2,
l. 10-17). With the property DoNextAfter we can also specify how many minutes after
fulfilling the condition function or after the specified DoUntil time the subsequent SCO
should be processed by the SCE. The default value for the DoNextAfter property is the
global time step ∆tg.
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Fig. 3.2.: Constraints and Control Handling Algorithm for compressor stations imple-
mented in the simulation tool SAInt
If no internal constraints exist, the algorithm sorts the list of violated constraints according
to their constraint level starting from the highest level (hard limit). If the list of violated
constraints contains only soft limits then the current control of the station is saved for
subsequent iterations for the current simulation time tn. Next, we set the control of
the station to the soft limit with the highest percental deviation from its corresponding
constraint value and return to the CCH loop.
In contrast if the violated constraints include any hard limits the algorithm firstly verifies
if a saved control exist. This is to ensure that the processing of a soft limit does not trigger
another hard limit. The saved control is always a control that allows the continuation of
the simulation, even if not all soft limits could be removed after the maximum number
of CCH iterations (kc,max). If no saved control is available, thus, no acceptable working
point has been found, then similar to the soft limits case the control of the station is set
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to the hard limit with the highest percental deviation from its corresponding constraint.
Finally the CCH algorithm is exited and returned to the CCH loop.
CCH Algorithm for Entry and Exit Stations
The CCH algorithm for entry and exit stations is illustrated in the flow diagram shown
in Fig. 3.3. The first step of the algorithm is to check if the station is a demand or supply
station and then to check if the internal constraints regrading the sign of the nodal load is
violated. In this case the station is turned off by setting the nodal load to zero. Otherwise,
the algorithm sorts the list of constraints and follows the same procedure as explained for
compressor stations.
CCH Algorithm for UGS
Figure 3.4 shows the CCH algorithm for UGS facilities. The first step of the algorithm is
to verify which storage process is currently running at the facility, i.e withdrawal (WDR)
or injection (INJ) process. Depending on the running process the algorithm checks if
internal constraints are violated. If the nodal load is positive and the working inventory
is smaller zero for the withdrawal process, the station is turned of by assigning a zero
load to the node. The same setting is applied, if the nodal load is negative or the working
inventory is greater maximum working inventory in an injection process. In case none of
these internal constraints are violated, the algorithm checks if the current load exceeds the
maximum withdrawal/injection rate respectively and changes the control of the station
accordingly. If no internal constraints are violated, the constraint violation is then either
the maximum gas withdrawal pressure (restricted by the maximum operating pressure of
the pipeline system)or the minimum gas injection pressure (restricted by the minimum
line pack for operating the network and the minimum inlet pressure to the compressor
station in the UGS facility). In this case, the control of the station is set to pressure
control with a pressure value equal to the limiting pressure.
CCH Algorithm for LNG Terminals
Figure 3.5 shows a flow diagram of the CCH algorithm for LNG terminals. The algorithm
firstly checks if the nodal load is negative and if the working gas inventory is depleted
and then shuts down the station of one of these conditions is fulfilled. If none of these
internal constraints are violated the algorithm then checks if the nodal load is greater
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Fig. 3.3.: Constraints and Control Handling Algorithm for entry and exit stations imple-
mented in the simulation tool SAInt
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Fig. 3.4.: Constraints and Control Handling Algorithm for UGS facilities implemented in
the simulation tool SAInt
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than the maximum regasification rate and sets the control of the station to the limiting
flow rate in case of a violation. If also the maximum regasification rate is not violated,
then the algorithm checks if the maximum gas injection pressure is exceeded and changes
the control of the station to the limiting pressure, in case of a violation. After as new
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Fig. 3.5.: Constraints and Control Handling Algorithm for LNG Terminals implemented
in the simulation tool SAInt
3.5. Modelling of Measures to Mitigate the Impact of
Disruptions
The different generic control modes for non-pipe facilities presented in Chapter 2 are sim-
ilar to those available to TSOs to manage their actual systems and to react to disruptions
in the GTS. A TSO can typically change the settings of each facility dynamically depend-
ing on the current state of the system and the forecasts for gas supply and demand. In case
of a disruption, the TSO will typically follow a strict sequence of actions and measures
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(protocol) to mitigate the impact of the disruption. The degrees of freedom available to
the TSO to apply these measures, which are included in the Emergency Plan and are
based on the events identified in the Risk Assessment, depend on the legal commitments
with other stakeholders (gas customers, shippers, producers, competent authorities etc.)
and the technical restrictions imposed by the gas infrastructure (pressure, flow and power
limits etc.). To model these actions together with the available control modes listed in
Tab. 2.1 & 2.2, we introduce a conditional expression for the execution of a requested
control change of a non-pipe facility. The conditional expression may depend on a num-
ber of different network parameters, such as the line pack, the available supply capacities
and gas demands. By doing this, we enable the simulation model to react dynamically
to a disruption, similar to how a TSO would react in reality, allowing by these means
a more realistic simulation of the gas network behaviour and a better estimation of gas
crises consequences.
Furthermore, to model the different entities and their responsibilities in the simulation
model of interconnected multinational gas transport systems, we introduce the possibility
to subdivide the network model into different subsystems, which are then assign to the
different entities responsible for their operation. Each subsystem inherits the properties
from total network model. This way, the parameters of the subsystems can be used in
the conditional expressions to request a change in control mode for a specific facility. For
instance, an increase in gas supply to a subsystem can be initiated in case of a drop in
line pack below a certain threshold. In the next section, we give a brief description of
the developed simulation software SAInt. Finally, we demonstrate the capabilities of the
software by applying it to a real world instance.
3.6. Model Application
The models presented in this chapter are implemented into a simulation software
- SAInt (Scenario Analysis Interface for Energy Systems). SAInt is divided into
two separate modules, namely, SAInt-API (Application Programming Interface) and
SAInt-GUI (Graphical User Interface). The API is the main library of the software and
contains all solvers and classes for instantiating the different objects comprising the gas
system model (nodes, pipes, compressors etc.). The API is independent of the GUI and
can be used separately in other environments supporting .NET libraries (e.g. MS Excel,
Visual Studio etc., IronPython). SAInt-GUI is the graphical interface, which enables a
visual communication between the API and the user. The GUI uses the classes and solvers
provided by the API to perform the simulation tasks requested by the user.
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In this section, we apply SAInt to perform a case study on one of the regions affected by
the gas crisis in January 2009, namely, the Bulgarian and Greek NGTS. In the case study,
a) Subsystem 1: Bulgaria - Transmission b) Subsystem 2: Bulgarian - Transit
c) Subsystem 3: Greece - North Region d) Subsystem 4: Greece - South Region
Fig. 3.7.: Assigned subsystems in the Bulgarian-Greek simulation model
we assess the resilience of the network in case of a disruption in a compressor station. We
apply mitigation measures to reduce the impact of the disruption by changing the settings
of specific facilities using conditional control settings. Figure 3.6 shows a snapshot of the
network model in the graphical user interface of SAInt.
For the case study, we divide the network model into four subsystems, as shown in Fig.
3.7 and Tab. 3.6. We will use the parameters of the subsystems to define conditional
expressions for the control of surrounding non-pipe facilities.
In order to start the dynamic simulation, an initial state of the network model (obtainable
from a steady state computation), is required. The results of the steady state computation
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Property Value Unit
Number Of Nodes 217
Number Of Elements 221
Number Of Grid Segments 345
Number Of Grid Points 352
Number Of Loops 5
Total Pipe Length 3610.697 [km]
Total Geometric Pipe Volume 1574337.774 [m3]
Max Pipe Diameter 1174.2 [mm]
Min Pipe Diameter 140.8 [mm]
Tab. 3.5.: Properties of the Bulgarian-Greek NGTS
Subsystem Nodes Elements Supply Demand Compressor
BG_RING 92 95 0 32 4
BG_TRANSIT 25 27 1 2 6
EL_NORTH 35 34 1 11 0
EL_SOUTH 65 65 1 26 1
Tab. 3.6.: Properties of the assigned subsystems
Parameter Symbol Value Unit
time step ∆t 900 [s]
total simulation time tmax 48 [h]
gas temperature T 288.15 [K]
dynamic viscosity η 10−5 [kg/m · s]
standard pressure pn 1.01325 [bar]
standard temperature Tn 273.15 [K]
relative density d 0.6 [-]
Tab. 3.7.: Input parameter for transient simulation of the Bulgarian-Greek network model
are shown in the map in Fig. 3.6, where the pressure and load distribution and the gas
flow direction in the pipelines are depicted. The input data for the loads are based on
peak winter consumption in 2011. Furthermore, each supply node in the model is pressure
controlled, while each compressor station (except the compressor station at UGS-Chiren,
which is typically used for storage injection) is outlet pressure controlled with pressure
set points ranging from 40-54 bar-g. For the cross border import stations Negru Voda and
Kipi, we define constraints for the maximum pressure and maximum supply quantity, as
shown in the snapshot of the node dialogues in Fig. 3.8 & 3.9. For the dynamic simulation,
we assign to the demand nodes representing city gate stations the characteristic relative
load profile depicted in Fig. 3.11, which we multiply with the corresponding steady state
loads. For the other demand nodes, we assume a constant profile equal to the steady state
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Fig. 3.8.: Snapshot of the SAInt-Node-Editor showing the assigned constraints to CBI-
Negru Voda
load. Moreover, for each city gate station, we define a minimum delivery pressure limit
of 20 bar-g and for the two cross border export stations a minimum delivery pressure
of 30 bar-g. Furthermore, for UGS-Chiren and LNG-Revythoussa, we use the storage
envelope and facility limits shown in the snapshot of the storage and LNG-Terminal
dialogue in Fig. 3.10. Additional simulation settings and gas properties are listed in Tab.
3.7.
To assess the resilience of the network and to show the capability of the simulation tool to
model the reaction of the gas system to supply disruptions, we introduce a disruption in
compressor station CS-Petrich located at the Bulgarian-Greek border. Figure 3.12 shows
a snapshot of the SAInt- Scenario Definition Table, where the different control mode
definitions are listed. After the start of the simulation (6:00), we interrupt the gas flow
from the Bulgarian transit pipeline to Greece by shutting down the compressor station
CS-Petrich at 12:00. The flow interruption is relaxed 12 hours later at midnight 00:00 by
changing the control mode of the station to bypass. To mitigate the supply disruption,
we define conditional control settings to the surrounding compressor stations, namely,
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Fig. 3.9.: Snapshot of the SAInt-Node-Editor showing the assigned constraints to CBI-
Kipi
CS-Ihtiman and CS-Nea Messimvria. We request a change in control mode for CS-Nea
Messimvria from outlet pressure to inlet pressure control with a control set point of 35 bar-
g, if the minimum pressure in the subsystem EL_North is below 30 bar-g, in order to
stabilize the pressure in EL_North.
In addition, we request a change in control mode for CS-Ihtiman from outlet pressure con-
trol to maximum driver power control, whenever the line pack in the subsystem EL_South
goes below 12.5 Msm3. If the line pack is above this threshold, we request the station to
return to its original outlet pressure control. In reality such a control change would require
the coordination of the two TSOs as indicated in the list of mitigation measures in Tab.
3.2. The results of the computation are shown in Fig. 3.16 - 3.20 and are discussed in the
following.
Figures 3.16 - 3.18 show the time series of the station control, inlet and outlet pressure
and flow rate for the compressor stations CS-Ihtiman (top plot, CS.8), CS-Petrich (middle
plot, CS.9) and CS-Nea Messimvria (bottom plot, CS.10). As can be seen in the middle
time plots, the flow through CS-Petrich is interrupted at 12:00, causing the inlet pressure
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Fig. 3.10.: Snapshot of SAInt-Storage Editor (left) and LNG-Terminal-Editor (right)
showing the assigned properties for UGS-Chiren (left) and LNG-Terminal-
Revythoussa (right)
to increase and the outlet pressure of the station to decrease. The disruption also affects
the pressure level and total line pack in the subsystem EL_North as depicted in figure
3.13, where the total line pack and the minimum pressure in the subsystems EL_North
(GSUB.0) and EL_South (GSUB.3) are depicted. At approximately 15:00 the minimum
pressure in subsystem EL_North drops below 30 bar-g, which is the threshold for chang-
ing the control of CS-Nea Messimvria to inlet pressure control. At the time where this
condition is fulfilled, the inlet pressure of CS-Nea Messimvria is above the requested set
point of 35 bar-g, thus, to achieve the requested set point the station compresses more
gas from the suction to the discharge side, causing the flow rate to increase (see bottom
plot of Fig. 3.18) and the driver power to reach its maximum value (s. bottom plot of
Fig. 3.16). The requested inlet pressure set point is finally reached at approx 18:00 (see
bottom plot of Fig. 3.17).
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Fig. 3.11.: SAInt-Profile-Editor showing the relative 24 h load profile assigned to demand
nodes representing city gate stations
The effect of the second mitigation measure can be seen if we compare the time series of
the line pack in subsystem EL_South (Fig. 3.13) and the time series for the compressor
station CS-Ihtiman. At approx. 21:00 the line pack in subsystem EL_South drops below
12.5 Msm3, causing the compressor station to change its original pressure outlet set point
from 50 bar-g to the maximum outlet pressure 54 bar-g. This set point differs from the
requested maximum driver power control (see Fig. 3.12). The reason for this is that
operating the compressor station at maximum driver power would violate the maximum
outlet pressure constraint, thus the constraint and control handling algorithm considers
the next feasible working point, which in this case is the maximum outlet pressure.
The maximum outlet pressure control is relaxed at approx. 4:00, when the line pack in
subsystem EL_South rises above 12.5 Msm3. In this case the station is set back to its
original outlet pressure control of 50 bar-g. Since the original pressure set point is below
the outlet pressure at 4:00 (54 bar-g), the flow through the station is firstly interrupted
until the outlet pressure drops back to 50 bar-g.
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Fig. 3.12.: Snapshot of the SAInt scenario definition table showing the defined boundary
conditions disruption events and mitigation strategy for the case study
Figures 3.14-3.20 show the time series of the station control, pressure and load for the
four entry points CBI-Negru Voda, CBI-Kipi, UGS-Chiren and LNG-Revythoussa. In
these plots, we see the effect of the station constraints on the control set point of the
station and also how the disruption in CS-Petrich affected the entry points. The most
affected facilities are CBI-Kippi and LNG-Revythoussa, where the gas supply rises to its
maximum, in order to balance the demand in the northern and southern Greek region.
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Fig. 3.13.: Time series of Line Pack (LP) and Minimum Pressure (PMIN) in the subsys-
tems EL_NORTH (GSUB.0) and EL_SOUTH (GSUB.3)
Fig. 3.14.: Time series of of delivered gas quantity, station control, load and pressure for
the Cross Border Import Negru Voda
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Fig. 3.15.: Time series of of delivered gas quantity, station control, load and pressure for
the Cross Border Import Kipi
3.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, the gas network model from Chapter 2 was extended and implemented
into a simulation software with a graphical user interface named SAInt. The software is
designed for analysing the consequences of natural gas supply disruptions. In the first
part, a formal definition of the term Risk was given and the different elements comprising
a Risk Assessment, namely, the identification of potential scenarios and the estimation of
their probability and consequences, were discussed. We pointed out the importance of es-
timating the consequences of potential scenarios in an adequate manner, using hydraulic
models that reflect the dynamic behaviour of gas transport systems appropriately. Fur-
thermore, we gave an overview of the different mitigation measures that can be adopted to
reduce the impact of gas supply disruptions and the facilities in the gas infrastructure to
apply these measures. Next, we presented an algorithm for solving the physical equations
describing the dynamic behaviour of gas transport systems. In addition, we elaborated
how to model the control settings of non-pipe facilities such as compressor stations and
regulator stations and how these control modes are implemented in the simulation tool
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Fig. 3.16.: Time series of station controls for compressor stations CS-Ihtiman (CS.8), CS-
Petrich (CS.9) & CS-Nea Messimvria (CS.10)
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Fig. 3.17.: Time series of inlet pressure (PI) and outlet pressure (PO) for compressor
stations CS-Ihtiman (CS.8), CS-Petrich (CS.9) & CS-Nea Messimvria (CS.10)
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Fig. 3.18.: Time series of flow rate (Q) for compressor stations CS-Ihtiman (CS.8), CS-
Petrich (CS.9) & CS-Nea Messimvria (CS.10)
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Fig. 3.19.: Time series of of the supply, storage inventory, delivered gas quantity, sta-
tion control, pressure and storage envelope for the Underground Gas Storage
Facility Chiren
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Fig. 3.20.: Time series of the supply, storage inventory, delivered gas quantity, station
control, pressure and storage envelope for the LNG-Terminal Revythoussa
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SAInt. Finally, we applied the methods developed in this chapter to a real world instance,
where we demonstrated the capability of the developed tool to simulate gas supply dis-
ruptions and to model and asses demand and supply side measures to mitigate the impact
of gas supply disruptions.
This chapter focused on addressing the following sub-research questions, which have been
partly addressed in Chapter 2:
• How can we develop a mathematical model that reflects appropriately
their physical behaviour and their technical and contractual constraints?
• What countermeasures can be deployed to mitigate the impact of disrup-
tions and how can these countermeasures be integrated into the combined
model?
The features added to the gas model enable the modelling of different kinds of disruption
scenarios and the implementation of countermeasures to mitigate these disruptions. In
the next chapter, we develop the models for the electric power system and identify the
most important interconnections between the gas and electricity system. Furthermore we
use the developed gas model to develop a co-simulation framework between SAInt and
the Matlab-based open source power system library MATPOWER [116].
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4. Co-Simulation Framework for interdependent
Gas and Electricity Transmission Networks
This chapter is based on the following peer reviewed journal article and conference pa-
per:
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “Devel-
opment of a simulation framework for analysing Security of Supply in
integrated gas and electricity systems,” Applied Sciences, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 47,
2017.
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. J. Dijkema, “An
integrated simulation tool for analysing the operation and interdepen-
dency of natural gas and electric power systems,” in Pipeline Simulation
Interest Group (PSIG) Conference 2016.
4.1. Introduction
Large scale energy infrastructures for natural gas and power play a crucial role for any
well-functioning society. These infrastructures are systematically analysed and controlled
in order to understand their operational characteristics and to provide an energy efficient
operation and a sufficient level of security of supply. However, ensuring the required
level of security of supply is becoming more challenging, especially because of increasing
interconnection among the facilities in both systems.
The dependence of power generation on natural gas has increased the vulnerability of
electric power systems to interruptions in gas supply, transmission, and distribution. Since
the storage of gas on-site is not an option, as it is for coal and fuel oil, the direct gas
delivery through pipelines becomes more critical during unexpected events in electricity
systems like peak periods or disruptions. Particularly, short-term problems caused by
pipeline constraints that cause an inability of a generator to receive fuel gas can seriously
affect security of power supply [13].
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Another issue is the lack of predictability of renewable generation, which might increase
the magnitude of imbalances in the gas system. Although the increasing share of renew-
ables will cause a reduction of the power system dependency on natural gas, forecasting
the amount of gas needed to serve GFPPs will become more challenging due to growing
penetration of variable resources. Additionally, shale gas production already had a sig-
nificant impact on the deployment of new infrastructures, especially in the USA, where
the installed capacity of GFPPs has increased enormously during the last years and is
expected to continue increasing in the coming years [110]. This increase has obviously
tightened the dependency of the electricity system on the gas system. This could also
be the case in other regions of the world, including Europe, especially under scenarios of
abundant shale gas and low carbon policies.
Not only is the power system dependent on gas, but also the gas system is dependent
on power. A gas network consists of different facilities that depend on electrical power
in order to maintain normal operation (e.g., electric driven compressors, LNG facilities,
UGS facilities, valves, regulators, gas meters). The usage of electric drivers in gas fa-
cilities is increasing due to advantages regarding environmental impacts and flexibility
compared to gas turbines [10]. Moreover, increased availability, better control, improved
energy efficiency, and shorter delivery times are other important and attractive advan-
tages of electric drivers. Since the proper functioning of electric drivers requires a reliable
power supply, gas system dependency on the power system can be considered critical.
Additionally, the present advancement in the P2G technology, where excess power gen-
eration from renewable sources is used to produce hydrogen or synthetic natural gas will
significantly contribute to the coupling of both systems [48], since the power system will
depend on the gas system as an energy storage provider.
Summarizing these aspects, it appears that interconnections between gas and electricity
systems make the entire energy system vulnerable, since a disruption occurring in one
system (e.g., an unexpected failure) may propagate to the other system and may possibly
feed back to the system, where the disruption started. Tight relations are increasing the
potential risk for catastrophic events, triggered by either intentional or unintentional dis-
ruptions of gas or electricity supply and possibly magnified by cascading effects. Analysing
the two systems in an integrated manner and developing a combined assessment method-
ology is needed in order to know whether and how such interdependencies may contribute
to the occurrence of large outages and to ensure the proper functioning of the energy
supply system.
In this chapter, we propose a co-simulation framework for assessing the interdependency of
integrated gas and power systems in terms of security of supply. The framework combines
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a steady state AC-flow model with the transient hydraulic gas network model developed
in Chapters 2 and 3. The data exchange between the two models is established through
the developed software application SAInt, which contains a graphical user interface for
creating the network models and scenarios for evaluating the simulation results. The pro-
posed framework implemented into SAIntis intended to be used by system operators,
researchers, operational planners interested in analysing the operation and interdepen-
dency of gas and electricity systems in terms of security of energy supply; i.e., to analyse
the cascading impacts of contingencies on the operation of integrated gas and power sys-
tems and to assess system flexibilities by providing information on system abilities to
react to changes.
To achieve these goals, the chapter follows the following pattern. In Section 4.2, an in-
troduction to electric power systems is given and the physical equations and simulation
models are elaborated followed by Section 4.3, where the the most important interconnec-
tions between gas and electric transmission networks and the coupling equations reflecting
these interconnections are presented. Section 4.4 is dedicated to explaining the develop-
ment of the co-simulation framework which is finally applied to perform a contingency
analysis on a real life-sized test network.
4.2. Electric Power System Models
An electric power system can be divided into three subsystems operating at different volt-
age levels, namely, the generation (11-35 kV), transmission (usually above 110 kV) and
distribution system (11 kV- 400 V or 230 V)6. The generation system produces electricity
by converting primary energy sources (e.g. fossil fuels, wind, hydro etc.) to electric energy,
using synchronous turbo generators, which are driven by gas, steam, water or wind tur-
bines. The generating units inject Alternating Currents (AC) to a 3-phase transmission
system at a constant voltage magnitude (|V |) and frequency (f) (usually 50 Hz). Voltage
magnitude and frequency are typically controlled by a designated Automatic Generation
Control System (AGC) [111].
In order to reduce the power losses incurred during transportation (∼= I2 ·R), the output
voltages of generation units are usually increased to transmission system level using step
up transformers. The transmission system provides a network of interconnected lines and
substations to enable a safe and reliable transport of electric power to large customers
6the primary distribution system typically starts at 6.6 kV, 3.3 kV or 11 kV and the secondary distri-
bution system is 230 V or 400 V
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directly served from the transmission grid and to smaller customers supplied through the
local distribution system. The distribution system is typically operated at lower voltage
levels, thus, the voltage level of the transmission system is reduced by step down trans-
formers installed at substations connected to the distribution system. In this thesis, we
focus primarily on the high voltage electric transmission system, which is the most crucial
subsystem in the power supply chain.
A power transmission system is described by a directed graph G = (V,E) consisting of a
set of nodes V and a set of branches E, where each branch e ∈ E represent a transmission
line or a transformer and each node i ∈ V a connection point between two or more
electrical components, also referred to as bus. At some of the buses power is injected into
the network, while at others power is consumed by system loads.
In contrast to gas transmission systems, electric power systems are predominantly in
steady state operation or in a state that could with sufficient accuracy be regarded as
steady state [112]. Thus, the 3-phase transmission system is typically modelled as a bal-
anced per phase equivalent system using linear models for the elements involved in the
transport process.
Transmission lines and transformers can be described by a generic per-phase equivalent pi-
circuit model depicted in Fig. 4.1, which reflects the basic properties of both components,
such as resistance Rft, reactance Xft, line charging susceptance bft, transformer tap ratio
tft and phase shift angle φft. From the pi-circuit model, we can derive for each branch










Vt = |Vt| ejδt
1 : tft
Fig. 4.1.: Generic branch model (pi-circuit) for modelling transmission lines (tft = 1 &
φft = 0), in-phase transformers (φft = 0) and phase-shifting transformers
(φft 6= 0). The transformer tap ratio is modelled only on the from-Bus side
of the branch model.
e ∈ E a branch admittance matrix Ybr, which relates the complex from-bus and to-bus
4.2. Electric Power System Models 117
current injections If & It, respectively, to the complex from-bus and to-bus voltages Vf
& Vt, respectively, as follows:If
It
 =
a2ft(yft + bft2 ) −t∗ft · yft
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The elements of the branch admittance matrices can be used to assemble the bus admit-
tance matrix Ybus which describes the relation between the vector of complex bus current
injections I to the vector of complex bus voltages V for the entire power network.
I = Ybus ·V, Ybus = [Yij ]Nb×Nb (4.3)
The in- and outflow of electric power to the power system is modelled by generation units,
loads, shunt capacitors and reactors connected to the buses of the power system. Table
4.1 shows a list of these components, their function and constraints.
4.2.1. AC-Power Flow Model
The steady state analysis of a power system involves the determination of the voltage
magnitudes |Vi|, voltage angles |δi|, active power Pi and reactive power Qi supply at
each bus i, considering the constraints imposed by the different facilities and components
in the power system. These state variables are computed from the power flow balance
equation, derived from Kirchhoff’s Current Law (KCL) applied to each bus. The power
balance equation for a bus i yields the following two non-linear equations for the active
and reactive power balance:
Pi(δ, |V |) =
n∑
j=1
|Vi||Vj ||Yij | cos(δi − δj − θij) (4.4)
Qi(δ, |V |) =
n∑
j=1
|Vi||Vj ||Yij | sin(δi − δj − θij) (4.5)
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shunt reactors a placed locally
to control the steady state
over-voltages at buses under
light load conditions, while
shunt capacitors are used to
boost a bus voltage in a
stressed system
Tab. 4.1.: Basic components in an electric network model
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PG,i − PD,i − Pi(δ, |V |) = 0 (4.6)
QG,i −QD,i −Qi(δ, |V |) = 0 (4.7)
where PG,i, QG,i are active and reactive power generation at bus i, respectively, PD,i,
QG,i active and reactive power demanded at bus i, respectively, and Yij = |Yij |(cos(θij)+
j sin(θij)) the elements of the bus admittance matrix describing the branch connection
between bus i and any connected bus j. The solution of the power flow equations (4.6)
- (4.7) requires additional boundary conditions in order to close the problem, which are
provided by the set points for generation units and loads. In the traditional power flow
analysis, each bus is classified depending on the prescribed boundary conditions into the
following three bus types:
1. Slack-Bus (Reference Bus):
Voltage magnitude |V | and voltage angle δ are specified and active power P and
reactive power Q are computed. A slack bus is usually connected to a generation
unit with terminal voltage control. At least one slack bus is needed as a voltage
angle reference and also for balancing the active power losses not covered by other
generation units.
2. PV-Bus (Generation Bus):
Active power P and voltage magnitude |V | are prescribed and voltage angle δ and
reactive power Q are computed. Buses connected to generation units with terminal
voltage control are specified as PV-Buses. If the reactive power limit of a PV -Bus
is violated during computation the PV bus is changed to a PQ-Bus and the reactive
power is set to the next closest feasible working point.
3. PQ-Bus (Load Bus):
Active power P and reactive power Q are prescribed and voltage magnitude |V |
and voltage angle δ are computed. Buses with purely load connections are usually
classified as PQ-Buses.
4.2.2. Distributed Slack Bus Model
In a real power system a single slack bus, that balances the active power of the total
system does not exist. Thus, to model the power generation and the balancing of the
power system more realistically, the concept of distributed slack bus generation is typically
used [113–115], which enables the balancing of the power system by regulating the active
power output of a selected number of generation units. For each generation unit, we specify
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an active power generation set point P setG,i and a participation factor Ki, describing the
flexibility of the generation unit to regulate a fraction of the required additional generation




P setG,i − PD,i − PLoss (4.8)
where PLoss is the total power loss of the power system. The active power balance equation
(4.6) can be modified as follows, while the reactive power balance equation (4.7) remain
unchanged:
P setG,i +Ki ·∆P − PD,i − Pi(δ, |V |) = 0 (4.9)
n∑
i=1
Ki = 1 (4.10)
The resulting system of non-linear power flow equations is solved iteratively using a
Netwon-Raphson approach:
J(xk) ·∆xk = −F(xk) (4.11)
xk+1 = xk + ∆xk (4.12)
where J is the Jacobi matrix, F residual vector and x = [δ, |V |,∆P ]T the solution vec-
tor.
4.2.3. AC-Optimal Power Flow Model
The operation of a power system is restricted by a number of constraints imposed by
technical components and stakeholders (producers, consumers, regulators etc.) involved
in the power supply chain. Transmission lines, for instance, can only transport a limited
amount of power due to thermal restrictions, while the operation of power plants is lim-
ited by the capability curves of the installed generators. The power TSO is responsible
for respecting these constraints, while operating the system in an economic and secure
manner.
The AC-power flow model presented in Section 4.2.1 gives a solution for the power system
without respecting the constraints mentioned above. Thus, after a power flow solution is
obtained the feasibility of the solution has to checked against the limits of the power
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system and the boundary conditions have to be adapted iteratively in order to obtain a
feasible solution (e.g. changing the control settings of generators, load buses and lines).
To avoid this iterative process, an AC-optimal power flow (AC-OPF) model can be used,
which gives a solution to the power flow problem that satisfies a given set of constraints.







c0,i + c1,i PG,i + c2,i P 2G,i (4.13)
s. t. GP,i(X) = Pi(V)− PG,i + PD,i = 0, i = 1 . . . Nb (4.14)








|Vi||Vj ||Yij | sin(δi − δj − θij), i = 1 . . . Nb (4.17)
Hfk (X) = S
f
k
∗ · Sfk − Smaxk 2 ≤ 0, k = 1 . . . Nl (4.18)
Htk(X) = Stk
∗ · Stk − Smaxk 2 ≤ 0, k = 1 . . . Nl (4.19)
δi = δrefi , i = iref (4.20)
|V mini | ≤ |Vi| ≤ |V maxi |, i = 1 . . . Nb (4.21)
PminG,i ≤ PG,i ≤ PmaxG,i , i = 1 . . . Ng (4.22)
QminG,i ≤ QG,i ≤ QmaxG,i , i = 1 . . . Ng (4.23)
where the decision variables expressed by vector X
X =
[
∆ Vm PG QG
]T
(4.24)
are the set of bus voltage angles ∆, bus voltage magnitudes Vm and active and reactive
power generation PG and QG, respectively. f in eq. (4.13) is a scalar quadratic objective
function, which describes the total operating costs for each committed generation unit in
terms of its active power generation, while the non-linear equality constraints expressed by
eq. (4.14)–(4.17) describe the set of active and reactive power balance equations derived in
Section 4.2.1 (see eq. (4.6) - (4.7)). Equations (4.18) and (4.19) are non-linear inequality
constraints, which describe the transmission capacity limits Smaxk for each line, while the
upper and lower limits of the decision variables are described by eq. (4.21)–(4.23). For
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each isolated sub network one bus is chosen as the voltage angle reference (see eq. (4.20)),
i.e., the voltage angle of the reference bus is set to zero.
The described AC-OPF model is implemented into the open source power flow library
MATPOWER [116], which is utilize as the power system simulator in the context of the
proposed co-simulation framework.
4.3. Interconnection between Gas and Power Systems
Gas and electric power systems are physically interconnected at different facilities. The
most important connections between the two systems are as follows:
1. Power supply to electric drivers installed in gas compressor stations:
The electric power consumed by the compressor station can be described by the
following expression (derived from the first and second law of thermodynamics for
an isentropic compression process) describing the required driver power PCSD,i for










 , i = 1 . . . NCS (4.25)
where f is a factor describing the fraction of total driver power provided by electric
drivers, ηad the average adiabatic efficiency of the compressors, ηm the average
mechanical efficiency of the installed drivers, p2 the outlet pressure, p1, Z1, T1 the
inlet pressure, compressibility factor, temperature, respectively, R the gas constant,
and κ the isentropic exponent.
The power supply to the gas network is added to the active power demand in the
electric model.
2. Electric power supply to LNG terminals and UGS facilities:
We capture this interaction by assuming a linear function in terms of the regasifi-
cation or withdrawal rate Lrw, respectively:
P rwD,i = ki,0 + ki,1 · Lrw,i (4.26)
3. Fuel gas offtake from gas pipelines for power generation in GFPPs:
The required fuel gas LGFPP,i for active power generation PG,i at plant i can be
4.4. Integrated Co-Simulation Framework for Security of Supply Analysis 123
expressed in terms of the thermal efficiency ηT of the GFPP and the gross calorific
value GCV of the fuel gas, as follows:
LGFPP,i =
PG,i
ηT ·GCV , i = 1 . . . NGFPP (4.27)
4.4. Integrated Co-Simulation Framework for Security of
Supply Analysis
The modelling framework carried out within SAInt considers the integrated gas and elec-
tricity transmission network under cascading outage contingency analysis. The cascading
outages are investigated when the gas or electricity system has just experienced a dis-
ruption, like a shortage in supply or transmission capacity. The framework comprises
of
(i) a simulator (MATPOWER) for solving an AC-OPF for the power system,
(ii) a transient hydraulic gas simulator (SAInt) for the gas system which includes sub-
models of all relevant pipe and non-pipe facilities
(iii) and an interface (SAInt) which handles the communication and data exchange be-
tween the two isolated simulators.
In order to perform power flow calculations and to extend the functionality of SAInt,
SAInt-API is linked to MATLAB using the Matlab COM Automation Server. This link
is used to establish a communication between the Matlab-based open source power flow
library MATPOWER [116] and SAInt. This allows the execution of AC-PF and AC-OPF
with MATPOWER and the data exchange, evaluation and visualization of the obtained
results using SAInt-GUI.
The proposed co-simulation framework is illustrated in the flow diagram depicted in Fig.
4.2, which is explained further below.
The power system model is designed to provide a realistic representation of the behaviour
of an actual power system, when subjected to contingencies. Cascading effects of con-
tingencies in the power grid are very complex phenomena, and identifying the typical
mechanisms of cascading failures and understanding how these mechanisms interact dur-
ing blackouts is an important research area [117–122]. Potential mechanisms that might
be modelled include overloaded line tripping by impedance relays due to the low voltage
and high current operating conditions, line tripping due to loss of synchronism, the unde-
sirable generator tripping events by over-excitation protection, generator tripping due to
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abnormal voltage and frequency system condition, and under-frequency or under-voltage
load shedding. For each additional mechanism of cascading failure included in a model,
assumptions must be made about how the system will react to these rarely observed oper-
ating conditions. This chapter introduces a steady state AC-flow model which is adapted
to reflect a set of corrective actions performed by TSOs when trying to return the system
to a stable operating condition after a contingency.
While the initial contingency can usually be considered as being a random event, an in-
teraction of cascading failure mechanisms exists in the subsequent events. For example,
the loss of critical components such as tripping of transmission lines creates load redis-
tribution to other components, which might become overloaded. The overall network is
then weakened due to the stress on remaining elements, possibly leading to an instability.
If corrective action plans are not applied quickly further failures might be created as a
consequence leading to a blackout. In this chapter, this cascading failure phase, starting
with the initiating event is modelled, where the cascading contingencies occurrence are
affected by operator actions and the times between subsequent events are considered in
a range of tens of seconds to 1 hour. Various system adjustments that are considered
include the post-contingency redispatch of active and reactive resources, cascade tripping
of an overloaded transmission line, tripping or re-dispatching of generators due to load-
/generation imbalance, and load shedding at load buses to prevent a complete system
blackout when insufficient voltage magnitudes are observed.
The initial state of the model is obtained by solving the standard AC optimal power-flow
problem as described in eq. (4.13)–(4.23), which yields the optimum hourly generator
dispatch for given hourly loads for given cost functions for each generator and bus voltage
and line loading constraints. To execute this task MATPOWER 6.01b AC-OPF algorithm
is utilised [116].
Any change from the initial state caused by a contingency event, such as a (simultaneous)
failure of one or more transmission lines, failure of a generation unit or decreased amount
of generation capacity due to lack of gas supply, can be introduced in the model by
defining a scenario parameter for the corresponding facility as described in Chapter 3.
Whenever a contingency is observed in the system, an imbalance between total generation
and total load may occur. In order to re-balance the system, the model redistributes the
missing or excess power to the remaining facilities in the power grid. The power re-
dispatch is obtained by running the AC-OPF model, while considering the new topology
triggered by a previous disruption (e.g., lines and generation units may be disconnected).
However, since the system is under a stressed state, the AC-OPF algorithm may deliver an
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Fig. 4.2.: Flow chart of the proposed Simulation Framework SAInt, showing the imple-
mented algorithm.
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infeasible solution that does not satisfy the convergence criteria, since system constraints
such as line overloading or voltage limits cannot sustain the desired system loads. In
order to allow the system to find a converged solution, the bus voltage (|V | ≥ |V min|)
and line capacity constraints (Sf · S∗f ≤ Smax2 & St · S∗t ≤ Smax2) in the standard AC-
OPF formulation are relaxed for the re-dispatching process. The re-dispatching process is
followed by a two step feasibility checking procedure. In step one, bus voltage violations
are mitigated by performing load shedding at the affected buses and recomputing the
relaxed AC-OPF until no voltage violations are detected, so called under-voltage load
shedding. The model assumes that there is enough time for the operator to implement
under voltage load shedding to prevent a voltage collapse, which is the root cause of most
of the major power system disturbances [123–125]. The model sheds load in blocks of
2% for the corresponding bus until the relaxed bus voltage constraint is satisfied. If a
violation is not eliminated although the load sheds more than 50% of its original load, we
assume complete failure of the affected bus and set the load value to zero [15]. The second
step of the feasibility checking procedure follows after all bus voltage violations have been
remedied in the first step. During the re-dispatching process new failures may occur at
certain components as they become overloaded. In this chapter the overloads are aimed
to be strictly avoided for all component contingencies. This means that it is assumed
that the probability for line trip is 1 when line flow exceeds its thermal capacity with
a tolerance parameter. The second step involves disconnecting overloaded transmission
lines from the power grid and recomputing the relaxed AC-OPF until a feasible solution
is obtained. It should be noted that, the connectivity of the network is checked in every
simulation step prior to the AC-OPF computation in order to detect isolated facilities.
The algorithm used for checking the connectivity is based on the well-known minimum
spanning tree algorithm and is described in detail in [15].
After obtaining a feasible solution for the power system, the resulting hourly power gen-
eration of GFPPs is converted into a hourly gas demand profiles and provided as input to
the gas model. The gas model needs an initial state for running the transient simulation.
This state can either be a solution of a steady state simulation or the terminal state of a
transient simulation. If an initial state is not available the algorithm uses the initial loads
of the generated gas demand profiles for GFPPs to compute a steady state solution. This
solution is then used as an initial state for the transient simulation. After each transient
or steady state simulation the algorithm checks if the fuel gas pressures at GFPP nodes
are sufficient to operate the facilities. If an insufficient fuel gas pressure is detected, the
affected GFPP is shut-down and the power system model is recomputed. The algorithm
is terminated if no pressure violations are detected after the transient gas simulation.
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Finally, the amount of energy not supplied is calculated as an indicator of the impact of
the disruption event.
The gas and electric model described above are connected through an interface which
enables the communication and data exchange between the two simulators (i.e., MAT-
POWER as power system simulator and SAInt as transient gas simulator, see Fig. 4.2).
The time integration of the combined model is performed separately for the two systems
and the interconnection between them is established through data exchange at discrete
time and space points.
The timing of the power model is based on the discrete event simulation concept. It is
assumed that the configuration of the power system (e.g., the state of generation units
and lines) remains unchanged between events and changes only at the time of the specific
event. If no events are scheduled or triggered in the course of the simulation the time step
of the power system corresponds to a reference time step of 1 hour.
In contrast to the power system, the time integration of the transient gas model, is
based on a dynamic time step adaptation method, which adapts the time resolution with
respect to the control changes of controlled gas facilities during the solution process. The
DTA allows capturing rapid changes in the gas system (shut-down of a power plant or
compressor station etc.) with a higher time resolution. In this context, the gas model
can be viewed as a quasi-continuous system, where the values of the state variables (i.e.,
nodal pressure p, element flows Q and nodal loads L) between two discrete time points
are approximated by linear interpolation. If no events are scheduled or triggered in the
course of the simulation the time step of the gas system corresponds to a reference time
step of 15 min.
In the following section, the proposed framework is applied to perform a contingency
analysis for an integrated gas and power system network.
4.5. Model Application
In this section, an integrated gas and power network is constructed to demonstrate the
previously discussed simulation framework implemented in SAInt. Three supply side sce-
narios (one non-disrupted scenario (base case) and two supply disruption scenarios) are
presented in order to demonstrate the value of the proposed framework and to stress
the importance of modelling the interdependence between gas and power systems with
respect to security of supply.
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The proposed scenarios are performed on the test network depicted in Fig. 4.3. The test
network applied in this chapter is a model of a real gas and electric power network of
a European region. Due to confidentiality reasons and the sensitivity of the presented
results, the topology and facility names of the real network have been disguised. The
network topology and properties used for the computations, however, are realistic data
for the combined network). The scenarios are composed of a number of extreme events
causing more than two network facilities to be deactivated or to cascade out of service.
The sample network includes a power grid with 158 buses, 62 generating units with
Fig. 4.3.: Integrated gas and power network applied in the case study. Map shows a real
network of an European region, which has been disguised due to confidentiality
reasons. The network data and properties used for the case studies, however, are
original input data for the actual network. The solid black lines (lines 1–3, 7–12,
14–18) represent interconnections between Gas Fired Power Plants (GFPPs) in
the power grid (left) and their fuel gas offtake points in the gas grid (right),
while the dashed black lines (4–6, 13) represent interconnections between electric
buses in the power grid (left) supplying electric power to connected facilities in
the gas grid.
22,076 MW installed capacity based on different generation mix that mainly consists of
lignite (33%), natural gas (28%), coal (20%), wind power (7%) and others (12%). The
transmission system consists of 194 high voltage transmission lines with total line length
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of approx. 8,000 km. The base voltage levels for the transmission lines are distinguished
between 200 kV and 400 kV.
The solution of the AC-OPF equations requires the knowledge of the voltage levels, admit-
tances as well as the maximum thermal capacities of the transmission lines. The reactance
of a line depends mainly on its physical properties. It increases proportionally to the ge-
ometric length of the line. Therefore, in the scope of this work, we assume equal physical
properties for all lines and use the length to determine the reactance. A typical value for
the reactance of a transmission line per unit length is 0.2 [Ω/km]. Regarding the thermal
capacities of the transmission lines, we assume a transmission capacity of 800 MW for
400 kV lines and 530 MW for 200 kV lines. In AC-OPF analysis the reactive power has
strong influence on voltage drop thresholds. Thus, during AC OPF analysis, the maxi-
mum and minimum voltage levels for buses are considered and a value between 1.12 and
0.96 p.u. is assigned, respectively.
The gas network comprises of 345 pipe segments with a total pipe length of roughly
4,000 km, 10 compressor stations and 352 nodes (54 CGSs), 15 stations to direct served
customers (14 GFPPs and one IND), two CBEs (CBE_1 & CBE_2), one CBI, one
LNG terminal, one production field and one UGS facility. The CBI, PRO, LNG terminal
and UGS facility are pressure controlled, while each compressor station is pressure ratio
controlled with a pressure ratio set point ranging between 1.02 and 1.2. The input data for
the compressor stations are listed in Tab. 4.2. The data used for the facilities supplying
gas to the gas system are given in Tab. 4.3, while the data for the GFPPs are listed in
Tab. B.7. The minimum delivery pressure for the 14 GFPPs is set to 30 bar-g while the
time needed to reach complete shut-down of a GFPP is set to 45 min.
The transient scenarios for the integrated gas and power network are simulated by as-
signing the relative load profile depicted in Fig. 5.8 to the relevant exit stations (left plot
represents the gas load profile and right plot the power load profile). It should be noted
that the relative load profile for the gas system is only assigned to CGSs, which are the
connection points between the gas transmission and local distribution system. For all
other exit stations (CBE_1, CBE_2, IND) a constant load profile corresponding to the
steady state load is assumed. The absolute values of the load profile for CGS nodes are ob-
tained by multiplying the steady state load with the relative values in Fig. 5.8 (left plot).
The load profiles of the 14 GFPPs in the gas model are provided by the power model
based on allocating the results obtained from the AC-OPF analysis to the corresponding
nodes in the gas model. For the power network, the resulting loads for a time window of
24 h are obtained by multiplying the initial loads by the relative profile depicted in Fig.
5.8 (right plot). All 14 GFPPs in the power grid are physically interconnected to the gas
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Compressor PRSET PRMAX PWMAX POMAX PIMIN
Station [-] [-] [MW] [bar-g] [bar-g]
CS_1 1.05 1.6 10 54 34
CS_2 1.02 1.45 44 54 25
CS_3 1.01 1.6 60 54 25
CS_4 1.2 1.45 25 54 25
CS_5 1.2 1.45 80 54 25
CS_6 1.2 1.3 35 54 25
CS_7 1.2 1.45 50 54 25
CS_8 1.2 1.7 20 54 25
CS_9 1.2 1.7 20 54 25
CS_10 1.05 2 10 65 25
Tab. 4.2.: Compressor station control (PRSET—Pressure Ratio Set Point) and con-
straints (PRMAX—Maximum Pressure Ratio, PWMAX—Maximum Available
Driver Power, POMAX—Maximum Discharge Pressure, PIMIN—Minimum
Suction Pressure).






CBI - - 50
PRO - - 52.6
UGS 3.5 0.01 56
LNG 5 0.03 50
Tab. 4.3.: Input data for facilities supplying the gas system with gas.
relative load profile gas relative load profile power






























Fig. 4.4.: Load profiles gas (left side) and power (right side) networks.
network. Furthermore, we assume additional interconnections between the gas and power
network at two compressor stations, at the LNG terminal and at the UGS facility, which
are supplied with power from the electric grid. The integrated gas and power network
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[%] [MW] [MW] [MVAr] [MVAr] [bar-g]
GFPP_1 0 220.86 0 60 475 0 332.5 -285 30
GFPP_2 0 220.86 0 41 130 0 91 -78 30
GFPP_3 0 220.86 0 57 101 0 70.7 -61 30
GFPP_7 0 220.86 0 45 180 0 126 -108 30
GFPP_8 0 220.86 0 44.5 105 0 73.5 -63 30
GFPP_9 0 220.86 0 51 420 0 294 -252 30
GFPP_10 0 220.86 0 30 1,127 0 788.9 -676 30
GFPP_11 0 220.86 0 40 360 0 252 -216 30
GFPP_12 0 220.86 0 48 420 0 294 -252 30
GFPP_14 0 220.86 0 30 766.7 0 536.7 -460 30
GFPP_15 0 220.86 0 45 147.8 0 103.5 -89 30
GFPP_16 0 220.86 0 61 435 0 304.5 -261 30
GFPP_17 0 220.86 0 67 390 0 273 -234 30
GFPP_18 0 220.86 0 55 410 0 287 -246 30
Tab. 4.4.: Input data for GFPPs connected to the gas and electric power system. Num-
bering of GFPPs corresponds to the numbering of the solid interconnection
lines in Fig. 4.3
with 18 physically interconnected facilities is illustrated in Fig. 4.3. Additional input pa-
rameters for the gas simulator are given in Tab. 5.1. Applying the simulation tool SAInt
Parameter Symbol Value Unit
time step ∆t 900 [s]
total simulation time tmax 24 [h]
gas temperature T 288.15 [K]
dynamic viscosity η 1.1 × 10−5 [kg/m·s]
pipe roughness k 0.012 [mm]
reference pressure pn 1.01325 [bar]
reference temperature Tn 273.15 [K]
relative density d 0.6 [-]
gross calorific value GCV 41.215 [MJ/sm3]
Tab. 4.5.: Input data for the gas simulator.
on the presented sample network, some preliminary observations on cascading outage con-
tingency analysis can be made. Initially, a base case scenario (scenario 0) with no supply
disruption in any of the two interlinked networks is introduced. In the base case scenario,
we capture the behaviour of the networks at normal operation. Then, we compare the
base case scenario with two scenarios, where we introduce a number of disruption events
and simulate the reaction of the system to these events. The simulated grid is generated
with a time resolution of 900 s and all scenarios are simulated for one gas day from 06:00
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to 06:00 (For the case study, we chose a simulation time of one operating day (24 h) with
a time resolution of 15 min for the gas model and a time resolution of one hour for the
power model, in order to keep the size of input data and information at a moderate level
for the results discussion. However, the framework is designed to allow an extension and
adaptation of the time window and resolution depending on if a short or long term study
of a contingency scenario is of interest. It should be noted that although it is possible to
change the status of the failed components (repairing and restoration can be modelled)
within the simulation, the scenarios that are presented in this study do not take into
account the repairing activity in order to analyse system capabilities in worst-cases.
While the first scenario involves a disruption of several supply points in the gas network,
the second scenario includes supply disruptions triggered by the power network. In sce-
nario 1, we assume a reduced regasification rate for the LNG terminal from maximum via
a ramp-down between 06:00 and 07:00 (see Fig. 4.5), which corresponds to an expected
7-day delay in cargo. In addition, we assume a supply disruption at the production field
causing a ramp down of the supply between 08:00 and 9:00 (see Fig. 4.5). Furthermore, a
30% supply reduction at CBI station at time 14:00 is implemented via a ramp-down be-
tween 14:00 and 15:00 (see Fig. 4.5). Scenario 2 is related to power network contingencies
and initial contingency set consist of the loss of major lignite power plant with 1157 MW
operational capacity at 07:00 and 70% lack of power generation from wind turbines at
06:00 (see Fig. 4.5).
In the following, we discuss the simulation results for the three scenarios 7.
The sequence of initial events (shown in black) and their consequences (shown in orange
and red) are summarized in Fig. 4.5 and 4.6 for scenario 1 and scenario 2, respectively.
It can be seen from the figures that when a minimum pressure violation for a GFPP is
detected in the gas model, the failure of the corresponding power plant is applied after 45
min due to the required shut-down time. Figures 4.7–4.9 show the difference in gas supply
to the system through the CBI station, the production field and the LNG terminal. There
is a big difference in inflows to the system through these supply points in scenario 0 and
scenario 1, where the difference is more than 20 Msm3/d (Million standard cubic meter
per day), where the reference pressure is 1.0135 bar and the reference temperature is 0 ◦C.
The impact of this observation can be seen in Figures 4.7–4.11. Figure 4.10 shows that
the disruptions introduced in scenario 1 have the highest impact on the gas network, since
the flow balance, which is the sum of inflow minus sum of outflow, is always negative; the
7The simulation results and conclusions are based on the input data chosen for the sample network.
While some data were provided by the TSOs, others were not available (e.g., pipe roughness, gas
temperature, line properties etc.) and were therefore estimated using typical values. Thus, these input
data are connected with uncertainties
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system is not able to supply enough gas to balance the demand. In fact, the flow balance
is quite negative throughout the time, peaking down to a value of −32 Msm3/d. As a
result, the quantity of gas stored in the pipeline (i.e., the linepack) reduces significantly as
time passes. The flow balance can be viewed as the time derivative of the linepack, thus,
if the flow balance is negative the linepack decreases and if positive the linepack increases.
A zero flow balance corresponds to no change in linepack. Latter is the assumption made
in steady state gas models, which cannot capture the changes in linepack, and therefore,
the real behavior of the gas system appropriately. Moreover, Fig. 4.10 shows a decrease in
linepack from ca. 85 to 67 Msm3 for scenario 1 (approx. 18 Msm3 lost along the day in the
pipelines). In contrast, in scenario 0 only approx. 1.5 Msm3 of linepack is extracted. This
produces a steady decrease of pressure in the CBI station, the production field and the
LNG facility causing the pressure to reduce to approx. 39, 42 and 31 bar-g, respectively
(see Fig. 4.7–4.9).
An important observation is the pressure drop to approximately 31 bar-g at the LNG
terminal, which is the main gas supplier for some of the GFPPs in the hydraulic region.
This value is slightly above the 30 bar-g minimum delivery pressure threshold required
by the GFPPs. When gas supplies are scarce, the only way to maintain sufficient pressure
and to allow the network to continue operating is to reduce consumption, either through
curtailment or fuel switching, if there is the chance to do this with some power plants. In
scenario 1, gas curtailment at GFPPs is implemented, presuming that replacement fuel
is not available in any of the investigated GFPPs.
Figure 4.11 shows the behavior of the UGS facility, the only supply node able to increase
gas supply to satisfy the increased demand in scenario 1. The UGS facility is able to
maintain its pressure set point till the end of the simulation (see Fig. 4.11). The dis-
connection of four GFPPs from the gas network at 14:15, 15:45 and 16:30, respectively,
allows the gas system to continue running (see Fig. 4.5 and 4.12). The pressure and load
profiles for failed GFPPs are given in Fig. 4.12 and 4.13. This curtailment was sufficient
to cope with the pressure drop in the network. Therefore, there was no need of gas curtail-
ment at CGSs, where protected customers (e.g., households, public services) are supplied
with gas. Figure 4.14 and 4.15 depict the voltage profiles for a selected number of buses,
where minimum voltage violation is detected for scenario 1 and 2, respectively. In order
to keep the bus voltage above the minimum voltage level, load shedding is implemented
at the affected buses. The left plots in Fig. 4.14 and 4.15 show the voltage profiles of
the affected buses for the computation where voltage violations were detected and no
countermeasures were employed to avoid this violation, while the right plots show the
voltage profiles after implementing load shedding at the affected buses. As can be seen
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Fig. 4.5.: Timing of initial (black) and cascading (orange, red) events for Scenario 1.
Abbreviation PNS stands for power not supplied, while GNS stands for gas not
supplied, value in brackets refers to the fraction of not supplied power/gas with
respect to total power/gas loads.
4.5. Model Application 135
in the right plots of Fig. 4.14 and 4.15, the bus voltages recover to a value above the
minimum voltage threshold after load shedding is implemented. However, due to load
shedding some customers connected to the affected buses are not supplied with enough
electricity (see Figs. 4.5 and 4.6).


























































Fig. 4.6.: Timing of initial (black) and cascading (orange, red) events for Scenario 2.
Abbreviation PNS stands for power not supplied, value in brackets refers to the
fraction of not supplied power with respect to total loads.
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Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2































Fig. 4.7.: Time evolution of gas supply and pressure at the cross border import (CBI)
node for the computed scenarios
Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2































Fig. 4.8.: Time evolution of gas supply and pressure at the production field for the com-
puted scenarios.
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Fig. 4.9.: Time evolution of regasification rate and pressure at the liquefied natural gas
(LNG) terminal for the computed scenarios.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
































Fig. 4.10.: Time evolution of flow balance (sum of inflow minus sum of outflow) and
linepack for the computed scenarios.
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Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
































Fig. 4.11.: Time evolution of withdrawal rate and pressure at underground gas storage
(UGS) facility for the computed scenarios.
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Fig. 4.12.: Time evolution of load and pressure of failed GFPPs in scenario 1.
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Fig. 4.13.: Time evolution of load and pressure of failed GFPPs in scenario 2.
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Fig. 4.14.: Time evolution of bus voltage before load shedding (left) and after (right) for
scenario 1. All four buses where load shedding was applied are shown in this
figure.
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Fig. 4.15.: Time evolution of bus voltages before load shedding (left) and after (right)
for scenario 2. Load shedding was applied at 15 buses. Among these buses are
the 4 buses from scenario 1, which are shown in this figure.
Regarding the CBE_1 station, due to the pressure drop at the station (see Fig. 4.16),
the flow is restricted around 21:00 because the threshold pressure of 30 bar-g is reached.
This is the only way to keep minimum delivery pressure at that exit point; otherwise
problems would arise downstream due to too low pressure. Figure 4.16 shows the drop in
flow (around 8 Msm3/d ) at CBE_1 station due to the pressure restriction. Moreover, the




























Fig. 4.16.: Load and pressure profile of CBE_1 for scenario 1.
difference between scenario 0 and scenario 2 shows the gas system reaction to the electric
side disruption. In Fig. 4.10, it can be seen that the flow balance of the gas network in
scenario 2 is more negative (the gas system loses more gas) than in scenario 0 until 18:00.
This is caused by the increase in gas demand of GFPPs due to the disruption of the lignite
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power plant and the loss of power generation from wind turbines. The increase in gas
demand of GFPPs leads to a pressure drop in two GFPPs, followed by the disconnection
of the power plants from the network (see Fig. 4.6 and 4.13). The pressure and load profiles
for failed GFPPs are given in Fig. 4.13. The disconnection of the generators affects the
loading of the gas system in a positive way. Moreover, the linepack starts to recover after
18:00 (see Fig. 4.10).
The scenario results indicate clearly that the disruptions taking place in the gas network
that affect GFPPs also affected the operability of the power network. After failure of each
GFPP, the power model calculates the new generating profiles for all power plants and
sends these profiles to the gas model. In scenario 1, the closure of four GFPPs due to low
pressure levels in the gas system caused voltage violations in the electricity network at
peak demand hour (19:00–20:00) because of the high amount of power transmission from
relatively distant generators in order to compensate the missing generating capacity. This
violation in voltage levels caused 954 MW of load shedding during 2 h (see Fig. 4.5 and
4.14). In scenario 2, the cascading effects are more severe including three line overloads
and load shedding of 1607 MW at the peak demand hours (19:00–20:00, see Fig. 4.6 and
4.15). The initial failure of large capacity lignite power plant together with lack of power
generation from wind power caused an increase in power generation from GFPPs. This
increase results in pressure drops at two GFPPs followed by the closure of both facilities.
The system has to implement these cascading effects in order to avoid a complete blackout
in the overall network.
Furthermore, the results show that the impact of disruptions introduced in both scenarios
is much higher for the power system than for the gas system.
4.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed an integrated co-simulation framework for cascading outage
contingency analysis in combined gas and power system networks and demonstrated the
capabilities of the implemented framework by applying it to a realistic, combined elec-
tricity and gas transmission network of an European region.
The simulation framework is composed of a transient hydraulic model for the gas system
and a steady state AC-OPF model for the power system. Both models, are derived from
the physical laws governing the flow of gas and electric power, respectively. Moreover, the
most important facilities and their technical constraints are considered.
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The gas and power system models are coupled through coupling equations describing the
fuel gas offtake of GFPPs for power generation and the power supply to LNG terminals,
UGS facilities and electric driven compressor stations. The model application was divided
into three scenarios, namely, scenario 0 with no disruption, scenario 1 with gas side
disruptions and scenario 2 with power side disruptions.
The results of these scenarios show how disruption events triggered in one system propa-
gate to the other system. In scenario 1, for instance, three major gas supply stations are
disrupted and as a result a number of GFPPs are shut-down due to insufficient fuel gas
pressure. This contingency propagates further to other buses in the power system, where
load shedding is implemented in order to maintain the voltage levels above the minimum
voltage threshold. Similar observations are made in scenario 2, where a drastic reduction
in renewable energy generation together with a shut-down of a large power plant triggered
a large increase in gas demand of GFPPs, leading to a rapid pressure drop in the gas net-
work and the subsequent shut-down of GFPPs. Eventually, this circumstance increased
the stress on the power system leading to minimum bus voltage violations in a couple of
buses, which is remedied by applying load shedding at the affected buses.
Based on these key findings, it can be concluded that there is a need for close collaboration
and coordination between gas and power TSOs. Data concerning pressures, flows, voltages
etc., efficiently handled and communicated may introduce resilience on the integrated
network. This has to be done via well-structured protocols that inform the other TSO
about the grace periods and support that each network may grant the other. The use of
models like the one proposed in this study may be of much help for getting part of this
information to share with the other operator.
In this chapter, the following sub-research questions elaborated for the gas system in
Chapters 2 and 3 was addressed for the electric power system:
• What are the most important facilities in the gas and electricity trans-
mission networks in terms of security of supply?
• How can we develop a mathematical model that reflects appropriately
their physical behaviour and their technical and contractual constraints?
Furthermore, the following sub-research questions regarding the interconnections between
gas and electricity networks were discussed:
• What are the most crucial interconnection points between the gas and
electric power system?
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• How can these interconnections be represented in the mathematical
model?
• How do disruptions originating in the gas and/or electric network prop-
agate from one network to the other and even back to the network where
the disruption originated?
• How do disruptions triggered in one systems affect the operation of the
other system?
The co-simulation framework developed in this chapter is able to capture the propaga-
tion of disruptions from one energy system to the other. However, there are a number of
aspects that could not be reflected appropriately due to the nature of the model.
Firstly, the coupling between the two energy systems are simulated in two different sim-
ulation time frames. Thus, there is no immediate feedback from one system as a result of
a disruption in the other system.
Secondly, the curtailment of power system loads were directly applied to buses that were
affected by voltage violations based on a predefined rule. Priority levels between different
power system customers were not considered, which may have an effect on the results.
Finally, time transitional constraints of power system generators in terms of maximum
ramp rates, start-up and shut down times were neglected, which may restrict the available
generation capacities to balance the power system loads.
In the next chapter, we develop a combined simulation model for interdependent gas and
electricity networks that considers these aspects.

145
5. Combined Simulation of integrated Gas and
Electricity Networks
This chapter is based on the following peer reviewed journal article and peer reviewed
conference paper:
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “SAInt -
A novel quasi-dynamic Model for assessing Security of Supply in coupled
Gas and Electricity Transmission Networks,” in Applied Energy, vol. 203, pp.
829 – 857, 2017.
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. J. Dijkema, “An
integrated simulation tool for analyzing the operation and interdepen-
dency of natural gas and electric power systems,” in Pipeline Simulation
Interest Group (PSIG) Conference 2016.
5.1. Introduction
The ongoing integration of RES into existing energy supply systems is connected with an
increased coupling between natural gas and electric power transmission systems.
On the power side, the installation of variable RES, such as wind and solar, is increasing,
which require flexible and reliable back up generation units with short start-up and shut
down times and large ramping rates in order to provide the flexibility needed in the
electricity system to cover the variability and uncertainties provided by wind and solar
power. Gas fired power plants connected to gas and electricity networks, which are known
for their reliability, short start-up time and shut down time can provide such flexibility
to the electric power system [110].
On the gas side, an increased use of electric power to operate facilities in the gas system
such as LNG terminals and electric driven compressors installed in gas compressor stations
and UGS facilities, can be noticed [10]. Electric drivers outperform traditional gas turbines
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with a higher mechanical efficiency, lower maintainance costs and less impact on the
environment [11].
In addition to these interconnections, the power to gas (P2G) technology will significantly
contribute to the coupling between the two systems [48,49], where excess electric energy
production (e.g. during variable RES curtailment) is used in an electro-chemical process
to produce hydrogen and SNG, which can be injected and stored in gas pipelines or UGS
facilities for later use at peak electricity demand periods. As more P2G facilities are
installed, the dependence of electric power systems on gas network systems as a provider
for energy storage will increase.
These developments stress the need to
(1.) examine the depth and scope of these interdependencies,
(2.) how they may affect the operation of the two systems and
(3.) how to proactively approach the bottlenecks and challenges that may emerge.
The traditional co-simulation approach, where the physical equations for the gas and
electric power system are solved in independent time frames [15,57,60,126,127] and/or a
steady state model is used for the gas system [15,29,40,126,127], can only give qualitative
information on how a contingency may affect security of supply in coupled gas and electric
power systems. For instance, a steady state approach for the gas system cannot quantify
appropriately the time evolution of the quantity of gas stored in pipelines, also referred
to as linepack, which is a key indicator [60] for how much flexibility the gas system can
provide to GFPPs for electric power generation (e.g. available ramping capacity for fuel
gas extraction at start-up of spinning reserves, which have to deliver electric energy within
10-30 minutes in case of a contingency [61]) .
Furthermore, the co-simulation approach cannot estimate accurately the grace period for
gas and power TSOs to coordinate and deploy counter measures to mitigate a contingency.
In order to examine the issues raised in (1.)-(3.) in a quantitative way, a dynamic model
of the coupled gas and electric power system is needed that can reflect appropriately how
disruptions triggered in one system propagate to the other system and affect the operation
of facilities in both systems. This will allow gas and power system stakeholders to suggest
modifications, that may help prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of disruptions.
Some of these modifications that can be implemented are, for instance:
(a) The curtailment of gas and electric power loads at specific locations and times to
reduce the stress on the system and to prevent insufficient pipeline pressures
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(b) The installation of UGS facilities at strategic locations to increase the flexibility to
react to loss or shortage of gas supply
(c) The increase of withdrawal capacity of existing UGS facilities
(d) The shut-down of specific power plants to maintain the operation of the system in
degraded mode
(e) The expansion of the network to increase transmission capacities and line pack
(f) The availability of reverse flow at cross-border-points to increase the flexibility and
resilience of the gas system
In this chapter, the simulation tool SAInt (Scenario Analysis Interface for Energy Sys-
tems) [128, 129] is extended by a novel combined quasi-dynamic model composed of the
transient hydraulic simulation model for the gas system presented in Chapters 2 & 3,
which considers the constraints and control of the most important facilities in the gas
system, such as compressor stations and UGS facilities, and a steady state model for
the electric power system based on AC-OPF, where the operational costs and key elec-
tric power system constraints such as thermal capacity limits of electric lines, active and
reactive power generation limits and upper and lower limits on bus voltage magnitudes
are considered. The bi-directional coupling between the two systems is established by
synchronizing the fuel gas offtake from the gas system for power generation in GFPPs
and the electric power supply to electric driven compressors installed in gas transport
systems. Moreover, the power supply to LNG terminals is also modelled as an additional
gas system dependence on the electric power system.
The scope of the proposed model is primarily on the technical operation of the integrated
energy system in a contingency scenario, assuming that market based measures have
been fully exploited but were insufficient to mitigate the impact of a disruption. Therefore,
aspects related to the energy market are only considered partly in this studies8. Moreover,
aspects related to the transient stability of the power system in case of a contingency (e.g.
voltage stability, rotor angulor or synchronous stability, frequency stability [112]), which
may play a role in case of a disturbance in the power system, are not considered. However,
we assume that the automatic generation control (AGC) system is capable of returning
the system to a balanced and stable steady state within a short time frame (less than 5
minutes) after a disturbance [112]. Thus, we describe the operation of the power system
by a succession of steady state model.
8operational costs for each power plant are considered
148 5. Combined Simulation of integrated Gas and Electricity Networks
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no commercial or open source simulation
software on the market that allows the coupled simulation of gas and electric power
systems in a single time frame and simulation environment. Thus, SAInt is the first
published software tool to offer this type of functionality.
The model presented in this chapter and implemented into SAInt is intended to assist
governments, gas and power TSOs, regulatory agencies and researchers to address the
challenges connected with the ongoing transformation of critical energy infrastructures
(CEIs). In particular, SAInt can be used to examine potential threats to security of
energy supply and to develop strategies to prevent and mitigate the consequences of
undesired disruption events in multi-vector energy systems with high penetrations of
variable RES. Moreover, the capability of SAInt to quantify the impact of a disruption
on security of supply can be utilized to perform a risk assessment of CEIs as postulated
by EU Regulation 994/2010 [12], which involves, the identification of critical scenarios,
the probability of their occurrence and the impact of the identified scenarios on security
of supply, which can be estimated by SAInt [129].
To achieve these goals, this chapter follows the following structure. In Section 5.2.1,
the AC-OPF model presented in Chapter 4 is extended by additional time transitional
constraints and a model for dispatchable loads for modelling the curtailments of power
system loads based on priority levels. In Section 5.2.2, the coupling equations developed
in Chapter 4 are extended.
Next, the algorithm for solving the resulting system of equations for the combined energy
system is elaborated, followed by the definition of parameters to evaluate and quantify the
impact of disruptions on security of energy supply in Section 5.3. Finally, in Section 5.4,
the functionality of the simulation tool and the capability of the implemented simulation
model are demonstrated in a case study of a sample combined gas and electric power
transmission network.
5.2. Methodology
The operation of gas and electric power systems is increasingly interdependent, due to an
increased physical interconnection between the facilities installed in the two systems. A
change in one system may propagate to the other system and even back to the triggering
system. For instance, an increase in power generation from a GFPP, will cause the gas
offtake from the gas grid to increase. This, in turn, may result in an increased power
offtake of electric driven compressor stations to recover the pressure and line pack level
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in the area affected by the gas offtake. The additional power offtake, again, will have to
be balanced by the power generation units including GFPPs, by increasing the power
output. This cycle may continue until an equilibrium state is reached. The equilibrium
state in such a bidirectionally coupled system cannot be captured appropriately with the
traditional co-simulation approach, where the two systems are analysed in independent
time frames. Rather an integrated simultaneous solution of the physical equations de-
scribing the operation of the coupled energy supply systems at each simulation time step
is needed.
The first challenge that arises when modelling the coupled power-gas system is to find a
simulation model that describes the dynamic behaviour of the individual systems appro-
priately. The dynamics in gas transport systems, for instance, are much slower than the
ones in electric power systems. Electricity travels almost instantaneously (with speed of
light 3 · 108 m/s) and cannot be stored economically in large quantities in current elec-
tric power systems9 [15]. In case of a disruption, the response time of the electric power
system is quite fast and basically the transmission line flows satisfy the steady-state al-
gebraic equations. On the contrary, natural gas pipeline flow is a much slower process,
with gas flow velocities typically below 10 m/s and the propagation of pressure and flow
changes (speed of sound) around 340 m/s, resulting in a longer response time in case of
a large fluctuation. In particular, high-pressure transmission pipelines have much slower
dynamics due to the large quantities of natural gas stored in the pipelines.
In order to consider the different characteristics of the two systems, we propose a transient
hydraulic model for the gas system and a succession of steady state AC-OPF model for the
electric power system. The reason for using an optimal power flow instead of a power flow
model is to be able to reflect appropriately the real time power dispatch of generation
units, the curtailment of power system loads and important power system constraints,
such us thermal capacity limits of transmission lines, reactive and active power limits
of generation units and voltage limits of electric buses, which are not considered in AC
power flow models.
We couple the power and gas model to a combined simulation model by defining coupling
equations reflecting the physical interlink between the two systems at each simulation
time step.
9with the only exception of hydraulic pumping power stations, whose availability is very much limited
in a significant number of countries
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5.2.1. Extended Power System Model
The operation of an electric power system is restricted by a number of constraints, which
if violated can lead to severe contingencies. Transmission lines, for instance, have a max-
imum transmission capacity Smax, which if exceeded can lead to outages. Generation
units, in turn, can only operate within a specific operating envelope (generator capability
curve), which is restricted by the upper and lower limits on active and reactive power
generation PmaxG , PminG , QmaxG and QminG , respectively. Moreover, electric power deliv-
ered to directly served customers and local distribution systems must satisfy a contracted
minimum voltage level |V min|, to avoid legal penalties and outages in the subsystems
connected to the transmission grid.
In order to operate the electric power system in an economic and secure way, power
TSOs are equipped with a number of simulation models to schedule the operation and
control of generation units, in order to minimize total operation costs and to ensure
security of supply, taking into account the changes in the electricity market and the legal
and technical constraints imposed by stakeholders and power system components. The
determinaton of an optimal generation schedule usually involves a successive solution
of three different optimisation problems, namely, the unit committment (UC), economic
dispatch (ED) and reserve allocation (RA) [5, 61, 63]. The UC, which is described by a
mixed integer linear optimisation model, determines a cost optimal schedule of when to
operate which generation unit, taking into account its fixed and marginal operating costs,
its ramp rate and its start-up and shut-down times and costs. The solution of the UC is
used as input to the ED to compute the cost-optimal power dispatch schedule for each
committed unit. The ED typically involves solving a (non-)linear constrained optimisation
problem, where the objective is to find a solution for the state variables (voltage angle δ,
voltage magnitude |V |, active and reactive power generation PG and QG) that satisfies the
electric power system constraints and minimizes the operational costs, which is typically
expressed as a function of the active power generation PG,i for each committed unit i.
The UC and ED are complemented by the RA, which ensures that a minimum amount of
generation capacity is reserved and available to mitigate any unexpected contingency in
the electric power system. The UC and ED are typically solved one day ahead of the actual
operating day as well as in real-time intra-day operation, while the spinning reserves are
typically allocated in the day-ahead scheduling. In real-time operation the UC is normaly
computed every 15 minutes, while the real time power dispatch is executed every 5-15
minutes [61]. Thus, the ED reflects reasonably well the operation of the electric power
system, in particular, real-time power generation dispatch. Therefore, we will use the ED
to determine the changes of the state variables to the time varying electric power system
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loads for each simulation time step. In order to keep the complexity of the combined
simulation model at a moderate level, we assume that all generation units in the model
are involved in the real-time power dispatch. Thus, we omit solving the UC. However, for
the transition between two consecutive simulation time steps tn+1 and tn we consider key
parameters that are typically included in the UC model, such as the ramp rate ωr and
the start-up Ts and shut-down Td time for each generation unit, which we integrate into
the ED model.
The basic ED, which is described by the AC-OPF model elaborated in Section 4.2.3
(see eq. (4.13)-(4.23)), can be solved for each simulation time step tn to capture the
behaviour of the electric power system. However, for the assessment of security of supply
in coupled gas and electric power systems in scenarios where the two systems operate close
to their limits, this basic formulation of the ED described above may not be suitable. For
instance, in a contingency scenario, where total power demand exceeds total available
power generation capacity, due to a disruption in a major power plant, the basic ED
would not converge to a feasible solution. However, in practice in such a situation the
power TSO will deploy demand side measures, like for instance, load shedding at specific
locations based on a contingency protocol10, in order to maintain a secure operation of
the electric power system. To account for such scenarios, we introduce the concept of
dispatchable loads [116] as depicted in Fig. 5.1. The set of active power demand PD at
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In addition, the objective function in eq. (4.13) is extended by a linear penalty function
with respect to PD,i and the upper and lower limits on the new decision variables are







PminD,i ≤ PD,i ≤ P setD,i, i = 1 . . . Nb (5.3)
The penalty function for dispatchable loads is subtracted from the total active power
generation costs f(PG) which are always greater zero. Thus, the solution for PD,i will
tend to fulfil the scheduled electric power demand P setD,i if generation and transmission
10which depends on the contractual agreements with each customer, e.g. agreements on firm and inter-
ruptible loads, penalties in case of unserved electric power








Fig. 5.1.: Linear penalty function f(PD,i) and constraints for dispatchable loads. The
active power load can vary between the scheduled load P setD,i, which is typically
given by the load profile, and the minimum load P setD,i which is greater or equal
zero. The coefficient pii of the penalty function is the slope of the penalty curve
and is referred to as the penalty factor. The penalty factor can be used to
assign priority levels to the different customers connected to the power grid.
The higher the penalty factor the less likely a facility will be affected by demand
side measures
capacities are sufficient to balance the power system loads and if bus voltage limits are
not active. P setD,i is set as the upper limit for the active power load PD,i, while the lower
limit PminD,i can be set according to the contractual agreement with the customer (e.g.
agreement on firm capacity and interruptible loads). As illustrated in Fig. 5.1 the slope
of the linear penalty function is represented by the penalty factor pii, which we define as
follows:









· λi, k = 1 . . . Ng, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ 2 (5.4)
where λi is the priority factor for the corresponding load PD,i, which can be used to assign
different priority levels to each individual customer connected to the power grid. This way,
in cases where load shedding is required to balance the power system, customers with high
priority factors are less likely to be affected by such demand side measures than customers
with low priority factors. The priority factor is multiplied with the largest possible absolute
value of the first derivative of the cost function for active power generation in order to
ensure that the solution for dispatchable loads converges to the scheduled load P setD,i as
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long as power system constraints are not active (e.g. generation capacity covers scheduled
loads and power losses and minimum voltage limits are not active).
The solution of the extended ED for a time step tn is independent of the solution of a
previous or future time step tn−1 or tn+1, respectively. However, in real time power system
operation there are specific transitional constraints between consecutive time steps, which
restrict the operation and flexibility of the power system. In this study, we consider
the following three transitional constraints, which are key constraints in the UC model,
namely, the ramp rate, the start-up time and the shut-down time, which we define similar
to [130] and integrate into the extended ED model, as follows:
(1.) Ramp rate (ωr):
The ramp rate is the speed in [MW/min] at which the active power generation
Pn+1G,i at simulation time tn+1 can be increased or decreased between the minimum
and maximum active power generation limit PminG,i and PmaxG,i , respectively. Hence,
the upper (Pmax,n+1G,i ) and lower limit (P
min,n+1
G,i ) on active power generation of
plant i at each simulation time step tn+1 can be expressed as follows:
Pmax,n+1G,i = min
{





PminG,i ;PnG,i − ωr ·∆t
}
(5.6)
(2.) Start-up time (Ts):
The start-up time is the time span between activating the power plant and the time
after which the power plant reaches its minimum active power generation level PminG,i .
The start-up time depends on the plant type and the time duration between the last
shut-down time and the requested start-up time (i.e. cold start, warm start or hot
start [130]). To account for this characteristic, we assume the following exponential
function to determine the start-up time in respect to the last oﬄine time to and the
time tn at which the start-up of the power plant is requested:










where Tmins is the minimum start-up time for a hot start, Tmaxs the maximum
start-up time for a cold start and To is the time duration after which a station is
oﬄine and thus regarded as in cold start state. Similar to [130] we set To = 72 h.
(3.) Shut-down time (Td):
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We define the shut-down time as the time for the power plant to reduce its active
power generation to minimum active power generation PminG,i before finally going
oﬄine. The shut-down time depends on the ramp rate and the active power gener-
ation at the time the shut-down is requested.
The presented power system model can be solved with an interior point method, which is
explained in Appendix B.1. The interior point method and the algorithm for solving the
power system model are implemented into the simulation tool SAInt.
5.2.2. Extended Coupling Equations
The coupling equation developed in Section 4.3 for the coupling between GFPPs in the
electric power systems and demand nodes in the gas system (see eq. (4.27)) assume a
constant thermal efficiency to determine the equivalent fuel gas offtake for a specific active
power generation level. However, the thermal efficiency of a GFPP typically changes in
respect to its active power generation. This dependency is reflected by the heat rate curve
of the GFPP.
The required fuel gas Lp,i for active power generation PG,i at plant i can be expressed in
terms of the heat rate HRi(PG,i) of the GFPP and the gross calorific value GCV of the




, i = 1 . . . NGFPP (5.8)
The heat rate describes the amount of heat needed in MJ to generate and inject 1 kWh
of electric energy into the power transmission grid. It is an indicator of the efficiency of
the power plant to convert chemical energy stored in natural gas into electrical energy.
It is typically expressed as a quadratic function of the active power generation PG,i, as
follows [59,115]:
HRi(PG,i) = αi + βi · PG,i + γi · P 2G,i [MJ/kWh] (5.9)
The heat rate is the reciprocal of the thermal efficiency ηT , thus, HR = 3.6 MJ/kWh
corresponds to ηT = 100 %.
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Moreover, the linear coupling equation (see Section 4.3 eq. (4.26)) describing the power
offtake of LNG terminals in terms of the regasification rate is modified to the following
quadratic function:
PLNGD,i = ki,0 + ki,1 · Lreg,i + ki,2 · L2reg,i, i = 1 . . . NLNG (5.10)
5.2.3. Algorithm for solving the Combined Simulation Model
The coupling equations can be integrated into the gas and electric power system model
by extending the external nodal load Li in the integral continuity equation (2.39) to
Li = LGS,i + LGFPP,i (5.11)
and the active power demand PD,i in the active power balance equation (4.6) to
PD,i = PPSD,i + PCSD,i + PLNGD,i (5.12)
where LGS,i is the gas offtake or supply at non-GFPP facilities and PPSD,i power offtake
of non-gas facilities in the power grid. The resulting set of equations (2.46), (4.14)-(4.23),
(4.25), (5.2)-(5.12) describe the equilibrium state of the coupled gas and electric power
system at each time step tn. The time steps for the time integration are chosen according
to the dynamic time step method for the gas model. Additional time steps are introduced
if specific events in the power model occur such as the shut-down of a generation unit or
outages of transmission lines.
The coupled model can be solved as a single combined system by extending the ED with
additional decision variables, namely, the state variables p, Q and L from the gas model
and additional equality constraints expressed by the transient hydraulic gas equations
(2.41) & (2.2). While the computational costs for this approach may be acceptable for
problems of smaller size, its application to large scale combined gas and electric power
systems is connected with high computation time and storage. Thus, to speed up the
solution process, we propose an iterative boundary condition adaptation method, which
allows a parallel multi-threaded solution of the linearised equations (2.41) & (B.7). The
coupling equations are treated as boundary conditions, which are adapted after each
iteration step k until a converged integrated solution is obtained.
In order to start the combined dynamic gas and electric power system simulation, an
initial state for the coupled system at time step t0 is required, which can be obtained




for time step tn+1 = tn + ∆t
and set k = 1 & kc = 1
Make an initial approxima-
tion for the state variables
p, Q, L and the decision
variables ∆, Vm, PG, QG,
PD, Z, λ, µ using the values
from the previous time step
Assemble system matrices and
vectors in eq. (2.46) & (B.7)
using the (computed) values for
the state and decision variables
Solve eq. (2.46) & (B.7) in
parallel for iteration step
k and determine residual
‖Res‖ for both systems.
Calculate the corrected solution
vector W for the electric
power system using eq.(B.8)
For each link between the gas
and electric power system
calculate the power and gas
demand according to eq. (4.25),
(5.8) - (5.10) using the computed
state variables and assign the
new values to the corresponding
terms in eq. (2.46) & (B.7)
‖Res‖ ≤ ?k ≤ kmax?








for new time step tn+1
Linearize the pipe and non-
pipe equations for the gas
system. Run a new iteration
k=k+1
Invoke the constraint and
control handling algorithm
for the affected gas facility
















Fig. 5.2.: Flow chart of the algorithm for solving the coupled gas and electric power system
model
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from the solution of a combined steady state simulation or from the terminal state of a
combined dynamic simulation. The algorithm for solving the coupled system is described
in the flow chart depicted in Fig. 5.2. It contains three major loops, namely, the time
integration loop with the step variable tn, the iteration loop with step variable k and
the CCH loop with step variable kc. The CCH loop is entered, if a constraint in a gas
system facility is violated (e.g. minimum pressure, maximum compression ratio violation
etc.) after exiting the iterative loop. The control of the affected facility is set to the active
constraint and the iterative loop is repeated.
The ramp rate for each power plant is considered by adapting the value of the upper and
lower limits of the active power generation (see eq. (4.22)) for each simulation time step
tn such that the change in active power generation between two consecutive time steps
does not exceed the ramping limits. Furthermore, we make use of the simulation control
object introduced in Section 3.4 to control the start-up and shut down of a power plant
in the course of the time integration. The combined simulation is terminated successfully
if a converged and feasible solution is obtained for each simulation time step tn.
5.3. Security of Energy Supply Parameters
The algorithm for the combined model is designed for assessing the impact of disruptions
on security of energy supply in combined gas and electric power systems. In order to
estimate quantitatively
• how a disruption affects the operation of a facility or the total system,
• to compare the impact of different contingency scenarios and
• to evaluate different mitigation measures and their effectiveness,
we define the following parameters that serve as indicators for quantifying the impact of
contingencies on security of supply:
(1.) Quantity of gas or (electric) energy not supplied (GNS/ENS):
In case of a disruption, the quantity of gas or (electric) energy demanded by cus-
tomers may not be available, due to insufficient fuel gas pressure, line pack, voltage
magnitude or limited transmission capacity. The difference between the scheduled or
demanded quantity of gas or (electric) energy and the actual quantity delivered to a
customer (see Fig. 5.3) can be utilized as a quantitative indicator for the impact of
a disruption on security of energy supply for a group of customers connected to the















TSP = T1 + T2
scheduled demand quantity of energy supplied
actual demand quantity of energy not supplied
Fig. 5.3.: Security of supply indicators
affected facility or as a means of checking whether the terms of service are appropri-
ate. We refer to this quantity as gas or (electric) energy not supplied (GNS/ENS),
respectively. The total GNS and ENS for a gas offtake station (CGS,IND, CBE)
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The ENS is reflected by the size of the red area depicted in Fig. 5.3. Lseti (t) and
P setD,i(t) correspond to the load profiles prescribed to demand nodes in the gas sys-
tem (e.g. CGS, CBE, IND) and load buses in the electric power system, respectively.
(2.) Percentage of gas or (electric) energy not supplied (PENS):
The GNS and ENS of a facility gives an absolute value of the gas or energy not
supplied, respectively. To evaluate the severity of the supply disruption for a facility
or the total network we set the GNS/ENS in relation to the scheduled or expected
energy supply and define an additional parameter referred to as percentage of sched-
uled energy not supplied due to a contingency, which we denote PENS. The PENS











The PENS can be graphically interpreted as the ratio between the red area and the
sum of the red and blue area depicted in Fig. 5.3.
(3.) Survival time (SVT):
The indicators defined so far do not provide information on the propagation and
timing of contingencies, which may be crucial for the coordination between gas and
power TSOs. For instance, the time between the start time of a disruption and the
time of an undesired shut down of a GFPP due to insufficient fuel gas pressure
is a good indicator of the grace period for a TSO to react and deploy counter
measures to mitigate and to avoid cascading effects. Hence, a generic indicator for
the resilience and the grace period to react to a contingency can be defined as the
time span between the occurrence of the initial disruption td and the point in time
at which a facility i is affected, i.e. the time ta at which the ENS or PENS of
the affected facility is greater than a predefined tolerance svt. We refer to this
indicator as the survival time (SVT).
(4.) Time span of energy not Supplied (TSP):
The survival time indicates how long it takes until a facility is affected by a
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disruption, but not how long the disruption affected the facility. To account for this
crucial information, we define the parameter Time Span of Energy not Supplied
(TSP), which is the sum of all time intervals, where the ENS of a facility is greater
zero (see Fig. 5.3). The TSP is an indicator of how severe a facility is affected by a
contingency in terms of time.
(5.) Energy not supplied per time span (ENSTSP):
The TSP can be interpreted wrongly if a facility is affected by a disruption for a
long time period, but the ENS in this time period is relatively small. To avoid this
misinterpretation, we define an additional indicator for security of supply, which
we refer to as energy not supplied per time span (ENSTSP), which is the ratio
between ENS and TSP of a facility. The ENSTSP is the average rate of energy not
supplied per time during the time intervals the facility is affected by the disruption.
The indicators presented in this section have been implemented into SAInt and are defined
for each demand facility and for the total network system. In Chapter 3, we implemented
into SAInt the functionality to group the facilities in the network model into subsystems,
which can then be analysed independently11. Thus, we can use this option to determine
the value of each indicator for a specific area or group of facilities or customers, such as
GFPPs and protected customers [12] (e.g. households, public services) connected to the
gas or power grid. Moreover, the parameters of the subsystem can be used to declare
conditional expressions for a specific action or event during the simulation. For instance,
we can invoke the shut-down of a GFPP if the minimum pressure in a specific subsystem
is below a certain pressure threshold or if the total ENS of the subsystem is greater zero.
In the next section, we apply the developed models to a case study of a sample combined
energy system.
5.4. Model Application
The algorithm explained in Fig. 5.2 has been implemented into SAInt, a simulation soft-
ware designed for analysing security of supply in (coupled) critical energy infrastructures.
In this section, we apply SAInt to perform a case study on the sample coupled gas and
electric power system model depicted in Fig. 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. By doing this, we
11subsystems in SAInt are referred to as GSUB for gas subsystems and ESUB for subsystems of the
electric network




































































GSUB.NORTH GSUB.EAST GSUB.WEST GSUB.SOUTH
junction gas fired power plant Pipeline (D [mm] / l [km])
demand underground gas storage compressor station
supply LNG regasification terminal
Fig. 5.4.: 25-Node gas model used for the case studies
intend to demonstrate the functionality of the simulation software and capabilities of the
developed model to estimate and quantify
(1.) how disruptions triggered in one system affect the operation of facilities in the two
systems,
(2.) how disruptions propagate from one system to the other,
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(3.) the grace period for gas and power TSOs to coordinate and react to contingencies,
and
(4.) how effective are specific counter measures to mitigate the impact of disruptions.
The gas and electric network used in the case study are bidirectionally coupled through
three GFPPs (NO.4 <-> GEN.12, NO.18 <-> GEN.21, NO.23 <-> GEN.0), three ED-
CSs (CS.0 <-> BUS.6, CS.1 <-> BUS.7, CS.2 <-> BUS.14) and one LNG terminal
(NO.10 <-> BUS.13). Two of the GFPPs (NO.18 <-> BUS.21 & NO.23 <-> BUS.0)











































ESUB.NORTH ESUB.EAST ESUB.WEST ESUB.SOUTH
junction gas fired power plant transmission line
load compressor station loads
generation LNG terminal loads
Fig. 5.5.: Modified version of IEEE 30-Bus power system model
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Parameter Symbol Value Unit
reference time step ∆t 900 [s]
total simulation time Tmax 24 [h]
gas temperature Tg 288.15 [K]
dynamic viscosity 1 η 1.1 · 10−5 [kg/m · s]
isentropic coefficient κ 1.3 [-]
reference pressure pn 1.01325 [bar]
reference temperature Tn 273.15 [K]
critical pressure 2 pcrit 45 [bar]
critical temperature Tcrit 193.7 [K]
relative density d 0.6 [-]
gross calorific value GCV 41.215 [MJ/sm3]
nominal power BaseMVA 100 [MVA]
1 the dynamic viscosity of the gas is needed for calculating the
Reynolds number, which, in turn is needed for computing
the friction factor λ using Hofer’s equation as described in
Chapter 2
2 the critical pressure and temperature of the gas is needed for
calculating the compressibility factor based on the equation
developed by Papay as described in Chapter 2
Tab. 5.1.: Input parameter for the sample combined gas and power transmission network
uses conventional gas turbines (GTs) to generate electricity. The third GFPP serves as
a reserve and backup for intermittent wind power generation at generation bus GEN.22.
Thus, the GFPP is oﬄine unless the electric power generated by the wind turbines is
below a certain threshold. The input data for the nodes, pipes, compressor stations and
the LNG terminal in the gas network are given in Tables B.1 - B.4, while the data for the
buses, transmission lines and generators in the electric network are listed in Tables B.5-
B.7. The simulation properties for the case study are given in Table 5.112. The simulation
time window for all studied scenarios is set to Tmax = 24 h (one operating day, from 6:00
AM to 6:00 AM) for the sake of keeping the result data and discussion at a moderate
size. However, the time window can be extended as desired in order to study long-term
contingency scenarios. The reference time step is set to ∆t = 15 min, however, the time
resolution may be adapted by the dynamic time step adaptation (DTA) method in case
of control changes or changes in active constraints during the time integration process.
The DTA is explained in detail in a previous publication [129].
In order to run a combined quasi-dynamic simulation, an initial state of the combined
network is required, which can either be the solution of a combined steady state or the
terminal state of a combined quasi-dynamic simulation. For the case study, we compute
12All data used for the gas and power network are available as native SAInt input files in the electronic
version of this chapter and are described further in B.4.1. The properties of the power plants (see
Table B.7), were chosen according to the data provided by [130,131]
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initially a combined steady state scenario and use the solution as an initial state for the
combined quasi-dynamic scenarios studied in this chapter. The results of the combined
steady state simulation are plotted in Fig. 5.7 and listed in Tables B.8-B.11. The simula-
tion protocol, which includes information of the residual for the gas model, power model
and coupling equations for each step of the sequential linearisation is attached to the
electronic version of this thesis (SAInt-Log-SteadyState).
In the following sections, we simulate three scenarios and discuss their results. All three
scenarios were computed on an Intel Core i7-3630QM 2.4 GHz CPU with 8GB RAM and
a 64-Bit Windows 10 Operating System.
5.4.1. Case 0 - Base case scenario with intermittent wind power
generation and backup by spinning reserve GFPP
In case 0, we study a base case scenario, where wind power generation at bus GEN.22
is not available for some time intervals, due to insufficient wind velocity. We use the
functionality to define conditional scenario parameters in SAInt to enforce the start-up of
the backup GFPP connected to bus GEN.12 in case wind power generation at bus GEN.22
falls below 1 MW within two consecutive simulation time steps (see Fig. 5.4). However, the
start-up of the backup GFPP, is only possible if there is enough linepack in subsystem
GSUB.EAST and if the pressure in the corresponding fuel gas node (NO.23) is above
35 bar-g, in order to avoid a minimum pressure violation at start-up (pmin = 30 bar-g).
For all CGSs in the gas network, we assign the relative load profile depicted in the left
plot of Fig. 5.8 and scale the value with the computed steady state loads. For all active
and reactive loads at substations connected to the local distribution system (LDC) we
factor the relative load profile depicted in the right plot of Fig. 5.8 with the steady state
power system loads. All other loads in both networks are assumed constant (i.e. loads of
IND & CBE). The relative profile for wind generation visualized in Fig. 5.9 is assigned to
the wind power generator connected to bus GEN.22 and is scaled with the steady state
active wind power generation (60 MW). Fig. 5.10 shows a snapshot of the SAInt-electric
network scenario table, where the boundary conditions and the implementation of the
start-up and shut down of GFPPs is implemented.
For the given settings in case 0, we do not expect any significant impact on security of
supply for both networks, since the available generation capacity provided by the backup
GFPP should be sufficient to cover the system loads at times of missing wind power
generation.
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relative load profile gas relative load profile power






























Fig. 5.8.: Load profile assigned to CGS in gas network (left side) and active power load
at buses in electric power network (right side)
relative wind generation profile











Fig. 5.9.: Relative profile for variable and intermittent wind power generation assigned to
bus GEN.22
The results for case 0 are illustrated in the time plots depicted in Fig. 5.11 & 5.14 and in
the animation video SAInt_Case0 generated with SAInt and attached to the electronic
version of the thesis. The simulation protocol for case 0 SAInt-Log-Case0, which contains
information on the residual for each simulation time step and the changes in control and
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Fig. 5.11.: Case 0 - Time plot for active power generation (PG) at buses GEN.12 and
GEN.22
Fig. 5.12.: Case 0 - Time plot for Energy Not Supplied (ENS) for the total gas (blue
curve) and total electric network (green curve)
active constraints of active gas facilities, is also available in the electronic version of the
thesis. The computation for case 0 took approximately 10 s for 96 time steps.
Figure 5.11 shows the time evolution of the active power generation (PG) at buses GEN.22
(blue curve, wind generation) and GEN.12 (green curve, backup GFPP). As can be seen,
the GFPP starts-up whenever wind power generation is zero and shuts down whenever it is
above zero. The start-up of the GFPP, however, is always delayed by approx. 30 min after
loss of wind power generation, due to the transitional constraints (limit for start-up time
is ≥ 15 min for GFPPs, see Table B.7) explained in Section 5.2.1 and defined in Table B.7
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Fig. 5.13.: Case 0 - Time plot for Percentage of Energy not Supplied (ENS) for the total
gas (blue curve) and total electric network (green curve)
and the conditional expression for starting-up and shutting down GFPPs after the active
power generation is below or above 1 MW for two consecutive time steps, respectively.
The impact of the delay in backup power on security of energy supply is visible in the
time plot for ENS and PENS for the total gas and total electric power system depicted
in Fig. 5.12 & 5.13. While the ENS and PENS for the gas system remain zero, security of
supply in the electric power system is affected exactly at times, where there is a delay in
backup power generation by the backup GFPP connected to GEN.12. The power system
implements load shedding in order to balance the reduced generation capacity, which is
visible by the increase in ENS and PENS at approx. 10:45 and 18:15. However, the impact
of the load shedding is relatively small, since the PENS is less than 1 %. One way to avoid
load shedding would be to set the wind power generation threshold for starting-up the
GFPP to a higher value. However, this may also result in an increased number of start-up
and shut down cycles, which, in turn, is connected to higher operational costs.
Besides, without the extension of the basic ED by the dispatchable load model derived
in Section 5.2.1, the combined model would not have converged to a feasible solution,
due to insufficient generation capacity to balance the power system loads. The ramping
of the backup GFPP is possible, because there is enough pressure at the corresponding
fuel gas offtake node in the gas system and sufficient linepack in the corresponding sub-
system GSUB.EAST, as can be seen in Fig. 5.14, where the time plot of the unit state
at GEN.12, the fuel gas offtake and pressure at gas node NO.23 and the linepack in
subsystem GSUB.EAST is illustrated.
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Fig. 5.14.: Case 0 - Time plot for linepack in subsystem GSUB.EAST (LP ), nodal pressure
(P ) and fuel gas offtake for power generation (Q) at node NO.4
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5.4.2. Case 1 - Disruption in compressor station CS.1
In this section, we examine how a disruption in compressor station CS.1 affects security
of supply in the combined system. The gas flow through CS.1 is interrupted completely
(OFF) at 14:00 for 8 hours, due to a failure in the compressor station13. At 22:00, the
failure in the station is remedied, but the start-up of the station is delayed for another 4
hours. However, in this time the flow can bypass (BP) the station without gas compression
until the station returns to its original control set point at 02:00 (outlet pressure control
of 60 bar-g). The described events are visualized in Fig. 5.15, where the time evolution of
the control of compressor station CS.1 is depicted. All boundary conditions and settings
from case 0 are carried over to case 1.
We expect a stronger impact of the disruption on security of supply in the gas network
than in the electricity network. For the gas network, the disruption in CS.1 may cause the
pressure and line pack in the downstream hydraulic area to drop. Therefore, the scheduled
gas demand in the area may not be covered due to insufficient gas pressure. This in turn,
may also influence the start-up of the backup GFPP for balancing the missing wind power
generation, which requires a specific fuel gas pressure and available linepack to operate.
The results for case 1 are illustrated in the time plots depicted in Fig. 5.15 & 5.22 and
in the animation video SAInt_Case1 attached to the electronic version of the thesis. The
simulation protocol for case 1 (SAInt-Log-Case1) is also available in the electronic version
of the thesis. The computation for case 1 took approximately 22 s for 100 time steps.
Figure 5.16 shows the reaction of the inlet and outlet pressure to the disruption and the
control changes at compressor station CS.1. The interruption of gas flow through the
station at 14:00 caused a rapid decrease in outlet pressure and a slight increase in inlet
pressure. The inlet pressure stabilizes to a constant pressure due to the pressure control
at the CBI station connected to node NO.0. As can be seen in the animation video for
case 1 (SAInt_Case1), the gas supply from NO.0 decreases right after the interruption of
gas flow at CS.1 to avoid an overpressure in the subsystem GSUB.NORTH. The reduction
of the outlet pressure is a result of an imbalance between gas offtake (IND at NO.16 &
CGS at NO.24) and gas supply (UGS at NO.22) to the downstream hydraulic area (area
in GSUB.EAST separated by the outlet node of CS.1 and the pressure controlled UGS
node NO.22). Thus, the linepack and the average pressure in the hydraulic area decreases
13Case 1 is a hypothetical scenario to demonstrate the capability of the developed model to simulate
and estimate the impact of supply disruptions. In practice, a failure in a compressor station would
not necessarily result in a complete shut-down and stop of flow, but rather the flow will bypass the
station without compression through a designated bypass valve system. However, in this case study,
we assume the bypass valve cannot be opened, due to a technical failure
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Fig. 5.15.: Case 1 - Time plot of the station control (CTRL) of compressor station CS.1
Fig. 5.16.: Case 1 - Time plot of the inlet and outlet pressure of compressor station CS.1
rapidly (the flow imbalance between NO.16, NO.24 and NO.22 right after the disruption
can be seen in the animation video for case 1 (SAInt_Case1). The pressure and linepack
in the hydraulic area decreases to an extend that at a certain simulation time the gas
offtake at NO.16 and NO.24 are curtailed in order to maintain the minimum operating
pressure of 25 bar-g and 16 bar-g, respectively (see simulation protocol SAInt-Log-Case1
and animation video SAInt_Case1 for more details). The simulation time at which the
curtailment of gas demand is initiated is shown in the time plot of the TSP for the gas
network depicted in Fig. 5.20 (blue curve). The TSP starts increasing linearly at approx.
20:00, 6 hours after the disruption in CS.1. This is the grace period for the gas TSO to
react to the contingency, by deploying an emergency plan to mitigate or avoid the impact
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Fig. 5.17.: Case 1 - Time plot for active power generation (PG) at buses GEN.12 and
GEN.22
Fig. 5.18.: Case 1 - Time plot for Energy Not Supplied (ENS) for the total gas (blue
curve) and total electric network (green curve)
of the disruption on security of supply. A counter measure could be for instance, to set
the withdrawal from the UGS facility connected to node NO.23 to maximum withdrawal
capacity. The information obtained for the grace period would not be available if instead
of a dynamic model a steady state gas model was used, since the imbalance between
supply and demand and, thus, the change in pressure and linepack cannot be reflected
with the steady state approach.
The disruption in the gas system propagates also to the electric power system and affects
security of supply in the power system, as can be seen in Fig. 5.17 & 5.22, where the active
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Fig. 5.19.: Case 1 - Time plot for Percentage of Energy Not Supplied (PENS) for the total
gas (blue curve) and total electric network (green curve)
Fig. 5.20.: Case 1 - Time plot for Time Span of Energy Not Supplied (TSP) for the total
gas (blue curve) and total electric network (green curve)
power generation at buses GEN.22 and GEN.12, the linepack in subsystem GSUB.EAST
and the fuel gas offtake and pressure at node NO.23 are depicted. The start-up of the
backup GFPP connected to bus GEN.12 after the loss of wind power generation at ap-
proximately 19:00 is delayed for a approximately 4 hours (compare Fig. 5.11 to 5.11), due
to insufficient fuel gas pressure at node NO.23 and linepack in subsystem GSUB.EAST.
Because of this delay, the generation capacity in the electricity system is insufficient to
balance the power system loads. Thus, some loads in the power system are curtailed in
respect to the priority factors assigned to the different load buses in Table B.5.
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Fig. 5.21.: Case 1 - Time plot for Energy Not Supplied per Time Span of Energy Not
Supplied (ENSTSP) for the total gas (blue curve) and total electric network
(green curve)
The impact of the disruption on security of supply for the total gas and electricity network
is depicted in Fig. 5.18 - 5.21. In absolute terms, the gas system is more affected by the
disruption than the electricity system (see Fig. 5.18), since the ENS for the gas network is
significantly higher than the ENS for the electricity network (ca. 2 GWh compared to ca.
0.1 GWh), while in relative terms, the impact is slightly higher for the electricity network
than for the gas network as can be seen in Fig. 5.19. Furthermore, the survival time for
the total gas system is 6 h and for the electricity system 8 h (see Fig. 5.19), assuming a
survival time tolerance of svt = 1 % for the PENS of the total system. This means that
the time span between the disruption event and the point in time at which the total ENS
is about to exceed 1 % of the expected or scheduled total energy supply is 6 h or 8 h,
respectively. This crucial time information can be regarded as the grace period for gas
and power TSOs to coordinate and react to the contingency.
Figures 5.20 & 5.21 show how long the disruption affected the total gas and electricity
system (TSP) and the average rate of energy not supplied per time span (ENSTSP). As
can be seen, the power system was affected by the disruption for a longer time period
than the gas system (6.3 h compared to 3.75 h). However, due to the relatively large
magnitude of the ENS for the gas system compared to the ENS for the electric power
system (see. Fig. 5.18) the ENSTSP for the gas system is significantly greater than the
one for the power system.
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Fig. 5.22.: Case 1 - Time plot for linepack in subsystem GSUB.EAST (LP ), nodal pressure
(P ) and fuel gas offtake for power generation (Q) at node NO.4
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5.4.3. Case 2 - Full withdrawal capacity at gas storage facility to
mitigate the impact of compressor station disruption
In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of a countermeasure to mitigate the impact
of the disruption in compressor station CS.1, by enforcing the UGS facility connected to
node NO.23 to increase its pressure set point to maximum operating pipeline pressure
of 60 bar-g if the linepack in subsystem GSUB.EAST is below 3.3 Msm3. All boundary
conditions and events defined in case 1 a carried over to case 2.
We expect this countermeasure to reduce the impact on security of supply in the gas
and electricity system. However, we expect the gas system to benefit more from the
countermeasure than the electricity system, since the countermeasure is applied in the
gas system.
The results for case 2 are illustrated in the time plots depicted in Fig. 5.23 & 5.27 and
in the animation video SAInt_Case2 attached to the electronic version of the thesis. The
simulation protocol for case 2 (SAInt-Log-Case2) is also available in the electronic version
of the thesis. The computation for case 2 took approximately 23 s for 101 time steps.
Figure 5.23 shows the time plot of gas offtake (Q) gas pressure (P ) station control (CTRL)
GNET ENS(Tmax) PENS(Tmax) TSP (Tmax) ENSTSP (Tmax) SV T (1 %)
[GWh] [%] [h] [MW] [h]
Case 1 2.04 0.93 3.75 543.09 8
Case 2 1.31 0.60 3.25 403.23 -
∆ -35.68 [%] -35.48 [%] -13.33 [%] -25.75 [%] -
Tab. 5.2.: Summary of results for security of supply parameters for gas network
ENET ENS(Tmax) PENS(Tmax) TSP (Tmax) ENSTSP (Tmax) SV T (1 %)
[GWh] [%] [h] [MW] [h]
Case1 0.09 1.26 6.30 14.02 6
Case2 0.05 0.66 4.45 10.41 -
∆ -47.57 [%] -47.62[%] -29.37[%] -25.76[%] -
Tab. 5.3.: Summary of results for security of supply parameters for electric network
and the storage envelope showing the working points for the UGS facility connected to
node NO.4. As can be seen, the UGS facility reacts to the disruption at approximately
16:45 when the linepack in subsystem GSUB.EAST is lower than 3.3 Msm3. The pressure
set point is increased to 60 bar-g, however, this set point cannot be maintained at all
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Fig. 5.23.: Case 2 - Time plot of gas offtake (Q) gas pressure (P ) station control (CTRL)
and the operating gas storage envelope (withdrawal and injection rate versus
working inventory) for the UGS facility connected to node NO.4
time, due to the maximum withdrawal capacity limit of 300 ksm3/h illustrated in the
operating envelope of the UGS facility.
The increased withdrawal from storage has a positive effect on security of supply in the
gas and electricity network, which is visible, if we compare the time plots from case 1 for
ENS, PENS, TSP and ENSTSP (see Fig. 5.18-5.21) to the time plots for case 2 shown in
Fig. 5.24-5.27. The values of the security of supply parameters at the end of the simulation
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Fig. 5.24.: Case 2 - Time plot for Energy Not Supplied (ENS) for the total gas (blue
curve) and total electric network (green curve)
Fig. 5.25.: Case 2 - Time plot for Percentage of Energy Not Supplied (PENS) for the total
gas (blue curve) and total electric network (green curve)
(Tmax are summarized in Tables 5.2 & 5.3. The ENS for the gas system is reduced by
more than 35 % and for the electricity system by almost 48 %. In addition, the SVT
for both systems is increased to unlimited, since the total PENS for case 2 is always
lower than the survival time tolerance of 1 %. Moreover, the TSP for the gas system is
reduced by almost 30 % and for the electricity system by more than 13 %. Finally, the
ENSTSP for both systems is reduced by roughly 26 %. Therefore, we can conclude that the
countermeasure deployed in the gas system reduced the impact of the disruption triggered
in compressor station CS.1 on security of supply in the combined gas and electric power
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system. Moreover, the countermeasure was more effective for the electricity network than
for the gas network, even though, it was deployed in the gas network.
Fig. 5.26.: Case 2 - Time plot for Time Span of Energy Not Supplied (TSP) for the total
gas (blue curve) and total electric network (green curve)
Fig. 5.27.: Case 2 - Time plot for Energy Not Supplied per Time Span of Energy Not
Supplied (ENSTSP) for the total gas (blue curve) and total electric network
(green curve)
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5.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a novel quasi-dynamic simulation model for assessing security
of supply in interconnected gas and electric transmission networks. The model consists of
a transient hydraulic model for the gas system, which includes sub models of all important
facilities and an extended ED for the electric power system, which contains a model for
dispatchable loads and considers time transitional constraints such as the ramp rate and
the start-up time of generation units. The models for the individual energy systems were
combined through coupling equations describing the power supply to EDCSs and LNG
terminals and the fuel gas offtake for power generation in GFPPs. The resulting system
of equations describing the state change of the combined system between two consecutive
time steps is solved iteratively by a sequential linearisation method, which updates the
boundary conditions expressed by the coupling equations at each iteration step. In order
to quantify the impact of contingencies on security of supply, we proposed five security
of supply parameters, namely, (1) the energy not supplied, (2) the percentage of energy
not supplied, (3) the survival time, (4) the time span of energy not supplied, and (5) the
energy not supplied per time span.
The security of supply parameters together with the algorithm for the combined energy
system were implemented into a novel simulation software named SAInt, the first pub-
lished simulation tool that allows the combined simulation of interconnected gas and
electric power systems in single time frame and simulation environment. The capabilities
of the combined model and the functionality of the software tool were demonstrated in
a case study of a sample combined gas and electric power system. The case studies were
composed of three scenarios with supply disruptions triggered by the loss of wind power
generation in the electric network (in all three cases 0, 1 & 2) and loss of gas compression
and interruption of gas flow at a major compressor station (in case 1 and 2).
In case 0 the loss of wind power generation is compensated by a backup GFPP. However,
due to the start-up time limits, which causes a short delay in power generation from
GFPPs after the loss of wind power generation, some power system loads are curtailed,
in order to balance the reduced generation capacity. The curtailment of the power system
loads was enabled by the dispatchable load model added to the basic ED.
In case 1, the disruption in a compressor station affected gas offtake stations in the
gas system and active power demand at load buses in the electric power system. The
disruption caused the nodal gas pressure at the GFPP node and the linepack in the
hydraulic area downstream the disrupted compressor station to fall below the threshold
for starting-up and operating the GFPP. Thus, the start-up of the reserve GFPP to backup
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the loss of wind power generation is delayed a couple of hours. During this time period
the generation capacity in the electric network was insufficient to balance the scheduled
or expected power system loads. Thus, the loads at a number of power system buses were
curtailed based on a priority factor assigned to each load bus, in order to balance supply
and demand in the electric network.
Finally, in the last case, we demonstrated how a countermeasure can be implemented
to mitigate the impact of the disruption triggered in the compressor station and how
the developed security of supply parameters can be utilized to evaluate the effectiveness
of this countermeasure. The countermeasure consisted of increasing the withdrawal rate
from a neighboring UGS facility to full withdrawal capacity by setting the pressure control
set point of the facility to maximum operating pipeline pressure if the linepack in the
affected hydraulic area goes below a certain threshold. The results for case 2 show that
the countermeasure helped mitigate the impact of the disruption on security of supply in
both energy networks, since all security of supply parameters were significantly reduced.
Remarkably, the countermeasure had a stronger effect on the electric power system than
on the gas system, though it was deployed in the gas system.
In summary, the case study demonstrate the very detailed level of information that can
be obtained from the presented combined model implemented into SAInt. The type of
information provided in this chapter cannot be obtained by a steady state approach for
the gas system or by the co-simulation approach adopted in many scientific publications,
due to their limitations. The provided information cannot only be used to analyse the
propagation of contingencies, but also to develop and test strategies to react to contingen-
cies, such as those described in the preventive action and emergency plan postulated in
Regulation 994/2010 [12]. This may help gas and power TSOs, energy research institutes,
policy makers, such as, competent authorities of EU-Member States, regulatory agencies
etc. to take the right decisions on how to increase the resilience and security of supply in
critical energy infrastructures. Furthermore, the security of supply parameters developed
in this chapter, can be used for further analysis of gas and electric power system networks,
such as sensitivity analysis, risk assessment or Monte Carlo simulation.
This chapter addressed the main research question of the thesis, namely, how the con-
sequences of disruptions in interconnected gas and electricity systems can be estimated.
The combined gas and electricity model together with the security of supply parameters
developed in this chapter enable the estimation of consequences of different disruptions.
The combined model was also used to assess the following sub-questions:
184 5. Combined Simulation of integrated Gas and Electricity Networks
• How can we quantify and compare the impact of supply disruptions on
different gas customers?
• How can we quantify the grace period for gas and power TSOs to coor-
dinate and react to supply disruptions?




In this thesis, different simulation models for analysing the impacts of disruptions on
security of supply in interdependent gas and electricity systems were developed.
In Chapter 2, a transient hydraulic gas model for simulating the operation of real world
natural gas transport systems in terms of security of supply was developed. The model con-
siders the physical equations describing the gas flow in pipelines and the most important
facilities (e.g. compressor stations, entry and exit stations, underground storage facilities
and LNG terminals) and their technical constraints. The set of equations describing the
dynamics in gas transport systems were obtained by simplifying and adapting the full
set of PDEs to the prevailing conditions in gas transport systems. The resulting equation
system was discretised and linearised using an implicit time integration method. Further-
more, the gas model was validated against results from the literature and the commercial
software package SIMONE. The comparison of the results confirmed the capability of the
model to reflect the dynamic behaviour of gas transport networks in an adequate and
accurate manner.
In Chapter 3, the transient gas simulation model developed and validated in Chapter 2,
was extended by additional algorithms, for modelling the transition between different con-
trol mode changes and their interactions with different constraints imposed by controlled
facilities in the gas network. Furthermore, the developed models, were implemented into
a simulation tool named SAInt, which is divided into an Application Programming In-
terface (API), which is the main simulation engine of the software and a Graphical User
Interface (GUI), which enables a visual communication between the user and the simula-
tion engine. The software is designed for setting up and running simulations of different
scenarios for a predefined gas network model. A dynamic scenario, for instance, contains
the definition of a time window, an initial network state and a set of control settings
for the different facilities in the gas network. The control settings are translated by the
simulation engine into boundary conditions in order to solve the mathematical equations
reflecting the physical operation of gas transport systems. The evaluation of each defined
control setting may be triggered in respect to a predefined evaluation time and/or condi-
tion in the gas network model, which can be defined by a logical or arithmetic expression.
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This enables the user to define an individual control logic for each controlled facility and
the option to implement curtailments based on specific rules. Furthermore, the concept
of subsystems was introduced, which allows dividing the gas network model into different
network sections. The aggregated properties for each subsystem can be used to define
conditional control settings for each facility. The capabilities of the the developed soft-
ware application to simulate gas supply disruptions and to model and asses demand and
supply side measures to mitigate the impact of gas supply disruptions were demonstrated
in a case study of a real world example.
After developing the gas network model and implementing it into the software applica-
tion, the next step (Chapter 4) was dedicated to defining a model for the electric power
system and to combine this model with the dynamic gas model to develop an integrated
co-simulation platform for cascading outage contingency analysis in interconnected gas
and power system networks. The model for the electricity system is based on steady state
AC- optimal power flow simulation (AC-OPF) and includes sub models for the most im-
portant power system facilities such as transmission lines, transformers, buses, generation
units as well as shunt capacitors and reactors. The AC-OPF model is implemented into the
Matlab based open source power system library MATPOWER and considers the active
and reactive power flow balance as well as the constraints of power system components
such as the thermal capacity limits of transmission lines, the reactive power capability
curves of generation units and the voltage limits at buses.
The gas and electricity model are integrated to a co-simulation platform by identifying the
most important physical interconnections between the two systems and defining mathe-
matical equations reflecting this interlink. These power gas interconnections include the
fuel gas offtake of GFPPs for power generation in the electricity system and the power
offtake from the electricity system for electric power supply to LNG terminals, and elec-
tric driven compressors installed in UGS facilities and gas compressor stations.
The co-simulation framework is divided into two separate simulation environments,
namely, the gas system simulator (SAInt) and the power system simulator (MAT-
POWER). The communication and data exchange between SAInt and MATPOWER
is established through an interface implemented into SAInt that makes use of the Matlab
Automation Server to execute Matlab scripts, to exchange input and output data with
Matlab workspace variables and to enable the visualisation of power system topologies
and simulation results. Furthermore, the co-simulation interface is responsible for respect-
ing the coupling equations between the two simulation models.
The co-simulation framework was applied to perform a case study on a realistic combined
gas and power system network of an European region. The model application was divided
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into three different scenarios, where different gas and power system contingencies were
studied. In the first scenario, the normal operation of the combined system with no dis-
ruptions was studied and the results were compared to the second scenario with gas side
disruptions and the third scenario with power side disruptions.
The simulation results demonstrated, how disruptions triggered in one system propagate
to the other system. In the second scenario, for instance, three major gas supply stations
were disrupted and as a result a number of GFPPs were shut-down due to insufficient fuel
gas pressure. This contingency propagates further to other buses in the power system,
where load shedding is implemented in order to maintain the voltage levels above the
minimum voltage threshold. Similar observations are made in scenario 2, where a drastic
reduction in renewable energy generation together with a shut-down of a large power plant
triggered a large increase in gas demand of GFPPs, leading to a rapid pressure drop in
the gas network and the subsequent shut-down of GFPPs. Eventually, this circumstance
increased the stress on the power system leading to minimum bus voltage violations in a
couple of buses, which is remedied by applying load shedding at the affected buses.
The co-simulation framework, was able to capture the propagation of disruptions from
one energy system to the other, however, there were a number of aspects that could not
be reflected appropriately due to the nature of the model.
Firstly, the coupling between the two energy systems were simulated in two different
simulation time frames, thus there was no immediate feedback from one system as a
result of a disruption in the other system. The power system was simulated for one
operating day (24 hours) and the results computed for gas fired generators were used
for calculating the corresponding fuel gas offtakes in the gas system. The gas offtakes, in
turn, were used to simulate the gas system and to check if the gas system can operate
under these conditions in terms of pressure limits at delivery points. If pressure limits
were violated the gas system curtailed the computed fuel offtakes from the power system
and the power system was simulated again using the fuel offtake constraints computed by
the gas system and additional power requirements of electric driven compressors and LNG
terminals. The fuel offtake constraints computed by the gas system reduces the generation
capacities in the power system, thus, power system loads were curtailed in order to balance
the system. The above iteration was repeated until a feasible solution for the two systems
was found. In reality the changes in one system has immediate effect on physical properties
(e.g. pressures, linepack, voltages, supply and demand) in the other system, which may
cascade back to the system were it originated. However, these cascading effects cannot be
captured by the co-simulation concept, where the time frames between the two systems
are inherently different.
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Secondly, the curtailment of power system loads were directly applied to buses that were
affected by voltage violations based on a predefined rule. Priority levels between different
power system customers were not considered, which may have an effect on the results.
Finally, time transitional constraints of power system generators in terms of maximum
ramp rates, start-up and shut down times were neglected, which may restrict the available
generation capacities to balance the power system loads.
To overcome these deficiencies, in Chapter 5, a novel combined quasi-dynamic simulation
model was developed and implemented into the simulation tool SAInt. The combined
simulation model consists of the transient gas system model developed in Chapters 2 &
3, an extended steady state AC-OPF model and the coupling equations describing the
physical interconnections between the two energy systems. The three model elements are
integrated into one combined model which is solved in a single simulation time frame
and environment. The extended AC-OPF model considers time transitional constraints
of power system generators, such us ramp up/down limits as well as start up and shut
down times and includes a model for dispatchable power system loads, which allows
the consideration of priority levels in the event of load curtailments. The concepts for
subsystems and scenarios developed for the gas model in Chapter 3 as well as the definition
of conditional control mode changes for gas system facilities were extended to the electric
power system model. Thus, the control logic of gas fired generators in the power system
model could be designed based on the conditions in the gas system model. For instance,
the start up and shut down of a gas fired power plant could be scheduled based on the
pressure and linepack level in a specific section (subsystem) in the gas network model.
In order to quantify the impact of contingencies on security of supply, and to compare
the effectiveness of different countermeasures to mitigate the impacts of disruptions on
security of supply a number of security of supply parameters were defined, such as energy
not supplied, percentage of energy not supplied and survival time.
The capabilities of the combined simulation model were demonstrated in a case study
of a sample combined gas and power system network. The case study consisted of three
scenarios with gas and power side contingencies as well as mitigation measures to react
to these disruptions.
In the first scenario, the operation of a gas generator was simulated, which serves as
reserve and back up for variable and intermittent power generation from a wind turbine.
In the second scenario a disruption in a gas compressor station was simulated which led
to curtailments in the gas system and eventually to a delayed start up of the back up gas
generator due to pressure restrictions in the gas system. The delayed start up of the gas
generator caused a reduced generation capacity in the power system, which eventually led
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to load curtailments in the power system based on a predefined priority level for each load
bus. The impacts on security of supply in the two energy systems were compared using the
security of supply parameters developed and implemented into SAInt. In terms of energy
not supplied to customers, the impact of the disruption was higher for the gas system
than for the power system. However, in terms of the ratio between energy not supplied
and total scheduled energy supply (i.e. percentage of energy not supplied) the impact of
the disruption was higher for the power system than for the gas system. Finally, in the last
scenario the effectiveness of a countermeasure to mitigate the impact of the disruption
in the gas compressor station was examined. The countermeasure was to increase the
withdrawal rate from a neighbouring underground storage facility to maximum capacity if
the linepack in the affected region goes below a specific value. Simulation results indicated
a reduction of the impact on security of supply as a result of the implementation of the
countermeasure.
The models and tools developed in this thesis demonstrate the importance of considering
the interdependencies between gas and electricity systems when assessing the reliability of
critical energy infrastructures. The information provided by the simulation models can be
used to improve the coordination between gas and power system operators. For instance,
gas and power system operators may develop strategies to coordinate and react to different
contingencies affecting the reliability of the two systems. The developed strategies can be
assessed using the simulation models and tools presented in this thesis to compare the
effectiveness of different strategies and their potential vulnerabilities and bottlenecks. The
estimation of consequences on security of supply computed by the developed models can
also be used to perform a risk assessment of combined gas and power systems, which would
enabled the detection of potential risks affecting security of energy supply. The results
from the risk assessment can be used to develop preventive action plans and emergency
plans, which can also be tested using the simulation model.
Furthermore, the developed models can be used to address future research questions in the
area of gas and power system interdependencies. One potential future research question
concerns the integration and operation of P2G facilities in combined gas and electricity
systems and how these facilities may impact the operation of the gas system if different
gas qualities are injected at different locations. Analysing these questions requires an




A. Input Data for 30-Nodes Gas Network
Parameter Symbol Value Unit
time step ∆t 900 [s]
total simulation time tmax 24 [h]
gas temperature T 288.15 [K]
dynamic viscosity η 1.1 · 10−5 [kg/m · s]
pipe roughness k 0.012 [mm]
standard pressure pn 1.01325 [bar]
standard temperature Tn 273.15 [K]
relative density d 0.6 [-]
calorific value CV 41.215 [MJ/sm3]
Tab. A.1.: Input parameter for the dynamic simulation of the 30-Nodes sample network
and the combined model
t [h]
rel. Load [−]






Fig. A.1.: Relative Load profile assigned to demand nodes of the sample network
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Node
Pipe inlet outlet L D Node QSET PSET [bar-g]
[km] [m] [ksm3/s] [bar-g]
1 1 2 24 0.7 1 - 50 (supply)
2 1 3 25 0.7 2 90 -
3 1 4 20 0.7 3 29 -
4 4 3 30 0.7 4 75 -
5 3 2 40 0.7 5 0 -
6 2 22 45 0.7 6 55 -
7 2 5 70 0.6 7 85 -
8 5 6 60 0.6 8 28 -
9 22 21 52 0.7 9 90 -
10 6 21 30 0.6 10 41 -
11 4 10 40 0.7 11 39 -
12 4 11 35 0.6 12 20 -
13 4 12 25 0.7 13 0 -
14 12 13 70 0.6 14 80 -
15 12 11 30 0.7 15 45 -
16 11 10 50 0.6 16 0 -
17 13 14 60 0.6 17 120 -
18 10 14 100 0.6 18 42 -
19 14 15 80 0.7 19 18 -
20 10 9 75 0.6 20 35 -
21 15 9 80 0.7 21 29 -
22 15 16 75 0.6 22 71 -
23 16 17 80 0.7 23 0 -
24 10 6 40 0.6 24 0 -
25 9 17 65 0.7 25 0 -
26 9 8 40 0.6 Compressor POSET [bar-g]
27 8 17 55 0.6 1 55
28 9 7 45 0.6 2 55
29 8 18 30 0.7 3 55
30 7 18 42 0.6
31 6 7 20 0.7
32 18 19 30 0.6
33 7 20 40 0.7
34 20 19 32 0.6
35 20 21 45 0.7
Tab. A.2.: Input data for the reference network taken from [92]
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B. Combined Simulation of Gas and Electricity
Networks
B.1. Primal Dual Interior Point Method
The extended ED model is solved with the Primal Dual Interior Point Method (PDIPM)
described in [116,132–134] by applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality con-













s. t. G(X) = 0, H(X) + Z = 0, Z > 0 (B.2)
where a set of positive slack variables Z is added to the set of inequality constraints
and for each slack variable Zi a logarithmic barrier function is subtracted from the cost
function. The resulting Lagrangian function of the augmented ED yields:
L(X,Z, λ, µ) = f(X,Z) + λT ·G(X) + µT · [H(X) + Z] (B.3)
where λ and µ are the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the set of equality G(X) and
inequality H(X) constraints, respectively. The optimal solution of the augmented ED
must fulfil the first order optimality conditions (KKT-conditions):
F(X,Z, λ, µ) = [LX , LZ , Lλ, Lµ]T = 0 (B.4)
LX =
∂L
∂X , LZ =
∂L







µ > 0, Z > 0 (B.6)
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which yields a non-linear equation system eq. (B.4) that can be solved for the solution




where the Newton updates for the primal (X,Z) and dual (λ,µ) variables are truncated
as follows, in order to maintain feasibility of the solution:
Xk+1 = Xk + αp ·∆X, Zk+1 = Zk + αp ·∆Z (B.8)





















i = 1... Niq, 0.9 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 (B.11)
The optimal solution obtained for the augmented ED coincides with the optimal solution
of the initial extended ED if the perturbation factor γ converges to zero during the itera-
tive solution process. Thus, at each Newton step k the perturbation factor γ is modified






, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 (B.12)
The Newton-Raphson iterations are completed successfully, if the infinity norm of the
residual vector Fk and the perturbation factor γ are below a specified tolerance f and
γ , respectively. The process is aborted if after a specified number of iterations kmax a
converged solution is not reached. The presented PDIPM is designed for solving large
scale problems with reasonable computation times [116], however, the method belongs to
the class of Newton methods, which are known to be not globally convergent, i.e. con-
vergence depends on the initial guess for the solution variables. However, results show
good convergence [116] if a flat start (δi = 0 & |Ui| = 1) or an available solution from
a previous time step is chosen as an initial guess, as it is done in the algorithm for the
combined gas and electric power system simulation (see Figure 5.2) explained in Section
5.2.2.
The presented PDIPM has been implemented into SAInt using the complex matrix nota-
tions for the derivatives of the Langrangian function (see eq. (B.4)-(B.7)) given in [134].
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The accuracy of the implementated model has been confirmed by benchmarking the re-
sults against the Matlab-based power system library MATPOWER [116]. The results of
an AC-OPF simulation conducted with SAInt and MATPOWER for the sample electric
network are attached as supplementary data to the electronic version of the thesis (see
B.4.4).
B.2. Data for sample gas and electricity network used in
the case study
The gas and electric network data used for the case study are given in Tables B.1-B.7. The
actual native input files used in SAInt for the computations are available in the electronic
version of this thesis and are explained further in B.4.1.
Nr ID Type X Y H pmin pmax Qmax Imax
[-] [-] [m] [bar-g] [bar-g] [ksm3/h] [Msm3]
0 NO.0 CBI -2.5 4.1 50 20 60 600
1 NO.1 -0.1 2 100
2 NO.2 -0.1 1.2 100
3 NO.3 4.4 2 150
4 NO.4 GFPP -3.8 -2 125 30 60 500
5 NO.5 5 2 150
6 NO.6 -6 -2 110
7 NO.7 0 -4.2 75
8 NO.8 IND 5 -3 50 25 60 250
9 NO.9 5 4 40
10 NO.10 LNG -7 -3 70 40 60 375 510
11 NO.11 CGS -7 -1 300 20 60 400
12 NO.12 0 -5 75
13 NO.13 -1.5 -6.5 120
14 NO.14 CGS -0.1 -8.1 215 16 50 250
15 NO.15 CGS -3.1 -8.1 45 30 50 275
16 NO.16 IND 4 5 50 25 50 240
17 NO.17 5 -5 60
18 NO.18 GFPP 5 -5.6 60 30 60
19 NO.19 5 -7 170
20 NO.20 CGS 4 -8.1 160 16
21 NO.21 CBE 6 -8 150 30 60
22 NO.22 UGS 7 -3 140 30 60 120 450
23 NO.23 GFPP 7 4 110 30 60
24 NO.24 CGS 7 0.5 80 16 50
Tab. B.1.: Input data for nodes in gas model
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ID FrNr ToNr D l k
[mm] [km] [mm]
PI.0 0 1 900 100 0.012
PI.1 1 3 900 80 0.012
PI.2 2 4 600 50 0.01
PI.3 4 6 300 20 0.02
PI.4 6 11 300 10 0.0112
PI.5 6 10 300 15 0.01
PI.6 4 7 600 60 0.012
PI.7 5 9 600 30 0.01
PI.8 9 23 600 30 0.012
PI.9 23 24 300 50 0.012
PI.10 24 22 300 40 0.01
PI.11 22 8 600 60 0.09
PI.12 8 17 600 60 0.012
PI.13 12 13 300 40 0.012
PI.14 13 15 300 25 0.012
PI.15 13 14 300 20 0.011
PI.16 14 20 300 50 0.012
PI.17 18 19 600 60 0.01
PI.18 19 20 300 30 0.012
PI.19 19 21 600 40 0.012
PI.20 9 16 300 30 0.012
PI.21 12 17 900 100 0.01
PI.22 17 18 600 50 0.012
Tab. B.2.: Input data for pipelines in gas model
ID FrNr ToNr D ηad ηm f
[mm] [-] [-] [-]
CS.0 1 2 600 0.78 0.9 1
CS.1 3 5 600 0.76 0.88 1
CS.2 7 12 600 0.79 0.91 1
ID PImin POmax Πmax PWDmax Qmaxvol Q
max
[bar-g] [bar-g] [-] [MW] [m3/s] [ksm3/h]
CS.0 25 60 2.5 55 50 1000
CS.1 25 60 2 40 50 1500
CS.2 20 60 2.5 45 50 1000
Tab. B.3.: Input data for compressor stations









LNG terminal NO.10 5 0.208 -0.000723
Tab. B.4.: Input data for electric power supply to LNG terminal
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Nr ID BasekV Vminm Vmaxm λ svt X Y
[kV] [p.u.] [p.u.] [-] [%] [-] [-]
0 GEN.0 135 0.95 1.05 - - -27.6 1.3
1 GEN.1 135 0.95 1.1 - - -24.6 1.3
2 BUS.2 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -27.6 -0.2
3 BUS.3 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -24.6 -0.2
4 BUS.4 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -21.5 1.3
5 BUS.5 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -22 -0.3
6 BUS.6 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -19 1.3
7 BUS.7 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -19.6 -1
8 BUS.8 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -22 -2.1
9 BUS.9 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -18.9 -3.5
10 BUS.10 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -23.2 -2.1
11 BUS.11 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -24.6 -2.5
12 GEN.12 135 0.95 1.1 - - -27.6 -2.5
13 BUS.13 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -26.7 -4.4
14 BUS.14 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -24.6 -5.9
15 BUS.15 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -23.3 -4.5
16 BUS.16 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -21 -4.5
17 BUS.17 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -23.3 -5.9
18 BUS.18 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -21.9 -5.9
19 BUS.19 135 0.95 1.05 10 1 -20.6 -5.9
20 BUS.20 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -17.5 -4.3
21 GEN.21 135 0.95 1.1 - - -18.9 -5.4
22 GEN.22 135 0.95 1.1 - - -24.6 -8.5
23 BUS.23 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -22.1 -8.5
24 BUS.24 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -19.7 -8.5
25 BUS.25 135 0.95 1.05 1 1 -17.7 -8.5
26 GEN.26 135 0.95 1.1 - - -16.4 -4.4
27 BUS.27 135 0.95 1.05 5 1 -18 0.4
28 BUS.28 135 0.95 1.05 5 1 -15.1 -3.8
29 BUS.29 135 0.95 1.05 5 1 -15.6 -4.9
Tab. B.5.: Input data for buses in power network. Priority factor λ is chosen such that
buses connected to LDSs are less likely to be affected by load shedding than
buses connected to INDs and CBEs.
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ID FrNr ToNr R X b Smax
[p.u.] [p.u.] [p.u.] [MVA]
LINE.0 0 1 0.02 0.06 0.03 100
LINE.1 0 2 0.05 0.19 0.02 100
LINE.2 1 3 0.06 0.17 0.02 100
LINE.3 2 3 0.01 0.04 0 100
LINE.4 1 4 0.05 0.2 0.02 100
LINE.5 1 5 0.06 0.18 0.02 100
LINE.6 3 5 0.01 0.04 0 100
LINE.7 4 6 0.05 0.12 0.01 100
LINE.8 5 6 0.03 0.08 0.01 100
LINE.9 5 7 0.01 0.04 0 100
LINE.10 5 8 0 0.21 0 100
LINE.11 5 9 0 0.56 0 100
LINE.12 8 10 0 0.21 0 100
LINE.13 8 9 0 0.11 0 100
LINE.14 3 11 0 0.26 0 100
LINE.15 11 12 0 0.14 0 100
LINE.16 11 13 0.12 0.26 0 100
LINE.17 11 14 0.07 0.13 0 100
LINE.18 11 15 0.09 0.2 0 100
LINE.19 13 14 0.22 0.2 0 100
LINE.20 15 16 0.08 0.19 0 100
LINE.21 14 17 0.11 0.22 0 100
LINE.22 17 18 0.06 0.13 0 100
LINE.23 18 19 0.03 0.07 0 100
LINE.24 9 19 0.09 0.21 0 100
LINE.25 9 16 0.03 0.08 0 100
LINE.26 9 20 0.03 0.07 0 100
LINE.27 9 21 0.07 0.15 0 100
LINE.28 20 21 0.01 0.02 0 100
LINE.29 14 22 0.1 0.2 0 100
LINE.30 21 23 0.12 0.18 0 100
LINE.31 22 23 0.13 0.27 0 100
LINE.32 23 24 0.19 0.33 0 100
LINE.33 24 25 0.25 0.38 0 100
LINE.34 24 26 0.11 0.21 0 100
LINE.35 27 26 0 0.4 0 100
LINE.36 26 28 0.22 0.42 0 100
LINE.37 26 29 0.32 0.6 0 100
LINE.38 28 29 0.24 0.45 0 100
LINE.39 7 27 0.06 0.2 0.02 100
LINE.40 5 27 0.02 0.06 0.01 100
Tab. B.6.: Input data for transmission lines in power network












[MW] [MW] [MVAr] [MVAr] [MW/min] [h] [h]
GEN.0 60 15 48 -36 3 2 4
GEN.1 100 25 80 -60 2.5 2 8
GEN.12 50 12.5 40 -30 7.5 1/4 1/2
GEN.21 60 15 48 -36 3 2 4
GEN.22 60 15 48 -36 3 3 20
GEN.26 115 28.75 92 -69 5.75 3 20


















GEN.0 65 3.75 0.06 22.3590 -0.5607 0.0047
GEN.1 55 1.125 0.01 - - -
GEN.12 60 4.5 0.04 56.0000 -1.8286 0.0183
GEN.21 50 3.75 0.06 22.3590 -0.5607 0.0047
GEN.22 55 1.05 0.003 - - -
GEN.26 30 1.1 0.01 - - -
Tab. B.7.: Input data for generation units in power model
B.3. Simulation results for combined steady state
simulation
The results for the combined steady state simulation are given in Tables B.8-B.11.
B.4. Description of supplementary data available in the
electronic version
All supplementary files are available for download online at http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0306261917307018. In the following sections, we give a de-
scription of the different files:
B.4.1. SAInt Project files
The input files provided as supplementary data to the electronic version of this thesis
include all input data used for the network and for the case studies. All files are original
SAInt input files and are provided in xml format. A SAInt-Project is generally divided
into the following four types of files:
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ID CTRL CTRLV Q p
[ksm3/h] [bar-g]
NO.0 PSET 50 [bar-g] -531.877 50
NO.1 OFF 0 45.734
NO.2 OFF 0 60
NO.3 OFF 0 45.319
NO.4 QSET 6.118 [ksm3/h] 6.118 52.325
NO.5 OFF 0 60
NO.6 OFF 0 56.013
NO.7 OFF 0 36.694
NO.8 QSET 250 [ksm3/h] 250 55.364
NO.9 OFF 0 60.078
NO.10 PSET 60 [bar-g] -87.931 60
NO.11 QSET 20 [ksm3/h] 20 54.986
NO.12 OFF 0 60
NO.13 OFF 0 52.674
NO.14 QSET 40 [ksm3/h] 40 50.93
NO.15 QSET 30 [ksm3/h] 30 52.1
NO.16 QSET 50 [ksm3/h] 50 57.483
NO.17 OFF 0 58.319
NO.18 QSET 6.403 [ksm3/h] 6.403 56.994
NO.19 OFF 0 54.99
NO.20 QSET 60 [ksm3/h] 60 51.155
NO.21 QSET 100 [ksm3/h] 100 54.653
NO.22 PSET 55 [bar-g] -92.713 55
NO.23 QSET 0 [ksm3/h] 0 59.538
NO.24 QSET 150 [ksm3/h] 150 47.908
Tab. B.8.: Nodal control set points and results for initial combined steady state compu-
tation. Negative Q means gas supply, positive Q gas offtake.
ID CTRL CTRLV Q PI PO PWD
[ksm3/h] [bar-g] [bar-g] [MW]
CS.0 POSET 60 [bar-g] 401.667 45.734 60 4.171
CS.1 POSET 60 [bar-g] 130.21 45.319 60 1.47
CS.2 POSET 60 [bar-g] 463.48 36.694 60 8.886
Tab. B.9.: Compressor stations control set points and results for initial combined steady
state computation.
1. SAInt-Network files ( with extensions *.net, *.enet):
Network files contain all topological information of the individual network and its
static properties, which typically do not change in the course of a simulation (e.g.
transmission line and pipeline properties). Each network in a project has its own
file and the network type is expressed by the its file extension (e.g. *.net for gas
network, *.enet for electric network).
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ID δ Vm Vm PD PDGAS QD
[◦] [kV] [p.u.] [MW] [MW] [MVAr]
GEN.0 0 141.75 1.05 0 0 0
GEN.1 0.115 142.543 1.056 0 0 0
BUS.2 -2.359 138.707 1.027 5 0 1.2
BUS.3 -2.762 138.185 1.024 0 0 0
BUS.4 -1.87 139.741 1.035 0 0 0
BUS.5 -3.224 137.514 1.019 0 0 0
BUS.6 -2.999 137.325 1.017 12 4.171 10.9
BUS.7 -3.578 136.082 1.008 25 1.47 30
BUS.8 -6.962 137.015 1.015 0 0 0
BUS.9 -7.457 137.343 1.017 0 0 0
BUS.10 -9.78 136.358 1.01 24 0 1.75
BUS.11 -7.241 136.759 1.013 0 0 0
GEN.12 -7.241 136.759 1.013 0 0 0
BUS.13 -9.616 132.592 0.982 24 8.053 1.6
BUS.14 -7.707 136.635 1.012 7 8.886 2.5
BUS.15 -8.11 135.577 1.004 9 0 1.8
BUS.16 -8.056 135.955 1.007 15 0 5.8
BUS.17 -9.796 133.445 0.988 10 0 0.9
BUS.18 -10.337 132.718 0.983 8 0 3.4
BUS.19 -10.359 133.009 0.985 25 0 0.7
BUS.20 -7.151 138.57 1.026 16 0 11.2
GEN.21 -6.959 139.448 1.033 0 0 0
GEN.22 -3.397 144.369 1.069 0 0 0
BUS.23 -5.347 141.75 1.05 0 0 0
BUS.24 -4.871 141.75 1.05 0 0 0
BUS.25 -11.06 129.103 0.956 30 0 2.3
GEN.26 -1.528 148.206 1.098 0 0 0
BUS.27 -3.251 138.546 1.026 0 0 0
BUS.28 -9.218 135.13 1.001 30 0 0.9
BUS.29 -10.654 132.639 0.983 35 0 1.9
Tab. B.10.: Results for power system buses for initial combined steady state simulation
ID PG QG Q COST HR ηT
[MW] [MVAr] [ksm3/h] [AC] [MJ/kWh] [-]
GEN.0 18.63 -4.549 6.118 155.686 13.535 0.266
GEN.1 100 28.022 0 267.5 - -
GEN.12 0 0 0 60 - -
GEN.21 20.676 27.522 6.403 153.183 12.764 0.282
GEN.22 60 10.36 0 128.8 - -
GEN.26 115 40.635 0 288.75 - -
Tab. B.11.: Results for power system generation units for initial combined steady state
simulation
2. SAInt-Scenario files (with extensions *.sce, *.esce):
For each network file, we can define an unlimited number of scenarios or cases,
which include all boundary conditions, conditional expressions, load profiles etc..
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Each scenario file is associated to a network (file). The type of network a scenario
is connected to is expressed by its file extension, analogous to the network file
extensions (e.g. *.sce for gas network, *.esce for electric network).
3. SAInt-State or condition files (with extensions *.con, *.econ):
The network and scenario files are both input files generated by SAInt. The state
or condition files, in contrast, are result files generated after each simulation run.
The state file contains the solution for all state variables for the terminal state of
a simulation. It can be regarded as a snapshot of the network at the end of the
simulation. The state file is needed as a initial state of the network for computing a
(combined) dynamic simulation. Each state file is associated to a scenario (file). The
type of network a state is connected to is expressed by its file extension, analogous
to the network file extensions (e.g. *.con for gas network state file, *.econ for electric
network state file).
4. and SAInt-Solution files (with extensions *.sol, *.esol):
The simulation results for a scenario are saved in a solution file. The result of a
dynamic simulation is a sequence of network states (snapshots) for each simulation
time step. To limit the size of the solution files the result for each state contains only
fundamental parameters that cannot be calculated or derived from a combination
of other parameters such as nodal gas pressure, voltage angle and magnitude. The
type of network a solution file is connected to is expressed by its file extension,
analogous to the network file extensions (e.g. *.sol for gas network solution file,
*.esol for electric network solution file).
In the following, we list all network, scenario, state and solution files used for the case
study and provided as supplementary data and give a short description of their content:
1. GNET25.net - Gas network file for sample 25 Node gas network
2. ENET30.enet - Electric network file for sample 30 Bus IEEE power network
3. CMBSTEOPF.sce - Gas network scenario file for the combined steady state scenario
4. CMBSTEOPF.esce - Electric network scenario file for the combined steady state
scenario
5. CMBSTEOPF.con - Gas network state file for the combined steady state scenario
6. CMBSTEOPF.econ - Electric network state file for the combined steady state sce-
nario
7. Case0.sce - Gas network scenario file for the combined dynamic scenario for case 0
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8. Case0.esce - Electric network scenario file for the combined dynamic scenario for
case 0
9. Case0.sol - Gas network solution file for the combined dynamic scenario for case 0
10. Case0.esol - Electric network solution file for the combined dynamic scenario for
case 0
11. Case1.sce - Gas network scenario file for the combined dynamic scenario for case 1
12. Case1.esce - Electric network scenario file for the combined dynamic scenario for
case 1
13. Case1.sol - Gas network solution file for the combined dynamic scenario for case 1
14. Case1.esol - Electric network scenario file for the combined dynamic scenario for
case 1
15. Case2.sce - Gas network scenario file for the combined dynamic scenario for case 2
16. Case2.esce - Electric network scenario file for the combined dynamic scenario for
case 2
17. Case2.sol - Gas network solution file for the combined dynamic scenario for case 2
18. Case2.esol - Electric network solution file for the combined dynamic scenario for
case 2
B.4.2. Animation videos for the case studies generated with SAInt
The animation videos for the three cases were generated by SAInt and a provided as
animated GIF-files, which can be played in any web browser. The videos show the time
evolution of the state variables, the direction of gas flow and electric currents, and the
state changes of controlled facilities in the gas and power system. The description of the
different symbols in the video are given in the caption of Figure 5.7. The digital clock in
the bottom mid-section indicates the current simulation time.
B.4.3. Simulation protocol for the case studies generated with SAInt
The simulation protocols were exported from the SAInt-log window and contain informa-
tion on the total simulation time, the number of iterations in the successive linearisation
loop, time integration loop, and the CCH-loop (as explained in section 5.2.2 and the flow
204 B. Combined Simulation of Gas and Electricity Networks
chart depicted in Figure 5.2), the residual for the gas and power system equations and
the residual for the value of the coupling equations for the last two consecutive steps of
the successive linearisation loop. Furthermore, the protocol contains a number of action
implemented by the solver to avoid constraints violations in the gas network.
B.4.4. Comparison between SAInt & MATPOWER [134] for
AC-OPF
The comparison between SAInt and MATPOWER were conducted for a single AC-OPF
simulation for the sample electric network used in the case study. The input data and
results obtained with SAInt are included in the Excel file ComparisonSAInt.xls while the
ones for MATPOWER are given in ComparisonMatpowerResult.log. A comparison of the
results confirms the accuracy of the AC-OPF model implemented into SAInt.
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The integration of renewable energy sources (RES) into existing energy supply systems
has increased the coupling between different critical energy infrastructures. The operation
of natural gas and electricity transmission networks, for instance, is increasingly interde-
pendent, due to a growing use of natural gas fired generators in the electricity system and
the use of electric driven compressor stations in the gas system. Moreover, new evolving
technologies such as power to gas (P2G) are expected to further increase the coupling
between both energy vectors.
Gas fired power plants (GFPP) are electricity producers in power systems and at the same
time gas consumers in natural gas networks. Due to their flexibility, manoeuvrability
and short response time, they are mainly used as peak shavers and as a backup for
variable and intermittent RES. Gas fired generators need a certain minimum delivery gas
pressure in order to operate. The fuel offtake from gas pipeline networks may be subject
to curtailments if the desired offtake would violate the minimum delivery pressure limits.
In the worst case, these curtailments may lead to a complete shut down of the GFPP,
which in turn may affect the operation of the electricity system, due to reductions in
total generation capacity. Thus, it is extremely important to investigate how the pressure
constraints in the gas system may affect the operation of gas generators in the electricity
system.
Electric driven compressor stations, in contrast, use electricity from the power grid to
increase the downstream gas pressure for gas transportation in pipelines and for meeting
contracted delivery pressures at offtake points. They are particularly attractive in situa-
tions, where the use of conventional gas turbines may be limited by emission restrictions
or other environmental regulations. Furthermore, electric drivers have higher mechanical
efficiencies, lower operating and maintenance costs and are more flexible and controllable
than conventional gas turbines.
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The growing interdependence between gas and electricity systems is connected to chal-
lenges concerning security of energy supply, i.e. the uninterrupted supply of energy to
customers, particularly, in difficult climatic conditions and in the event of an unexpected
disruption. A disruption in one energy system may cascade to the other system and even
back to the system where it originated. For instance, a rapid increase in power genera-
tion from a GFPP due to loss of renewable generation may be connected to an increase
in fuel gas offtake from the gas grid, which in turn may cause a pressure reduction in
the gas system. This pressure reduction may be compensated for by an electric driven
compressor station, which requires additional power offtake from the electricity network.
The additional power offtake, again, will have to be balanced by the power generation
units including GFPPs, by increasing the power output. This cycle may continue until an
equilibrium state of the coupled energy system is reached.
The above example demonstrates the importance of investigating and understanding the
interactions between gas and electricity systems, how they may affect the operation of
the two systems and how to proactively approach the bottlenecks and challenges that
may emerge. Traditionally, gas and electric power systems were operated independently,
due to the relatively weak coupling between both infrastructures, thus, most mathemat-
ical models examine the two systems individually without paying much attention to the
interactions between them. However, the growing interdependence between both energy
systems suggests the need for simulation models that are capable of examining both sys-
tems in an integrated manner considering the physical equations describing the operation
and interactions between the two systems.
Research Questions
In this thesis, simulation models for analysing the operation and interdependencies be-
tween interconnected natural gas and electricity transmission networks in terms of security
of energy supply are developed. The developed simulation models are implemented into
a novel simulation tool named SAInt - Scenario Analysis Interface for Energy Systems.
SAInt is intended to support gas and power transmission system operators, regulatory
agencies, governments, energy consultants and researchers, to examine the interactions
between gas and electric power systems and to assess the impact of disruptions on security
of supply in integrated gas and electric power systems. The tool can be used to answer
the main research questions of this thesis, namely, how to quantify the consequences of
disruption events originating in gas and/or electricity transmission networks and how to
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implement and compare the effectiveness of countermeasures to mitigate the impact of
these undesired events.
Answering these questions, requires the development of mathematical models, that reflect
the physical behaviour and constraints of the gas and electricity system and the coupling
between both energy vectors.
Methodology
When modelling the interdependencies between gas and electricity systems, there are sev-
eral aspects to be considered mainly due to the differences in the structure and physical
characterisitcs of both systems. For instance, the failure response of both infrastructures is
significantly different. A technical failure in the power system can result in an immediate
loss of service from a generation plant or transmission line. Under some extreme condi-
tions, this can propagate and eventually result in loss of service to electric customers due
to cascading effects. On the contrary, most technical failures in gas systems (e.g. pipeline
rupture, failure in compressor station or storage facilities etc.) result in a locally or region-
ally reduced network capacity rather than an entire loss of service to gas consumers [13].
This capacity reduction might result in curtailments of gas delivery to customers accord-
ing to their priority level. Another important distinction between the two systems is the
different dynamic behaviour. Electricity travels almost instantaneously and cannot be
stored economically in large quantities in current power systems. In case of disruptions,
the response time of the power system is quite small and the transmission line flows can
be described by a steady-state approach. On the contrary, the gas flow in pipelines is
a much slower process, with gas velocities below 15 m/s, resulting in a longer response
time in case of disruptions. In particular, high-pressure transmission pipelines have much
slower dynamics due to the large volumes of gas stored in pipelines. This quantity of gas
cannot be neglected when simulating the dynamics in gas transmission systems; in fact
the linepack in the pipeline increases the flexibility of the gas system to react to short
term fluctuations in demand and supply. This information is important especially in the
modelling stage, since different timing of the systems need to be considered during the
simulation process.
Considering these aspects the following approach is adopted for developing the combined
simulation model for assessing security of supply in interconnected gas and electricity
transmission networks. Firstly, the complete models for the individual energy systems is
developed, which includes sub models of the most important facilities and components,
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that may play a vital role in the event of a disruption. Secondly, the individual models
are integrated by identifying and modelling the most important interconnections between
the two systems. Finally, parameters for quantifying the consequences of disruptions on
security of supply are elaborated and applied to the integrated model to examine the im-
pact of disruptions and the effectiveness of countermeasures to mitigate the consequences
of such undesired events.
Gas System Model
The gas system model includes sub models for pipelines, compressor stations, regula-
tor stations, valves, underground gas storage facilities, LNG regasification terminals and
other entry and exit stations.
The pipeline model is based on the isothermal, one dimensional, transient hydraulic equa-
tions describing the gas flow in pipelines. It considers the basic physical properties of trans-
port pipelines such as pressure drop, friction, gravity and inertia. The transient pipeline
model is able to capture the pressure changes at entry and exit points of pipelines as well
as the changes in linepack, i.e. the quantity of gas stored in pipelines at any instant of
time.
Furthermore, the models for compressor stations and regulator stations consider the con-
trol modes and constraints that are inherently present in such automatic controlled facili-
ties. The constraints are modelled as generic constraints reflecting the overall limits of all
units and components in the respective facility. Some of the constraints that are consid-
ered are, for instance, the maximum discharge pressure, the minimum suction pressure,
the maximum shaft and driver power and the maximum volumetric and mass flow rate
constraints. The modelling of constraints are extremely important for security of supply
studies, since these limits define whether the system may be able to cope with a disrup-
tion or not. Furthermore, the open or closed state of valve stations are also modelled as
control modes.
In addition, the model for underground gas storage facilities considers the withdrawal
and injection process as well as the available working gas inventory in the reservoir. The
constraints of a storage facility is modelled by its storage envelope, which describes the
operating region of the facility in terms of withdrawal/injection rate and working gas in-
ventory. Different storage types, such as depleted gas fields, salt cavern or aquifer storages
can be modelled by assigning the respective parameters for the storage envelope.
Moreover, the model for LNG regasification terminals takes the maximum regasification
rate as well as the working gas inventory into account. Moreover, the arrival of LNG
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vessels to the terminal can be me modelled and scheduled considering the time and size
of arriving vessels and the vessel discharge rate for relocating the LNG from the vessel to
the storage tanks at the terminal. LNG regasification terminals as well as underground
gas storage facilities can be assigned a flow rate or pressure control, which is respected as
long as other facility constraints are not violated.
Finally, the model for exit and entry stations, such as production fields, GFPPs, city gate
stations (CGS), cross border import /export stations, which are typically equipped with
control devices such as control valves and meters, respects the maximum and minimum
delivery pressure limits as well as the maximum supply limits, respectively. Each entry
or exit station can be assigned a pressure or flow rate control, which is respected as long
as constraints are not violated.
The individual sub models for each gas system facility are interconnected to a total gas
system model by applying the integral form of the continuity equation, which yields
a system of non-linear equations, which can be linearised and solved for a discretised
spatio-temporal simulation grid using an implicit time integration method.
Development of a Simulation Tool
The gas simulation model is implemented into a simulation tool named SAInt, which
enables the visualization of the gas network topology, the set up of scenarios, the exe-
cution of simulation models and the visualization of simulation results. SAInt is divided
into two separate modules, namely, SAInt-API (Application Programming Interface) and
SAInt-GUI (Graphical User Interface). The API, is the main library of the software and
contains all solvers and classes for instantiating the different objects comprising the gas
system model (nodes, pipes, compressors etc.). The API is independent of the GUI and
can be used separately in other environments supporting .NET libraries (e.g. MS Excel,
Visual Studio, IronPython etc.). SAInt-GUI is the graphical interface, which enables a
visual communication between the API and the user. The GUI uses the classes and solvers
provided by the API to perform the simulation tasks requested by the user.
Electricity System Model
The electric power system model is based on steady state AC-optimal power flow (AC-
OPF) and includes sub models for the most important power system facilities such as
transmission lines, transformers, buses, generation units, loads as well as shunt capacitors
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and reactors. The basic AC-OPF model considers the active and reactive power balance
for the entire network as well as the constraints of power system components such as
the thermal capacity limits of transmission lines, the reactive power capability curves of
generation units and the voltage limits at buses.
The basic AC-OPF model is extended by a model for dispatchable power system loads
and transitional constraints, such as the maximum ramp rate and the start-up and shut-
down times of generation units. The model for dispatchable power system loads enables
the curtailment of power system loads based on predefined priority levels assigned to each
power system customer.
Coupling of Gas and Electricity Systems
The gas and power system model are interconnected at gas fired power plants, electric
driven compressor stations and LNG regasification terminals. Gas fired power plants rep-
resent generation units in the power system model and at the same time offtake points in
the gas system. The energy transfer between both networks is described by a quadratic
heat rate function and the the gross calorific value of the extracted fuel gas. Electric driven
compressor stations, in contrats, extract electric power from a load bus to increase the
gas pressure for transportation. The extracted load is equivalent to the required driver
power for compressing a quantity of natural gas from a given upstream pressure to a
desired downstream pressure. The coupling at LNG regasification terminals is described
by a quadratic function which yields the active power demand of the LNG terminal in
respect to the regasification rate of the terminal.
Co-Simulation Framework for assessing Security of
Supply
The transient gas simulation model, the basic AC-OPF model for electric power system
and the coupling equations describing their physical interlink are integrated to develop a
co-simulation framework for assessing security of supply in integrated gas and electricity
transmission network. The co-simulation framework is divided into two separate simu-
lation environments, namely, the gas system simulator (SAInt) and the power system
simulator (MATPOWER). The communication and data exchange between SAInt and
MATPOWER is established through an interface implemented into SAInt that makes
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use of the Matlab Automation Server to execute Matlab scripts, to exchange input and
output data with Matlab workspace variables and to enable the visualisation of power
system topologies and simulation results. Furthermore, the co-simulation interface is re-
sponsible for respecting the coupling equations between both simulation models.
The co-simulation framework is applied to perform a case study on a realistic combined
gas and power system network of an European region. The model application is divided
into three different scenarios, where different gas and power system contingencies are
studied. In the first scenario, the normal operation of the combined system with no dis-
ruptions is studied and the results are compared to the second scenario with gas side
disruptions and the third scenario with power side disruptions.
The simulation results demonstrate, how disruptions triggered in one system propagate
to the other system. In the second scenario, for instance, three major gas supply stations
are disrupted and as a result a number of GFPPs are shut-down due to insufficient fuel
gas pressure. This contingency propagates further to other buses in the power system,
where load shedding is implemented in order to maintain the voltage levels above the
minimum voltage threshold. Similar observations are made in scenario 2, where a drastic
reduction in renewable energy generation together with a shut-down of a large power plant
triggered a large increase in gas demand of GFPPs, leading to a rapid pressure drop in
the gas network and the subsequent shut-down of GFPPs. Eventually, this circumstance
increased the stress on the power system leading to minimum bus voltage violations in a
couple of buses, which is remedied by applying load shedding at the affected buses.
Combined Simulation of Gas and Electricity Networks
The co-simulation framework, was able to capture the propagation of disruptions from
one energy system to the other, however, there were a number of aspects that could not
be reflected appropriately due to the nature of the model.
Firstly, the coupling between the two energy systems is simulated in two different simu-
lation time frames, thus, there is no immediate feedback from one system as a result of
a disruption in the other system. The power system is simulated for one operating day
(24 hours) and the results computed for the gas fired generators are used for calculating
the corresponding fuel gas offtakes in the gas system. The gas offtakes, in turn, are used
to simulate the gas system and to check if the gas system can operate under these condi-
tions in terms of pressure limits at delivery points. If pressure limits are violated the gas
system curtails the computed fuel offtakes from the power system and the power system
is simulated again using the fuel offtake constraints computed by the gas system and
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additional power requirements of electric driven compressors and LNG terminals. The
fuel offtake constraints computed by the gas system reduces the generation capacities in
the power system, thus, power system loads are curtailed in order to balance the system.
The above iteration is repeated until a feasible solution for both systems is found. In re-
ality the changes in one system will have immediate effect on the physical properties (e.g.
pressures, linepack, voltages, supply and demand), which may cascade back to the system
where it originated. However, these cascading effects cannot be captured appropriately
by a co-simulation concept, where the time frames between both systems are inherently
different.
Secondly, the curtailment of power system loads are directly applied to buses that are
affected by voltage violations based on a predefined rule. Priority levels between different
power system customers are not considered, which may have an effect on the results.
Finally, time transitional constraints of power system generators in terms of maximum
ramp rates, start-up and shut down times are neglected, which may restrict the available
generation capacities to balance the power system loads.
To overcome these deficiencies, a combined quasi-dynamic simulation model is developed
and implemented into the simulation tool SAInt. The combined simulation model con-
sists of the transient gas system model, the extended AC-OPF model and the coupling
equations. The three model elements are integrated into one combined model, which is
solved in a single simulation time frame and environment.
Furthermore, the two energy networks can interact with each other through conditional
control mode definitions. Thus, the control logic of gas fired generators in the power
system model could be designed based on the conditions in the gas system model. For
instance, the start up and shut down of a gas fired power plant could be scheduled based
on the pressure and linepack level in a specific section in the gas network model.
In order to quantify the impact of contingencies on security of supply, and to compare
the effectiveness of different countermeasures to mitigate the impacts of disruptions on
security of supply a number of security of supply parameters are defined, such as energy
not supplied, percentage of energy not supplied and survival time.
The capabilities of the combined simulation model are demonstrated in a case study
of a sample combined gas and power system network. The case study consists of three
scenarios with gas and power side contingencies as well as mitigation measures to react
to these disruptions.
In the first scenario, the operation of a gas generator is simulated, which serves as reserve
and back up for variable and intermittent power generation from a wind turbine. In the
second scenario a disruption in a gas compressor station is simulated which leads to
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curtailments in the gas system and eventually to a delayed start up of the back up gas
generator due to pressure restrictions in the gas system. The delayed start up of the gas
generator caused a reduced generation capacity in the power system, which eventually
leads to load curtailments in the power system based on a predefined priority level for
each load bus. The impacts on security of supply in both energy systems are compared
using the security of supply parameters. In terms of energy not supplied to customers,
the impact of the disruption is higher for the gas system than for the power system.
However, in terms of the ratio between energy not supplied and total scheduled energy
supply (i.e. percentage of energy not supplied) the impact of the disruption is higher for
the power system than for the gas system. Finally, in the last scenario the effectiveness of
a countermeasure to mitigate the impact of the disruption in the gas compressor station
is examined. The countermeasure involves the increase of the withdrawal rate from a
neighbouring underground storage facility to maximum capacity if the linepack in the
affected region goes below a specific value. Simulation results indicated a reduction of the
impact on security of supply as a result of the implementation of the countermeasure.
Conclusion
The models and tools developed in this thesis demonstrate the importance of considering
the interdependencies between gas and electricity systems when assessing the reliability of
critical energy infrastructures. The information provided by the simulation models can be
used to improve the coordination between gas and power system operators. For instance,
gas and power system operators may develop strategies to coordinate and react to different
contingencies affecting the reliability of the two systems. The developed strategies can be
assessed using the simulation models and tools presented in this thesis to compare the
effectiveness of different strategies and their potential vulnerabilities and bottlenecks. The
estimation of consequences on security of supply computed by the developed models can
also be used to perform a risk assessment of combined gas and power systems, which would
enable the detection of potential risks affecting security of energy supply. The results from
the risk assessment can be used to develop preventive action plans and emergency plans,
which can also be tested using the simulation model.
Furthermore, the developed models can be used to address future research questions in the
area of gas and power system interdependencies. One potential future research question
concerns the integration and operation of P2G facilities in combined gas and electricity
systems and how these facilities may impact the operation of the gas system if different





De integratie van duurzame energie in bestaande energiesystemen vergroot de koppeling
tussen die energiesystemen. Het besturen van gas- en elektriciteitsnetwerken is in toene-
mende mate onderling afhankelijk. Dit komt door het gebruik van gas gestookte centrales
in elektriciteitsnetwerken en elektrisch aangedreven compressoren in gasnetwerken. Boven-
dien zullen nieuw opkomende technologieën zoals Power-to-Gas de koppeling tussen de
energie netwerken verder vergroten.
Een gascentrale is enerzijds een bron van energie in het elektriciteitsnetwerk en anderzi-
jds een gasleverantie in het gasnetwerk. Dankzij de flexibiliteit, manoeuvreerbaarheid en
snelle inzetbaarheid worden gascentrales vooral gebruikt voor piekafvlakking en intermit-
terende duurzame energie bronnen.
Gascentrales hebben een minimale druk nodig om te kunnen functioneren. Als de druk
van het brandstofafnamepunt in het gasnetwerk onder een minimum waarde dreigt te
komen kan de levering gekort worden. In het ergste geval kan dit leiden tot afschakeling
van de gascentrale, hetgeen van invloed is op de totale stroomvoorziening van een elek-
triciteitsnetwerk. Het is dus van groot belang te onderzoeken hoe de drukgrenzen in het
gasnetwerk de besturing van gascentrales in het elektriciteitsnetwerk beïnvloeden.
Omgekeerd gebruiken elektrisch aangedreven compressoren vermogen van het elektriciteit-
snetwerk om ten behoeve van gastransport de druk in leidingen op niveau te houden,
teneinde tegemoet te komen aan de minimale druk op afleverpunten. Elektrisch aange-
dreven compressoren zijn vooral van belang als het gebruik van conventionele gas tur-
bines beperkt is vanwege milieumaatregelen. Bovendien hebben elektrisch aangedreven
compressoren een hoger mechanisch rendement, lagere gebruiks- en onderhoudskosten en
zijn flexibeler en eenvoudiger te besturen dan conventionele gas turbines.
De groeiende onderlinge afhankelijkheid van gas- en elektriciteitsnetwerken staat in ver-
band met energie leveringszekerheid: de ononderbroken levering van energie aan gebruik-
ers, vooral onder moeilijke klimaatomstandigheden en onverwachte onderbrekingen. Een
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onderbreking in één energie systeem kan een domino effect hebben in het andere systeem
en weer terug slaan op het systeem waar het begon.
Als een duurzame energiebron plotselinge uitvalt moet een gasgenerator snel ingezet wor-
den met als gevolg toename van een brandstofvraag in het gasnetwerk met een er bij
horende druk verlaging. Als deze lagere druk gecompenseerd wordt door een elektrisch
aangedreven compressor vergt dit weer extra vermogen van het elektriciteitsnetwerk. Deze
additionele vermogensvraag moet onder andere gecompenseerd worden door extra gasgen-
eratoren. Deze cirkelgang kan doorgaan totdat een evenwichtsituatie van het gekoppelde
systeem is bereikt.
Bovenstaand voorbeeld laat zien dat het belangrijk is om de interactie tussen gas- en
elektriciteitsystemen te onderzoeken en te begrijpen, hoe zij de besturing van beide syste-
men beïnvloeden en hoe knelpunten benaderd moeten worden. Tot nu toe werden gas en
elektriciteitsystemen onafhankelijk van elkaar gestuurd hetgeen mogelijk was omdat beide
systemen slechts zwak aan elkaar gekoppeld waren. Dit gold ook voor de mathematische
modellen. Door de groeiende onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen beide energie systemen
groeit de noodzaak tot het gebruik van modellen waarmee beide systemen in een geïn-
trigeerde manier beschouwd kunnen worden en waaraan de natuurkundige vergelijkingen
van beide systemen ten grondslag liggen.
Onderzoeksvraag
Voor dit proefschrift zijn modellen ontwikkeld waarmee het sturen en de onderlinge
afhankelijkheid van aardgas- en elektriciteitstransportnetwerken geanalyseerd kunnen
worden in termen van leveringszekerheid. De ontwikkelde simulatie modellen zijn geïm-
plementeerd in een nieuw simulatie programma, genaamd SAInt – Scenario Analysis
Interface for Energy Systems. SAInt is bedoeld ter ondersteuning van gas- en elek-
triciteitstransportbedrijven, toezichthouders van de energiemarkt, energieconsultanten
en -onderzoekers; teneinde de interactie tussen gas- en elektriciteitsnetwerken en de im-
pact van verstoring van de leveringszekerheid in geïntegreerde systemen te kunnen on-
derzoeken. SAInt kan gebruikt worden om de belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen van dit
proefschrift te beantwoorden, namelijk: hoe ernstig is een verstoring in het gas en/of het
elektriciteit transport systeem en hoe effectief zijn de maatregelen om de impact van deze
verstoringen te verhelpen.
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Het beantwoorden van deze vragen vereist de ontwikkeling van wiskundige modellen die
het natuurkundige gedrag en de beperkingen van het gas- en elektriciteitsysteem weer-
spiegelen en de koppeling gestalte geven.
Methodologie
Bij het modelleren van de onderlinge afhankelijkheden van gas- en elektriciteitsystemen,
zijn er verschillende aspecten waarmee rekening gehouden moet worden, vooral vanwege
de verschillen in de structuur en de natuurkundige eigenschappen van beide systemen. De
manier waarop beide systemen op fouten reageren is significant verschillend. Een tech-
nische fout in een elektriciteitssysteem kan resulteren in een uitvallen van een generator
of elektriciteitsleiding. In extreme omstandigheden kan dit zelfs leiden tot leveringsprob-
lemen vanwege domino effect [13]. Technische fouten in gas-systemen daarentegen (b.v.
leiding breuk, storing bij compressorstation of berging) resulteren in locale of regionale
reductie van de netwerkcapaciteit en niet tot een volledige uitval. Deze capaciteitsreduc-
tie kan leiden tot een vermindering van gas levering op bases van een prioriteit. Een
ander verschil tussen beide systemen is het dynamisch gedrag. Het transport van elek-
triciteit is instantaan en elektrische energie kan in de huidige generatie niet op grote
schaal worden opgeslagen. Bij een onderbreking reageert een elektriciteitsysteem direct
en kan de nieuwe situatie benaderd worden door een stabiele toestand. De gasstroom in
leidingen, met snelheden lager dan 15 m/s, is daarentegen een veel langzamer proces het-
geen bij een verstoring tot een langere reactietijd leidt. Voor hogedruktransportleidingen
geldt dat zeker vanwege het grote volume aan gas dat in de leidingen opgeslagen is. Deze
hoeveelheid gas kan niet verwaarloosd worden als een gastransportsysteem dynamisch
gesimuleerd wordt; in feite vergroot de leidingbuffer de flexibiliteit van het gastransport-
systeem om te kunnen reageren op korte fluctuaties in vraag en aanbod. Deze informatie
is belangrijk bij het modelleren, omdat de verschillen in dynamische respons meegenomen
moeten worden in het simulatie proces.
Om tot een gecombineerd simulatiemodel te komen waarmee de leveringszekerheid van
gekoppelde gas- en elektriciteitstransportnetwerken bepaald kan worden is met in acht
name van het voorgaande de volgende benadering gevolgd. Eerst zijn de complete mod-
ellen voor de individuele energie systemen ontwikkeld met inbegrip van de deel modellen
van de componenten die een belangrijke rol spelen bij uitval. Vervolgens zijn de indi-
viduele modellen geïntegreerd door de koppelingen tussen beide systemen vorm te geven.
Tenslotte worden in het geïntegreerde model verstoringen in het aanbod aangebracht om
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de invloed van deze verstoringen en het effect van maatregelen om het effect van de
verstoringen te lenigen, te onderzoeken.
Gas-systeem model
Het gas-systeem model bevat deelmodellen voor leidingen, compressorstations, re-
duceerstations, afsluiters, ondergrondse berging, LNG-hervergassingsinstallatie en an-
dere voeding- en leveringstations. Het pijpleiding model is gebaseerd op de isotherme,
één dimensionale dynamisch hydraulische vergelijking die de gasstroom in pijpleidingen
beschrijft. Het betreft de basis natuurkundige eigenschappen van gastransport pijpleidin-
gen zoals drukval, weerstand, zwaartekracht en massatraagheid. Het dynamische leiding
model reageert op druk wisselingen aan beide zijden en houdt ook rekening met leiding-
buffer: de hoeveelheid gas opgeslagen in de pijp op een zeker moment. Verder nemen de
modellen voor compressor en reduceer stations, de besturingsmodus en het regelbereik in
aanmerking, die wezenlijk zijn bij een automatische regelaar. Het regelbereik is gemod-
elleerd in termen van grenzen op de variabelen van het betreffende onderdeel. De grenzen
zijn bijvoorbeeld: maximum uitlaatdruk, minimum inlaatdruk, maximum as- en aandri-
jfvermogen en maximum volume- en massastroom. Het modelleren van deze grenzen is
buitengewoon belangrijk voor leveringszekerheid studies, daar deze grenzen bepalend zijn
of het systeem om kan gaan met een verstoring of niet. Verder zijn de toestand open en
dicht van afsluiterstations ook gemodelleerd als besturingsmodi.
Het model voor ondergrondse gasopslag houdt rekening met het injectie- en zendpro-
ces, en de hoeveelheid opgeslagen gas in de berging. De beperkingen van injectie- en
zendstroom wordt gemodelleerd middels een contour die de operationele mogelijkhe-
den aangeeft in termen van injectie- en zendstroom en vulling. Verschillende buffer-
types, zoals uitgeputte gasvelden, zoutcavernes of aquiferopslag kunnen gemodelleerd
worden middels parameters van de contour. De LNG-hervergassingsinstallatie neemt ook
de maximum hervergassingstroom en het werkgasvolume mee. Het arriveren van LNG
schepen kan worden ingepland waarbij de aankomst-tijd en de grootte van het schip en
de maximale ontlaadstroom van het schip naar de terminal, meegenomen wordt. LNG-
hervergassingsinstallaties en ondergrondse bergingen kunnen gestuurd worden op druk- of
gasstroom zolang de andere stationsgrenzen niet overschreven worden. Er zijn voedings-
en leveringstations zoals: productie velden, gascentrales, stadslevering en import en ex-
port stations, waarvan de laatste meestal uitgevoerd zijn met reduceers en gasstroom me-
ters. De druk bij deze stations moet binnen grenzen blijven en ook de stroom is beperkt.
Voeding- en leveringstations zijn gestuurd op druk- of gasstroom zolang de stationsgrenzen
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niet overschreden worden. De individuele deelmodellen zijn met elkaar verbonden tot een
totaal gas-systeemmodel door toepassing van de integrale vorm van de continuïteitsvergeli-
jking. Door plaats-discretisatie verkrijgt men een verzameling differentiaalvergelijkingen
in tijd. Deze kunnen opgelost worden met een impliciete tijdsintegratiemethode. Het dan
verkregen stelsel niet lineaire vergelijkingen kan iteratief opgelost worden waarbij er bij
iedere iteratie gelineariseerd wordt.
Ontwikkeling van de simulator
Het gas-simulatiemodel is vorm gegeven in het simulatieprogramma met de naam SAInt
(Scenario Analysis Interface for Energy Systems). Met SAInt kan het netwerk gevisu-
aliseerd worden, er kunnen scenario’s opgesteld worden en een netwerk met een scenario
kan doorgerekend worden, waarbij de resultaten getoond worden. SAInt is opgedeeld in
twee modules, SAInt-API (Application Programming Interface) en SAInt-GUI (Graphical
User Interface). De API is de hoofd bibliotheek met modules voor het oplossen van al
de vergelijkingen op netwerk niveau en voor de verschillende onderdelen (knooppunten,
leidingen, compressors, enz.). De API is onafhankelijk van de GUI en kan afzonderlijk
gebruikt worden in andere .NET omgevingen (b.v. MS Excel, Visual Studio, IronPython,
enz.). SAInt-GUI is de grafische gebruikersomgeving waarmee de gebruiker op een visuele
manier de API kan gebruiken. De GUI gebruikt de modules van de API om door de
gebruiker gewenste simulaties uit te voeren.
Elektrisch systeem model
Het model van het elektrische systeem is gebaseerd op optimale wisselstroom netwerk
berekening met de naam AC-OPF (AC-optimal power flow). AC-OPF bevat deelmodellen
voor de belangrijkste onderdelen zoals elektriciteitsleidingen, transformatoren, knooppun-
ten, generatoren, leveringen en tevens capacitieve en reactieve belastingen. Het basis AC-
OPF model voldoet aan de actieve en reactieve vermogenbalans. De beperkingen van
de elektriciteitsleidingen, reactief vermogen contouren van de generatoren en spanningen
op knooppunten worden meegenomen. Het basis AC-OPF model is uitgebreid met af-
schakelbare leveringen en overgangsbeperkingen zoals maximale toenamesnelheid en de
benodigde tijd om aan of uit te zetten. Het model voor afschakelbare leveringen maakt
het mogelijk dat leveringen gekort worden op basis van individuele prioriteiten.
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Koppeling van het gas- en elektriciteitssysteem
De modellen van het gas- en elektriciteitsysteem zijn aan elkaar gekoppeld via gascen-
trales, elektrisch aangedreven compressoren en LNG hervergassingsinstallaties. Een gas-
centrale is tegelijkertijd een generator in het elektriciteitsysteem en een gaslevering vanuit
het gas-systeem. De gaslevering in termen van chemische vermogen is een kwadratische
functie van het generator vermogen. Omgekeerd is een elektrisch aangedreven compressor,
die de druk voor transport in het gas-systeem verhoogt, een levering vanuit het elektrische
systeem. Het geleverde elektrische vermogen is equivalent aan het gevraagde vermogen om
een gas-stroom van de inlaat druk tot de uitlaatdruk te brengen. De koppeling via de LNG
hervergassingsinstallatie wordt beschreven met een kwadratische functie die aangeeft hoe
het elektrisch vermogen afhangt van de hervergassings-stroom van de LNG-installatie.
Co-Simulatie raamwerk om de leveringszekerheid vast te stellen
Door het dynamische gas-simulatiemodel en het AC-OPF model voor een elektrische sys-
temen en de koppelingsvergelijkingen samen te voegen ontstaat een raamwerk waarmee
de leveringszekerheid van een geïntegreerd gas- en elektriciteitsysteem kan worden vast-
gesteld. Het co-simulatie raamwerk bestaat uit twee gesepareerde omgevingen, te weten
de gassimulator (SAInt) en de simulator voor het elektrische systeem (MATPOWER).
De communicatie en data uitwisseling tussen SAInt en MATPOWER is vorm gegeven
middels een koppeling die geïmplementeerd is in SAInt en gebruik maakt van de "Mat-
lab Automation Server". Hiermee worden MATLAB commando’s uitgevoerd, data uit-
gewisseld middels "Matlab workspace variables" en is het mogelijk de topologie van een
elektriciteitsnetwerk en de simulatieresultaten weer te geven. Deze co-simulatie koppel-
ing zorgt ook voor de koppelingsvergelijkingen tussen beide simulatie modellen. Met het
co-simulatie raamwerk is het mogelijk een casus te bestuderen van een gecombineerd
gas- en elektriciteitsnetwerk van een Europese regio. Om het effect van onvoorziene om-
standigheden te onderzoeken worden drie verschillende scenario’s doorgerekend. Het eerste
scenario komt overeen met normale sturing zonder uitval. De resultaten daarvan kunnen
dienen ter vergelijk met die van het tweede scenario met gas uitval en derde scenario
met elektrische uitval. De resultaten van de simulatie tonen aan hoe een verstoring in één
systeem doordringt in het andere systeem. In het tweede scenario worden bij voorbeeld
drie grote gasvoedingstations afgeschakeld zodat een aantal gascentrales automatisch uit-
gaan, vanwege onvoldoende druk op het brandstofgaspunt. Deze verstoring zet zich door
in andere knooppunten van het elektriciteitssysteem met als gevolg dat elektriciteitslev-
eringen gekort worden teneinde de spanning op die knooppunten niet onderuit te laten
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gaan. Gelijksoortige verschijnselen zijn opgetreden bij het derde scenario waar het weg-
vallen van duurzame energie en het afschakelen van een grote elektriciteitscentrale er toe
leiden dat een gascentrale moet opschakelen, hetgeen op zijn beurt er weer toe leid dat
de druk in het gas-systeem onderuitgaat, met als gevolg dat gascentrales uitgeschakeld
worden. De belasting van het elektriciteitsysteem kan er zelfs toe leiden dat de spanning
in knooppunten te laag zouden worden hetgeen voorkomen wordt door de leveringen op
die knooppunten te korten.
Gecombineerde simulatie van Gas- en Elektriciteitsnetwerken
Met het co-simulatie raamwerk kan de verbreiding van een verstoring van het ene en-
ergiesysteem naar het andere vorm gegeven worden. Vanwege de opzet van het framewerk
zijn er echter een aantal aspecten die niet goed doorwerken. Er is geen directe terugkoppel-
ing tussen beide energie systemen omdat de simulaties separaat worden uitgevoerd. Het
elektriciteitsysteem wordt gesimuleerd over een dag (24 uur) en de vermogens van de gas-
centrales worden gebruikt om de brandstoflevering uit het gassysteem te berekenen. Deze
gasleveringen worden op hun beurt weer gebruikt bij de simulatie van het gas-systeem
om te kunnen testen of de druk op afleverpunten binnen de grenzen blijft. Als druk
op deze afleverpunten onderuit dreigt te gaan worden de brandstofleveringen in het gas-
systeem gekort. Bij een volgende simulatie van het elektriciteitsysteem zijn de generatoren
minder inzetbaar vanwege lagere brandstof stromen en worden de berekende vermogens
ten behoeve van elektrisch aangedreven compressoren en LNG installaties gebruikt. De
beperkingen die voortvloeien uit een gas-systeemsimulatie reduceren de capaciteit van
de generatoren in het elektriciteitsysteem met als gevolg dat leveringen van het elek-
triciteitssysteem gekort worden om het systeem in balans te houden. Het bovenstaande
wordt herhaald tot er een aanvaardbare oplossing is gevonden voor beide systemen.
In werkelijkheid hebben de veranderingen in één systeem onmiddellijk effect of de waar-
den van de variabelen in het andere systeem (b.v. druk, leidingbuffer, spanning, voeding
en levering) hetgeen direct terug kan slaan op het systeem waar de verandering begon.
Dit domino-effect kan niet adequaat met co-simulatie behandeld worden, omdat het sep-
arate simulaties zijn. Een ander punt is dat het korten van leveringen van het elek-
triciteitsysteem direct plaats vind bij knooppunten waarbij de spanning onderuit dreigt
te gaan. Onderlinge prioriteiten tussen leveringen van het elektriciteitsysteem worden
niet meegenomen. Ten slotte worden overgangsbegrenzingen van elektrische generatoren,
zoals opschakeltijd en de tijd nodig om aan en uit te zetten niet meegenomen, waardoor
de beschikbare generatorcapaciteit overschat wordt.
LOm aan deze bezwaren tegemoet te komen is een quasi-dynamisch simulatiemodel on-
twikkeld en geïmplementeerd in SAInt. Het gecombineerde simulatiemodel bestaat uit het
dynamische gas-systeem-model, het uitgebreide AC-OPF model en de koppelingsvergeli-
jkingen. Deze drie model elementen zijn geïntegreerd in een gecombineerd model met
gemeenschappelijke tijdstappen.
Bovendien kunnen de beide systemen op elkaar regeren op basis van vooraf gestelde
voorwaarde. De besturing van een gasgenerator in het elektriciteitsysteem kan afhankelijk
zijn van de toestand in het gas-systeem. Het opstarten of uitschakelen van een gascentrale
kan bij voorbeeld gebaseerd zijn op het volume in een leidingbuffer.
Leveringszekerheidparameters kunnen gedefinieerd worden, zoals absolute of relatieve niet
geleverde energie of overlevingstijd. Hiermee kan de invloed van een verstoring gemeten
worden en het effect van maatregelen om de verstoring te verhelpen. De mogelijkheden
van gecombineerde simulatie wordt duidelijk gemaakt aan de hand van een casus van
een gecombineerd gas- en elektriciteitsnetwerk. De casus bestaat uit drie scenario’s met
verstoringen en maatregelen om de verstoringen te verhelpen.
In het eerste scenario wordt een gasgenerator gesimuleerd die als reserve staat en als back-
up fungeert voor variërende en uitvallende elektriciteit gegenereerd door een windturbine.
In het tweede scenario wordt uitval van een gascompressor gesimuleerd wat leidt tot
verminderde leveranties vanuit het gas-systeem en mogelijk tot een vertraagde start van
een back-up generator vanwege drukbeperkingen in het gas-systeem. Deze vertraagde
start van de gasgenerator zorgt ervoor dat het totaal opgewekte vermogen beperkt is wat
aanleiding kan geven tot beperkingen van leveringen op basis van prioriteiten.
De invloed op de leveringszekerheid per systeem wordt vergeleken met behulp van de
leveringszekerheidsparameters. In termen van niet geleverd vermogen is de invloed van
een verstoring groter voor het gas-systeem dan voor het elektriciteitsysteem. De relatieve
invloed van een verstoring is echter groter in het elektriciteitsysteem dan in het gas-
systeem. Ten slotte wordt in het laatste scenario de effectiviteit van maatregelen om een
verstoring van een gascompressor station te verhelpen, bekeken. Als maatregel wordt de
zendcapaciteit van een naburige berging maximaal ingezet als het leidingbuffervolume
van de door de compressor beleverde regio beneden een bepaalde waarde komt. De simu-




Met de modellen en programma’s uit dit proefschrift is het belang aangetoond om de wed-
erzijdse afhankelijkheden tussen gas- en elektriciteitsystemen mee te nemen als men de
betrouwbaarheid van deze kritische infrastructuren wil kunnen inschatten. De informatie
die men met deze modellen verkrijgt kan gebruikt worden om de coördinatie tussen gas-
en elektriciteitsysteemoperators te kunnen verbeteren. Gas- en elektriciteitsysteemopera-
tors kunnen bij voorbeeld een strategie ontwikkelen om samen te werken bij een reactie op
verstoringen die effect hebben op beide systemen. Strategieën kunnen ontwikkeld worden
met behulp van de simulatiemodellen en programma’s die in dit proefschrift ontwikkeld
zijn, en de effectiviteit, risico’s en knelpunten kunnen vergeleken worden. De ingeschatte
gevolgen op de leveringszekerheid, die met deze modellen berekend zijn, kunnen ook ge-
bruikt worden voor risicoanalyse van gecombineerde systemen zodat potentiële risico’s ten
aanzien van leveringszekerheid duidelijk worden. De resultaten van een risicoanalyse kun-
nen gebruikt worden om preventieve acties en noodplannen te ontwikkelen die weer getest
kunnen worden met het simulatie model. Bovendien kunnen de ontwikkelde modellen
gebruikt worden om toekomstige vraagstukken op het gebied van wederzijdse afhankeli-
jkheden van gas- en elektriciteitsystemen te beantwoorden. Eén van deze vraagstukken
betreft Power-to-Gas. Hoe moeten deze installaties ingezet en bestuurd worden in een
geïntegreerd gas- en elektriciteitsysteem en wat is de invloed als er gasinjecties zijn met





• K. A. Pambour, R. T. Sopgwi, B.-M. Hodge, and C. Brancucci, “The Value of
Day-Ahead Coordination of Power and Natural Gas Network Opera-
tions,” in Energies, vol. 11, no. 7, pp. 1628, 2018.
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “SAInt -
A novel quasi-dynamic Model for assessing Security of Supply in coupled
Gas and Electricity Transmission Networks,” in Applied Energy, vol. 203, pp.
829 – 857, 2017.
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “Devel-
opment of a simulation framework for analyzing Security of Supply in
integrated gas and electricity systems,” Applied Sciences, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 47,
2017.
• K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “An integrated transient
model for simulating the operation of natural gas transport systems,” in
Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, vol. 28, pp. 672 – 690, 2016.
• B. Cakir Erdener, K. A. Pambour, R. B. Lavin, and B. Dengiz, “An integrated
simulation model for analysing electricity and gas systems,” in Interna-
tional Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, vol. 61, no. 0, pp. 410 – 420,
2014.
Peer-Reviewed Conference Paper
• K. A. Pambour, B. Cakir Erdener, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. J. Dijkema, “An
integrated simulation tool for analyzing the operation and interdepen-
dency of natural gas and electric power systems,” in Pipeline Simulation
Interest Group (PSIG) Conference 2016.
LIV
Conference Papers
• K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, and G. P. Dijkema, “SAInt – A simulation
tool for analysing the consequences of natural gas supply disruptions,”
in Pipeline Technology Conference (PTC) 2016.
• N. Zaccarelli, N. Rodríguez-Gomez, K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, “To-
wards EUGas-26: The European gas assessment model for EU Directive
2008/14/EC and EU regulation no 994/2010,” in International Gas Union
Research Conference 2014.
• N. Rodríguez-Gomez, N. Zaccarelli, K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, “Scenario
analysis of gas crisis using the European Gas Assessment Model (EU-
Gas),” in International Gas Union Research Conference 2014.
Science and Policy Reports
• B. Cakir Erdener, K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, “Interdependencies be-
tween Natural Gas and Power - Development of a Strategy for Modelling
Interdependencies,” in European Union - JRC Science Hub, 2015.
• B. Cakir Erdener, K. A. Pambour, R. Bolado-Lavin, “Interdependencies be-
tween Natural Gas and Power - Scenario Analysis and Recommendations
to MS,” in European Union - JRC Science Hub, 2015.
LV
Author Biography
Kwabena Addo Pambour was born on December 13, 1983 in Accra, Ghana. In August
1992, he moved to city of Essen in Germany, where he attended primary school at
Krainbruch Grundschule Essen-Dellwig, and secondary and high school at Gesamtschule
Essen-Borbeck. In June 2003 he graduated from high school and joined the German
military to complete his nine month national military service with the 3. Wachbataillon
BMVg located in Siegburg/Bonn, Germany. After his military service, he was awarded
a six year scholarship by Evangelisches Studienwerk e.V. Villigst for his achievements in
high school (Abitur) and his engagement in the Pentecostal Church Community.
In October 2014, he started studying Mechanical Engineering at Ruhr-University in
Bochum, Germany and continued his studies in October 2006 at RWTH Aachen Uni-
versity, in Aachen, Germany, where he specialized in Aeronautical Engineering. From
September 2007 to June 2008, he completed part of his studies in a study-abroad program
at University of California, Davis, United States (UC Davis), which was sponsored by
Evangelisches Studienwerk e.V. Villigst.
After his study-abroad, he continued his studies at RWTH Aachen University, where he
graduated with the German degree Diplom-Ingenieur in Mechanical Engineering (Dipl.-
Ing., equivalent to M.Sc.) in June 2010. In June 2011, he was awarded the prestigious
Springorum-Medal by RWTH Aachen University. In parallel, Kwabena studied Business
Administration at RWTH Aachen University, which he completed in September 2011
with the German degree Diplom-Wirtschaftsingenieur (Dipl.- Wirt.Ing., equivalent to
MBA).
After his studies, he was employed by the European Commission (EC) - Joint Research
Centre (JRC) - Directorate (C) for Energy, Transport and Climate, in Petten, the
Netherlands, from May 2011 to May 2014 as a scientific researcher to conduct research
in the area of security of energy supply. After his employment at EC-JRC, he worked
as a software consultant and engineer for LIWACOM, the vendor of the gas network
simulation software SIMONE.
In December 2014, he started his PhD research as an external PhD student at University
of Groningen, the Netherlands, in the Energy and Sustainability Research Institute of
the Faculty of Science and Engineering.
LVI
In January 2017, Kwabena founded cleaNRGi Solutions GmbH, a energy startup devoted
to providing software and engineering solutions to the challenges connected to the
integration of renewable energy sources into existing energy infrastructures.
During his research, Kwabena developed the simulation software SAInt, which is used by
the EC-JRC, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), situated in Golden,
Colorado, USA and many other organisations. Furthermore, he wrote and presented
several papers at international conferences. He published five peer-reviewed journal
articles and a peer-reviewed conference paper.
